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Which Is the Fairest One of All?
A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
JAMES KONOW1

N

o man during, either the whole of his life, or
that of any considerable part of it, ever trod
steadily and uniformly in the path … of justice,
… whose conduct was not principally directed
by a regard to the sentiments of the supposed
impartial spectator, of the great inmate of the
breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct.
– Adam Smith (1759) p. 357

1. Introduction
Justice arguments are now widely invoked
to improve theoretical and empirical analysis
in nearly every field of economics.
Incorporated into game theory (e.g.,
Matthew Rabin 1993), fairness predicts the
deviations from pure self-interest observed in
many laboratory experiments (e.g., Werner
Güth and Reinhard Tietz 1990). Its impact
has also been cited in many real-world contexts, including the intermittent failure of
product markets to clear (Daniel Kahneman,
1
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Charness, James Devine, Jon Elster, Duncan Foley, Simon
Gächter, Wulf Gaertner, Guillermina Jasso, SergeChristophe Kolm, Alexander Kritikos, Axel Ockenfels, Joe
Oppenheimer, Richard Posner, Matthew Rabin, Erik
Schokkaert, John T. Scott, Alois Stutzer, Peyton Young, Ed
Zajac, and participants at the meetings of the Public
Choice Society, Social Choice and Welfare Society, and
International Society for Justice Research for many helpful suggestions and comments. Any remaining errors or
shortcomings are, of course, my own. I also thank Jack
Knetsch for permission to use questions from Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986).

Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler 1986); resolution of social choice problems such as
locating nuclear-waste facilities (Felix
Oberholzer-Gee, Iris Bohnet, and Bruno
Frey 1997); public-utility regulation (Edward
Zajac 1985); and labor unemployment due to
efficiency wages (e.g., George Akerloff and
Janet Yellen 1990). The view that “By now we
have substantial evidence suggesting that
fairness motives affect the behavior of many
people” (Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt
1999) is expressed in mainstream economics.
This contrasts with the traditional belief of
many economists that justice is chimerical or
amorphous. A more sympathetic stance
placed it outside the domain of economics,
better left to philosophers, political scientists,
or sociologists. There has been a steady
trend, however, of increasing interest in and
acceptance of justice in the economics profession, even partially displacing efficiency.2
This is not to say, of course, that economists
are or should be abandoning their traditional
2
This is suggested, for example, by an examination of
studies documented on EconLit. The number of entries for
the 1970s under the keyword “efficiency” outnumber those
under “justice” or “fairness” (not counting those under the
equivocal term “equity”) by sixteen to one. For the 1980s
this ratio falls to about nine to one, and for the 1990s this
gap further narrows to 4.4 to one. In fact, if one considers
entries under the JEL classification system in operation
since 1991 through the present, hits under the code closest
to justice (D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other
Normative Criteria and Measurement) outnumber those
under that closest to efficiency (D61: Allocative Efficiency;
Cost-Benefit Analysis) almost two to one.
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interest in efficiency. Instead, stimulated by
empirical evidence and, perhaps, the perception of increasing economic inequality, they
are expanding their studies to encompass a
wider set of distributive concerns. Despite
the emerging consensus in economics over
the relevance of fairness, though, no such
agreement yet exists among economists or,
for that matter, among psychologists, political
scientists, sociologists, or philosophers, about
the proper theory of justice.
1.1 Two Goals of the Study
One goal of this paper is to conduct a positive analysis of leading positive and normative
theories of justice, where a remarkable lacuna
exists in the literature.3 By positive analysis I
mean that each theory, whether originally
conceived for this purpose or not, will be
evaluated in terms of how accurately it
describes the fairness preferences of people.
In this paper, the terms fairness, justice, and
equity always refer to the view of Adam
Smith’s impartial spectator whose judgment is
not biased by any personal stake. The discussion includes both distributive justice, which
concerns fair outcomes, as well as procedural
justice, which addresses fair processes,
whereby the more extensive treatment of the
former reflects the relative emphasis in the
justice literature. Justice is operationalized
here mostly in relation to material wealth, the
chief concern of most economists, even
though it is clear that the forces discussed
often impact noneconomic domains. Other
factors that affect allocations include altruism,
reciprocity, spite, kinship, and friendship.
These are significant but distinct phenomena,
which nevertheless underscore the import
and timeliness of studying justice, given growing evidence that some behavior previously
attributed to these forces (especially reciprocity) is likely due to distributive preferences.
3
There are, however, excellent surveys on more narrow
topics from which this paper has also profited, e.g.,
Bernard Cullen (1994) reviews normative philosophical
theories and Erik Schokkaert (1994) normative economic
theories.

1189

A second, closely related goal of the paper
is to propose and defend an integrated justice
theory that synthesizes previous approaches
and explains actual values as the conflation of
four distinct forces or elements. These elements of justice inspire four corresponding
theoretical categories (or families) into which
each of the theories is placed and analyzed.
The category equality and need covers theories that incorporate a concern for the wellbeing of the least well-off members of society including egalitarianism, social contract
theories (chiefly Rawls), and Marxism. They
inspire the Need Principle, which calls for
the equal satisfaction of basic needs. The
utilitarianism and welfare economics family
comprises utilitarianism, Pareto Principles,
and the absence of envy concept, which have
grown out of consequentialist ethics, or the
tradition in philosophy and economics that
emphasizes consequences and end-states.
They are most closely associated with the
Efficiency Principle, which advocates maximizing surplus. The category equity and
desert includes equity theory, desert theory,
and Robert Nozick’s theory. Together they
inform the Equity Principle, which is based
on proportionality and individual responsibility. The context family discusses the ideas of
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler; Michael
Walzer; Jon Elster; H. Peyton Young; and
Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer, among others.
This fourth family does not generate a distributive principle but rather deals with the
dependence of justice evaluation on the context, such as the choice of persons and variables, framing effects, and issues of process.4
4
When dealing with such an extensive literature, even a
wide-ranging review cannot be comprehensive. Although I
have striven to include the most influential theories of justice, some theories are omitted because they are not primarily theories of justice (e.g., game theories), or because
their focus is more remote from the subject matter of economics (e.g., juridical theories), or because their incorporation into the four elements that frame the study seems
forced (rights theories). Actually, the paper seeks to represent the breadth of the literature in a relatively concise
manner by treating many theories while focusing on those
aspects of each that contribute to the integrated theory.
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While proceeding through the sometimes
intricate analysis that follows, the reader can
better maintain a sense of unity if he or she
keeps in mind the dual goals of this paper and
the framework that structures them. On the
one hand, the specific theories discussed
offer very different, and sometimes contradictory, perspectives on the meaning of justice. On the other hand, I argue for a general
theory of justice as a unifying framework for
the specific theories. These ostensibly dissonant objectives are reconciled by the following two facts. First, the general theory guides
the classification of a specific theory into the
category (i.e., element of the general theory)
that is judged as most helpful for distilling the
specific theory’s most salient contribution to
understanding actual justice views.
Nevertheless, the evidence, taken as a whole,
does not confirm any single theory in toto and
sometimes even refutes central suppositions
or conclusions. Both favorable and unfavorable evidence on the specific theories, however, produces lessons for the general theory.
Second, it should be emphasized that the
general framework around which the analysis
is organized is an integrated theory, but not a
composite theory: justice is more than the
sum of its parts. The three principles of justice must be weighted, and context provides
the weighting scheme in specific cases. The
argument is that each category captures an
element that is important to crafting a positive theory of justice but that no single family
or theory within a family suffices to this end.
Instead, fairness views are best explained by
an integrated approach that acknowledges
the influence of the three principles of justice, whereby the weight on each is determined by the context. This method enables
one to treat justice rigorously and to reconcile
results that often appear contradictory or at
odds with alternative theories.
1.2 Reasons for this Research Agenda
People justify their positions and behavior
in a wide range of situations based on justice,
for example, in connection with affirmative

action, global warming, labor-management
conflicts, “fair” trade negotiations, and
debates on the taxation of income, inheritances, and corporate dividends. The frequency and vehemence of such claims, often
accompanied by sacrifices, attest to a conviction on the part of the advocates regarding
both their normative value and their power
to persuade and, thereby, to alter outcomes.
These observations are significant because
they indicate that fairness, in fact, appeals to
a common moral sense, which, when applied
to specific cases, is subject to some interpretation. In particular, biases often emerge
when stakes are involved; e.g., Kenneth
Binmore (1994) reports a strong tendency by
subjects, when debriefed following bargaining experiments, to describe their self-serving decisions during the experiments as
“fair.” Various studies, including those of
Linda Babcock et al. (1995), Tore Ellingsen
and Magnus Johannesson (2003), and myself
(Konow 2000), trace this bias in large part to
deception, both of others and of oneself,
regarding what is fair. These studies also
indicate that, although biases sometimes
widen the range of predicted outcomes,
behavior is still constrained by fairness.
Thus, justice is not amorphous or arbitrarily
malleable, and, as I seek to show in this
paper, fairness preferences usually converge
when stakes are removed.
These facts suggest at least two important
reasons for seeking a descriptively accurate
theory of impartial justice. First, social scientists must consider how justice, alone or in
tandem with other goals (such as self-interest or reciprocity), affects the phenomena
they study. Although stakeholders often subject justice to biased and differing interpretations, in order to have moral force, their
claims cannot be capricious but must be
constructed around impartial standards.
Whereas observed behavior typically results
from multiple motives, a study of impartial
justice consciously aims at separating the
effects of unbiased justice, biased justice,
and other motives.
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A second important motivation for a study
of impartial justice concerns normative and
policy analysis in philosophy, law, and the
social sciences. One specific purpose is in the
area of conflict resolution: given the aforementioned fairness biases that often insinuate
themselves into legal, economic, and political
debates, impartial justice provides a standard
against which to evaluate and reconcile conflicting interests. In more general terms, the
appropriate role of such a study for normative
analysis depends on one’s stance on certain
questions of moral epistemology (i.e., how
one knows what is moral). Some scholars find
the impartial values of real people to be a
compelling foundation for an ethical theory.
As Tibor Scitovsky puts it, “An important part
of the economist’s task is to find out how well
the production and distribution of goods and
services conform to the public’s wishes. The
first thing to ascertain in this connection is
what the public’s wishes are” (1986, p. 3).
Philosophers, including Mill, Rawls, Nozick,
and Walzer, tacitly acknowledge the merit of
this approach by asserting that crucial premises of their theories are consonant with generally accepted values. Even those who would
derive prescriptive theories in another manner cannot ignore the actual preferences
their own theories will confront. As the bromide “ought implies can” suggests, any normative theory with a claim to relevance must
direct actions that are sustainable in the real
world of real values.
1.3 Empirical Method
Fairness is widely regarded as a motive
behind much behavior observed in the real
world (or the “field”), a view substantiated by
results of quasi-field studies that actually ask
implicated parties about their motives, such
as Babcock, Xianghong Wang, and George
Loewenstein (1996); Alan S. Blinder and
Don H. Choi (1996); and David I. Levine
(1993). Fairness, however, is often offset or
reinforced by other motives, such as selfinterest, public spirit, friendship, and reciprocal altruism (see Frey, Oberholzer-Gee,
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and Reiner Eichenberger 1996 for an interesting example of how several such concerns
interact in the area of social choice).
Unfortunately, field studies, though often
useful for demonstrating the impact of fairness, are usually not designed for evaluating
theories of fairness. Ones that elicit motives,
such as those mentioned above, are few,
and competing forces always threaten to
undermine clear inferences about fairness.
The evidence brought here to bear on the
justice theories is marshaled from numerous
studies spanning different disciplines and
employing various methods. Because of the
afore-mentioned difficulties with inferring
ethical intent from behavior in the field,
however, the results cited are largely from
studies that utilize experimental and survey
designs. In moral contexts, these methods
permit better control over confounding factors and stronger statements about causality.
In particular, the primary goal is to track the
values of the impartial spectator rather than
the implicated stakeholder.5 Much of the
evidence presented, therefore, comes from
studies that encourage participants to prescind and abstract from personal stakes. The
survey method, in particular, exhibits low
self-interest bias in general attitude surveys
(e.g., of support for income redistribution
as in Christina Fong 2001) as well as in
vignettes, or questions that present hypothetical scenarios and elicit preferences over
them (e.g., Menahem Yaari and Maya
Bar-Hillel 1984). An advantage of experiments, on the other hand, is that they provide behavioral measures of preferences and
demonstrate the willingness to act on them
when stakes are involved. One drawback of
this method for the current purpose, however, is that the stakes in most experiments are

5
Numerous studies have exposed a self-serving bias in
fairness judgments by stakeholders in the field, e.g.,
Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein (1996), as well as in the
laboratory, e.g., John Kagel et al. (1996) and Konow (2000).
David Messick and Keith Sentis (1979) have found this
stakeholder bias even when payments are hypothetical.
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personal and contribute to a self-serving
bias. Another is that even clear departures
from self-interest cannot necessarily be
attributed to justice as opposed to other
preferences since motives are usually not
elicited. This paper attempts to balance
these concerns by establishing corroborative
patterns across evidence from both experiments and surveys.
Since many surveys and all experiments
cited here use student subjects, the question
arises as to whether this group is representative of the general population. In the most
comprehensive examination of subject pool
effects in economics experiments, Sheryl
Ball and Paula-Ann Cech (1996) report the
results of various studies, including ones relevant to justice such as bargaining and public goods experiments, which compare student and non-student populations. With one
exception, they “find little evidence of subject pool effects” between different populations. The available evidence on such effects
from fairness surveys points in the same
direction. For instance, many of the
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986)
results from telephone interviews with
Canadian adults have been substantially
replicated, including with adult populations
in Germany and Switzerland (Frey and
Werner Pommerehne 1993) and with U.S.
adults and college students (Konow 2001,
and the current study). Erik Schokkaert and
Bart Capeau (1991) relate judgments of
Belgian respondents about fair distributions
of gains and losses in diverse scenarios to
subject pool choice and to the socio-economic characteristics of subjects. They compare
results from Schokkaert and Bert Overlaet
(1989) with 243 college students enrolled in
an introductory economics course, Overlaet
(1991) with 234 parents of a different group
of economics students, and their own survey
with a representative sample of 810 adults
from the general population. The authors
find that the three groups exhibit generally
the same pattern of choices and conclude
that “there is no need to worry” about the use

of convenience samples. After biasing their
representative sample study in favor of subject pool effects by selecting the most controversial questions from the student/parent
survey, Schokkaert and Capeau relate the
responses from the general population to
socio-economic variables including income,
sex, age, education, and profession. Based on
logit estimations, they conclude that the
“most striking fact is the extremely small
amount of variance which can be explained
using these equations. This is not completely
surprising … It is even rather comforting in
this case: if the answers to our cases really are
ethically inspired, one would not a priori
expect the socio-economic variables in our
equations to have much explanatory power”
(p. 337). Moreover, I will argue that, even
when significant differences across samples
surface, they are best explained not by different values but by patterned variations in
subject interpretation of a shared set of justice principles based on differences in subject information, experiences, or interests,
which is entirely consistent with, indeed is
predicted by, the theory proposed here (see
especially sections 4.2 and 5.2).
Many results cited here, including some
previously unpublished ones, make use of
vignettes. Numerous significant economic
studies have employed this method (e.g.,
Gordon B. Dahl and Michael R. Ransom
1999; Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979),
and it has proven especially useful for justice
research (e.g., Blinder and Choi 1990;
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986;
Levine 1993). Still, this method is less common in economics than, say, psychology, so I
will briefly review it and its application in the
present study. A characteristic feature of
vignettes is their contextual richness, which
has been shown to aid reasoning; e.g.,
William M. Goldstein and Elke U. Weber
(1995) report that when a problem is presented to people in abstract form, “they do
spectacularly bad at it,” whereas when it “is
fleshed out with understandable content,
there is remarkable improvement.” In
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addition, vignettes are less prone to the misunderstandings, caused by ambiguities about
relevant details, that often plague other
instruments. In fact, vignettes have been
used to improve surveys about “objective”
variables such as employment data (Elizabeth
Martin and Anne Polivka 1992). Moreover,
Marilyn Lewis Lanza et al. (1997) report evidence that responses to vignettes closely
reflect reactions to events in the real world.
An important strength of this method for justice research is that it offers a flexible and
easily controlled means to provide information that can prove relevant to fairness, for
example, details about effort or needs. The
answer formats may be qualitative or quantitative, but most studies cited here used the
former except where otherwise indicated. Of
course, a legitimate concern is that the content specificity of vignettes might limit the
generality of their results.6 A common
approach to this question is to examine the
robustness of claims through different questions or versions of questions that vary contextual elements. In fact, this also enables one
to establish evidence on the issue of whether
justice is context specific or whether common
principles apply across different contexts.
Another strategy is to compare results across
studies that employ other methods and data.
Both techniques are employed in this study:
for the new as well as previously published
results, claims are evaluated, where possible,
using multiple sources and methods.
Although there exists much evidence on
justice, some theories considered here have
not heretofore been examined as representations of impartial justice. For that reason,
this evidence is supplemented by previously
unpublished results drawn from a database
containing the responses of 3178 subjects to
6

A counterargument is that, given the abovementioned misgivings about decision-making in abstract
form, even a single vignette is more general by establishing
compelling findings in one, as opposed to no, context.
Indeed, in this author’s experience, conclusions based on
this method seem no less general when tested in different
contexts and with different methods than those derived
from abstract questions or experimental tasks.
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numerous vignettes of the author. These
comprise telephone interviews with a general adult population and written questionnaires completed by college students. The
surveys were designed and conducted to
produce meaningful results and to avoid
subject pool and response biases in line with
sound practices for survey research (e.g.,
Floyd J. Fowler 2002, and Jon A. Krosnick
1991). Fairness wording was explicitly used
for purposes of validity, i.e., to ensure the
instrument measures what it claims to measure, an important issue given evidence that
what is “fair” may differ from what is “good”
or what people prefer (see section 6).7
7
Other measures included the following. Different versions that comprised different subsets of the master list and
that varied the order of questions aimed at avoiding systematic order effects. When there were contrasting versions of a scenario, each subject faced at most one version
of a scenario in order not to encourage any tendency
toward overly similar or dissimilar responses across versions. A number of steps helped to minimize satisficing,
i.e., suboptimal cognitive processing: scenarios were formulated briefly and clearly to reduce task difficulty, and
answer formats were qualitative and simple, which has also
been shown to improve reliability (i.e., consistency on
retests). Relative to personal interviews, the telephone and
self-administered surveys we used afford greater anonymity and are associated with more candid responses. The telephone interviews were conducted on a random sample of
adults in Los Angeles, a city that, given its culturally diverse
and large immigrant population, is probably more representative of the world population than most samples.
Random digit dialing addressed issues of sample selection,
and, to promote attentiveness, each telephone interview
posed no more than five questions and lasted no longer
than five minutes. The response rate of 47 percent, considered good for telephone interviews, was achieved by brief
interviews, up to twelve attempts to contact respondents
and interviewing non-English speakers in their native
tongue. Written questionnaires were presented to students
in a wide range of undergraduate classes at Loyola
Marymount University and lasted no more than ten minutes. This written format was preferred for more intricate
scenarios, which telephone respondents tend to process
poorly. Although the telephone interviews drew from a
more general population, there were several other advantages of the written surveys. The questionnaires achieved
virtually a 100 percent-response rate and, by being selfadministered, reduced if not eliminated possible interviewer-induced bias. More educated respondents, such as these
college students, are also less susceptible to various types of
satisficing. Finally, several of the same or similar questions
were posed to both the adult and college respondents without large differences across samples, consistent with the
findings of Schokkaert and Capeau (1991) on this matter.

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1194

1194

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI (December 2003)

1.4 Organization of the Paper
Section 2 addresses equality and need,
section 3 covers utilitarianism and welfare
economics, section 4 is devoted to equity and
desert, and section 5 deals with context. The
paper’s development resembles a Hegelian
dialectic in which a theory is presented as a
thesis, often supported by evidence, only to
be confronted by its antithesis in the form of
counter-arguments and evidence contrary to
the theory. Ultimately, however, the goal is to
reach a synthesis of the theories at the end
of each section in the form of a principle or
lesson. Section 6 concludes with an even
broader approach that seeks to synthesize
the four elements of justice.
2. Equality and Need
Theories of equality and of need are usually characterized by a concern for the welfare of those in society who are the least
advantaged. Interpreted as a preference on
the part of real people for equally satisfying
basic human needs, they form a principle of
justice.
2.1. Egalitarianism
The most primitive, and probably oldest,
notion of justice associates equity with
equality. Justice has been construed as
equality of original positions, opportunity,
proportions and rights. Our discussion
begins with egalitarianism, by which I mean
the equality of outcomes. This simplest and
strongest notion of equality has often been
declared to be one of several principles of
justice (e.g., Morton Deutsch 1985).
Equality is also sometimes taken as a point of
departure for studies of inequality (e.g.,
Yoram Amiel and Frank A. Cowell 1999).
Kai Nielsen’s “radical egalitarian” concept of
distributive justice (1985) advocates the abolition of material inequalities.
Some social psychologists (e.g., Deutsch
1985; Gerold Mikula 1980) propose that
equality is the principle in a multi-criterion
system that is favored in cooperative as

opposed to competitive relationships.
Mikula and Thomas Schwinger (1973), for
example, study allocation decisions among
36 pairs of soldiers in the same unit who perform a task that generates joint earnings.
They find that many subjects who perform
well relative to their partners act against
their own interests and allocate earnings
equally, an effect that is stronger when subjects are paired with partners they like. This
result, which Mikula and his colleagues have
identified elsewhere (see Mikula 1980),
stands in stark contrast, however, to the
“self-interest” bias that almost all other
researchers find in allocation experiments
(e.g., Robert Forsythe et al. 1994; Elizabeth
Hoffman et al. 1994). The fact that each
group in Mikula’s experiments favors a rule
that is to its disadvantage, equality by high
performers and proportionality by low performers, suggests that his experimental
design is not capturing a distributive preference for equality, which should be shared by
all, but rather something closer to a “generosity bias” on the part of both groups. The
additional fact that this effect is stronger
when subjects like their partners reinforces
the impression that an interpersonal affinity
distinct from fairness is at work.
Numerous studies employing survey
designs are unfavorable to the descriptive
value of egalitarianism. One source of data is
from vignette studies of micro-justice, or of
fairness to and among individuals, such as
Konow (1996) and Schokkaert and Capeau
(1991). These indicate a frequent preference
for unequal allocations and that equal outcomes are only fair as a special case, e.g.,
when variables subjects consider relevant to
fairness happen to be equal across individuals. Survey studies of macro-justice, or of justice at the societal level, uniformly show
strong opposition to equal outcomes. When
the U.S. general public is asked about the
just distribution of income, only 7 percent of
938 respondents to the survey reported in
Herbert McCloskey and John Zaller (1984)
and 3 percent of the 1415 respondents in
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James Kluegel and Eliot Smith (1986) support complete or near equality of income. In
fact, Guillermina Jasso (1999) reports, based
on probability samples (N=8810), that if
people received what they consider just, the
distribution of income would be less, not
more, equal than the actual distribution in
eight of thirteen countries studied.
Despite widespread evidence of support
for departures from equal outcomes, equality can, as stated above, emerge as a special
case within a more general system, i.e., the
uncontroversial concept of “treating equals
equally.” In other cases, equality appears to
be invoked, not as a general principle, but as
a convenient approximation when the context renders “first-best” justice too complex
or thorny (see section 6). If the evidence
casts doubt on equality as one of several principles, it topples egalitarianism as the single
concern. Although complications can arise
implementing even this simple rule (e.g.,
does one equalize goods, income, or utility?),
the plethora of disputes over justice suggests
it is not as straightforward as equal outcomes.
2.2. Rawls and the Social Contract
The publication of John Rawls’s major
work, A Theory of Justice, in 1971 was a
landmark event in several respects. It provided the principal impetus to the resurgence of
interest in justice among philosophers, and
even many social scientists, during the twentieth century. In addition, the authors of
nearly every subsequent normative treatment
of justice have felt obliged to formulate their
theories within Rawls’s framework, or at least
to define their positions with reference to his
contribution. In part a critique of utilitarianism, A Theory of Justice builds upon the theory of the social contract associated with
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Equality plays a
central role in Rawls’s theory, as does duty,
including the duty to help those in need.
Rawls is concerned with social justice, or
“a standard whereby the distributive aspects
of the basic structure of society are to be
assessed” (p. 9). The principles of justice are
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those “that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would
accept in an initial position of equality” (p.
11). They are manifested as part of a social
contract, or an original agreement for the
basic structure of society. This agreement is
chosen in the original position, a hypothetical situation in which people are behind a
“veil of ignorance” of their places in society,
i.e., their social status, wealth, abilities,
strength, etc. Rawls argues that, since personal differences are unknown and everyone is rational and similarly situated, this
“veil of ignorance makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of
justice” (p. 140).
Competing contractarian theories of justice
have framed the question somewhat differently. Binmore (1994) and David Gauthier
(1985) employ game theory to examine the
emergence of justice through bargaining. In
his Treatise of Social Justice (1989), Brian
Barry rejects both the Rawlsian and gametheoretic approaches and suggests that principles of justice result, not from individual
choice or bargaining, but rather from debate
in which others are convinced of the reasonableness of principles, even if they run counter to their interests. Serge-Christophe Kolm’s
theory of the “liberal social contract” (1985)
departs from other contractarian theories in
several respects. Kolm’s contract is an agreement between real parties aware of their positions and not between fictitious individuals
behind a veil of ignorance, agreements may
be reached for subsets such that not all decisions require unanimity, and people are motivated not only by self-interest but also by
altruism. As in the case of the present study,
the goal of Brian Skyrms’s Evolution of the
Social Contract (1996) is descriptive rather
than normative. Specifically, Skyrms employs
evolutionary dynamics to explore the development of the existing implicit social contract.
Returning to Rawls, on whom we will
focus here, he claims two justice principles
would be chosen in the original position.
The first emphasizes equality, including
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equal rights, liberties, and opportunities.
The second principle (later called the difference principle) has been the subject of
greater commentary. Rawls himself states
this second principle as the general conception of his theory: “All social primary
goods—liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth and the bases of self-respect—are to
be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the
advantage of the least favored” (p. 303). The
difference principle, then, is a maximin rule
for the distribution of the goods, material
and other, that Rawls regards as primary.
The difference principle is the part of
Rawls’s theory that has generated the greatest volume of hostile reaction and on which
he is generally considered most vulnerable.
Kenneth Arrow (1973) and John Harsanyi
(1975) raise objections from the perspective
of welfare economics. Perhaps the most
damaging criticism, however, is of the psychological assumption that people in the
original position prefer to maximize minimum outcomes to the complete exclusion of
any other goals. Norman Frohlich and Joe
Oppenheimer (1992; 1987 with Cheryl
Eavey) have conducted various laboratory
experiments aimed at inducing the original
position. University students, assigned to
groups of five subjects, are introduced to
and tested on their understanding of four
distributive rules (including maximum
expected value and the difference principle).
The subjects then discuss the rules. If they
arrive at a unanimous agreement, they are
randomly assigned to different income classes and are paid according to income class
and group choice of rule. Subjects almost
always reach a consensus, and the vast
majority agree to a mixed rule: maximum
expected value subject to a constraint on the
minimum income. Rawls’s difference principle is the least favorite rule, being chosen by
only one of 81 groups. Similar results
emerge in experiments conducted in
Australia, Canada, Poland, Japan, and the
United States and in a replication that

purges the procedures of any explicit mention of justice or fairness (Paul Oleson 2001).
The experimental evidence on Rawlsian
justice seems to constitute a near-categorical
rejection
of
its
crucial
premise.
Nevertheless, legitimate questions can be
raised about the efficacy of the experimental
design. Passing through the laboratory door
is not necessarily equivalent to passing
through a veil of ignorance, and previously
formed knowledge and expectations might
taint subjects’ reasoning. In addition, the
structured discussion of the Frohlich and
Oppenheimer experiments resembles more
Barry’s debate leading to consensus than
Rawls’s perfect coincidence of individual
choices. On the other hand, this aspect does
seems to err in Rawls’s favor by allowing his
principle to be chosen even without identical individual preferences. If the difference
principle really represents shared values, it is
difficult to grasp why, even behind an imperfect veil, it does not emerge with greater frequency.
The question both Rawls and this study ask
is premised on a kind of impartiality. Rawls’s
thought experiment, however, involves individuals who are presumed to have a stake in
the outcome and who, by assumption, are
motivated in their choice of principles solely
by self-interest. Our question, by contrast,
concerns the choices of impartial spectators
who are not stakeholders and who are
assumed to be motivated by social preferences.8 In addition, we do not presume that
they deliberate over or even have any explicit
awareness of ethical theory, but only that their
preferences be guided by general principles
that can be deduced from their decisions.
The failure, therefore, of the Frohlich and
Oppenheimer experiments to confirm
Rawls’s hypothesis does not necessarily rule
8
This might seem like a difference without a distinction, but that is not so. For example, an egalitarian who is
risk-loving over his own allocations would prefer rules that
generate equal splits as impartial spectator but might favor
a very disperse distribution of outcomes in the original
position.
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TABLE 1. Questions 1A, 1B and 1C
1A. The owner of a small office supply store has two employees, Mike and Bill. They are equally productive and
hardworking and are both currently earning $7 per hour. The owner decides to move his store to a new location
nearby where he knows business will be better. He lets his workers know that if they wish to continue at the new
location he will be able to raise their wage. He explains that they will continue to have the same responsibilities but
that one worker will earn $8 per hour and the other $12 per hour. He also explains that which worker gets the higher wage will be determined later on the basis of a coin toss. The workers can choose to go with the owner to the
new location under these terms or to find similar work elsewhere for their current $7 per hour. They both choose
to go with the owner. Please rate the store ownerís terms for the new wages as:
Fair 14%
Unfair 86%
N  142
1B. Suppose Mike and Bill begin working for a computer software company at the same time and in the same
capacity. Initially they both earn a salary of $50,000 per year. After a trial period Mike demonstrates that he is hard
working, productive and performs far beyond initial expectations. Bill, on the other hand, is lazy, unproductive and
performs far below initial expectations. Their supervisor decides to give Mike a $10,000 per year raise and to cut
Billís salary by $1000. Please rate the supervisor’s decision to raise Mike’s salary and to cut Bill’s as:
Fair 80%
Unfair 20%
N  177
1C. Mike and Bill are identical twins who were reared in an identical family and educational environment. They
are the same in terms of physical and mental abilities, but Mike is more industrious than Bill. For that reason, after
they begin their careers Mike ends up earning more than Bill. Please indicate whether you view such a difference
in their earnings as:
Fair 99%
Unfair 1%
N  150

it out as a theory of justice in this other
sense. A different instrument, which purposely seeks to elicit views of impartial spectators, is better suited to this objective. In
this vein, the opposition cited to equal outcomes in the previous section is generally
unfavorable to Rawlsian justice. More specific evidence is provided by the vignettes in
table 1.9 Question 1A incorporates several
characteristics of Rawls’s thought experiment. Two individuals find themselves initially in a situation of equality, which is followed by a randomly determined state in
which their lots differ. Additionally, the proposed contract permits allocations that satisfy the difference principle: By accepting
the owner’s offer, they will both be better off
than initially (including the least advantaged
person), and they both even demonstrate
9
In this study, questions assigned the same number but
different letters (e.g., 1A, 1B, 1C) were always put to different groups of respondents. Questions from the written
questionnaires are identified by italicized question numbers (e.g., 1A), whereas ones from the telephone interviews
are identified by question numbers set in bold (e.g., 8A).

their preference for this unequal but
improved state by choosing it over an opportunity to duplicate the conditions of the initial state. Nevertheless, 86 percent of the
142 (N) respondents judge this contract
unfair.
A possible shortcoming of question 1A is
that respondents might reason that the
owner’s terms are unfair because they conjecture that the owner could also choose ex
post equality by raising the wages of both to
the same level (e.g., $10 per hour). One can
approach this problem differently. Rawlsian
respondents, in keeping with the difference
principle, should oppose any change that
leaves the least advantaged person worse off.
A corollary of this is that, beginning from a
position of equality, any change that makes
one person better off while making another
worse off is not fair. Question 1B tests this
corollary and finds that, in this context, 80
percent of the 177 respondents do, in fact,
support such a change, in opposition to
equality and to the difference principle.
Here the two parties appear similar, except
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with regard to effort and productivity.
Question 1C accentuates the equality of
starting positions of two individuals while
focusing on the role of differential effort,
and respondents almost unanimously view
unequal rewards as fair. The latter two questions highlight the fact that the drawbacks of
Rawls’s theory are not limited to what it contains but also to what it lacks. His framework
denies, or at least fails to assign any role to,
factors not due to the vagaries of “Nature.”
Question 1C, in particular, demonstrates
that inequalities can be fair even when
Nature bestows on individuals identical abilities and positions.
In defense of Rawls, his goal is to describe
the principles that govern the general structure of society, which, he claims, might differ
from those that apply in more specific cases
(p. 8), such as, perhaps, those above. On the
other hand, if they are genuinely general,
these principles must apply to a substantial
number of specific cases, a point he also
makes (p. 9), yet one is hard pressed to find
evidence of significant support for the difference principle. Nevertheless, other
aspects of Rawls’s theory resonate with popular values. In the context of duty, he stresses the importance of helping the needy,
although he grounds this rule on the selfinterested desire to insure oneself against
being a victim of misfortune (pp. 338–39).
Rawls’s attention to need and a kind of
impartiality probably represent his two most
significant contributions to justice theory.
2.3. Marxism
Justice is a highly controversial concept
among scholars of Marxism and has been
subject to very divergent interpretations.
Marx’s own treatment of justice is sparse,
and commentators have often read it as
rejecting justice, indeed the whole of morality, as a bourgeois construct that is specific
to context and history, and for which
socialism no longer has any use. Engels
writes that “justice is but the ideologised,
glorified expression of the existing economic

relationships” (Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels 1958, vol. 2, p. 128). Marx seems to
associate justice with rights and proportionality, which lead to inequalities. Instead, he
endorses the communist distributive principle, “From each according to his ability, to
each according to his needs!” (1875, p. 531).
Standing in contrast to these scant canonical writings is an extensive literature on
Marxian justice. Scholars of Marx have interpreted his view of justice as, in Marx’s words,
“obsolete verbal rubbish” of capitalism
(Allen Buchanan 1981), a critique of capitalism (Gary Young 1981), a juridical rather
than moral concept (Robert Tucker 1969;
Allen Wood 1981), and a set of historically
dependent principles that always reflect a
concern for equality and need (Jeffrey H.
Reiman 1981). Whether or not Marx thought
of justice in terms of need, this seems the
most promising approach for a Marxian theory (as opposed to a Marxian critique) of justice. There is no denying the centrality of
need as a principle of distribution for Marx.
Agnes Heller (1974), for example, writes
“We can see, then, that in the new economic
discoveries which Marx regarded as his own,
the concept of need plays one of the main
roles, if not actually the main role” (p. 25).
Experiments provide both implicit and
explicit evidence of need as a general distributive concern. In the dictator experiment,
one subject (the dictator) is given a fixed sum
of money, any amount of which he may share
with an anonymous counterpart, who has no
recourse. Catherine Eckel and Philip
Grossman (1996) conduct a dictator experiment in which some subjects allocate to
anonymous student counterparts and others
to an established charity. They find donations
to the presumably more needy charities to be
significantly greater than those to fellow students. In the ultimatum game experiment, a
proposer selects an offer to make to a responder, who can choose to accept, in which case
the pie is divided as proposed, or to reject, in
which no one gets anything. In the ultimatum games of David Kravitz and Samuel
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Gunto (1992), responders are more likely to
accept low offers from (unknown to them,
fictitious) proposers who appeal to their own
need. Wulf Gaertner, Jochen Jungeilges, and
Reinhard Neck (2001) find between 66 percent and 93 percent of 340 college students
surveyed prefer funding to satisfy the needs
of a handicapped child over educating an
intelligent child. It is unclear, however, from
these studies whether need is a justice principle or some other distributive motive.
Moreover, studies of macro-justice paint a
different picture. McCloskey and Zaller
(1984) report that only 20 percent in the
United States think a person’s wages should
depend on his needs versus the importance
of his job (N=938), and only 6 percent think
it would be fairer to pay people’s wages
according to economic need rather than
based on how hard they work (N=967).
Similarly, Kluegel and Smith (1986) find that
only 13 percent of 1468 U.S. respondents
think a person’s income should be based on
family needs rather than skills, although a
large minority of 41 percent agrees that it
would be fairer to pay people based on what
they needed to live rather than the kind of
work they do (N=669). These studies indicate that need affects distributive choices
and preferences but do not resolve whether
that fact is related to fairness.
2.4. The Need Principle
Basic needs often factored into the writings
of political economists who lived during much
earlier stages of economic development (e.g.,
Thomas Malthus 1798; Henry George 1879).
Today whole nations are protected from dire
need. Nevertheless, one out of every seven
people in the world still lives in hunger,
according to a United Nations agency
(www.wfp.org). The philosopher D. D.
Raphael (1980) appeals for the primacy of
equality and basic needs and claims that justice demands there be “a basic minimum for
all even if some of those affected could not
achieve it by their own efforts” (p. 56). Basic
needs are the material means considered “as
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essential for tolerable living” and should be
satisfied equally for all. Nevertheless, Raphael
argues one must consider not only need but
also utilitarian concerns, i.e., the effects on
incentives for efficiency: “Justice, then, is
thought to require a basic minimum of equal
satisfactions … Above that line, room is left
for individuals to do as they think fit” (p. 54).
Raphael’s comments imply, similar to
Rawls’, a lexicographic ordering of goals:
basic needs take priority over other concerns
but, once satisfied, attention turns to efficiency. The evidence cited above does suggest that people care not only about need but
also about adverse incentive effects of basing
allocations solely on need, which is why they
oppose it as the foundation for a system of
distribution. In addition, a scenario involving
a grant to an impoverished nation (Konow
2001) provides specific evidence that satisfaction of basic needs for food, shelter, and
clothing is considered “fair.” Moreover, as
efficiency is increasingly jeopardized in that
scenario, the concern for basic needs diminishes and is eventually overruled by efficiency, implying a tradeoff. Finally, in a survey
study by Helmut Lamm and Schwinger
(1980), respondents allocate earnings
between two students who require different
amounts of money to purchase their books.
Most divisions are unequal, with average allocations usually satisfying the differing needs.
The following conclusions seem consistent with the evidence presented here.
Empirical studies provide almost no support for egalitarianism, understood as
equality of outcomes, or for Rawls’s difference principle, although they do reveal a
concern for the least advantaged, in line
with core ideas of Marx, Rawls, and their
followers. The themes of equality and need
can be found in a more defensible rule I
will call the Need Principle: just allocations
provide for basic needs equally across individuals. Specifically, the evidence can be
reconciled with a multi-criterion justice
theory in which, as suggested by Raphael,
this concern tends to dominate when basic

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1200

1200

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI (December 2003)
TABLE 2. Question 2

2. Jane has baked 6 pies to give to her two friends, Ann and Betty, who do not know each other. Betty enjoys pie
twice as much as Ann. In distributing the pies, what is fairer:
A. 2 pies to Ann and 4 to Betty, or
40%
B. 4 pies to Ann and 2 to Betty, or
4%
C. 3 pies to each?
56%
N  211

needs are endangered. Nevertheless, when
needs differ across individuals, satisfying
needs at an equal level implies unequal
material allocations. In addition, this principle is not absolute: preferences over it are
not lexicographic but are instead consistent
with a trade-off between need and other
distributive goals.
3. Utilitarianism and Welfare Economics
Much evidence, such as that cited in the
previous section regarding efficiency, indicates that people care about outcomes at the
social, and not just individual, levels. The
theories discussed in this section share the
property that they reflect a concern for the
overall consequences of allocations or allocation schemes. In moral philosophy, these
belong to the school of consequentialist theories, which judge the rightness of an act
based on its consequences. These are contrasted, for example, with deontological theories, which stress the relevance of other factors, such as the Kantian concern with
intentions, in evaluating the morality of an
act. Most of normative economics is firmly
rooted in consequentialist ethics, having
grown philosophically out of the Utilitarian
traditions of Bentham and Mill. This is
apparent in the prominent place welfare
economics assigns to efficiency, a concern
we will consider as a principle of justice.
3.1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is the leading consequentialist theory of ethics and the chief forebear
in the lineage of welfare economics. It is the
moral doctrine that one should act so as to

produce the greatest possible balance of
good over bad, where good is understood to
mean happiness or pleasure. Jeremy
Bentham, who is responsible for the first
precise formulation of this theory (1789),
advocated what is sometimes called act utilitarianism. According to Bentham, one
should at every moment act so as to promote the greatest aggregate happiness. This
is contrasted with the views of another
famous utilitarian philosopher and political
economist, John Stuart Mill, who championed a version now usually called rule utilitarianism (1861). Mill proposed that one act
according to the general rules of conduct
that produce the greatest happiness (e.g.,
never lie, never steal), even if the rules do
not maximize aggregate happiness in every
instance. For Mill, justice is the most
important and binding subset of these
moral rules.
Welfare economics is derived from act
utilitarianism. Economic acts, i.e., choices,
are evaluated in terms of their consequences
for social welfare. This, in turn, typically
depends on a composite evaluation of individual welfare or utility, an approach
Amartya Sen calls welfarism (1979).
Classical economists, keeping with
Bentham, assumed individual utility to be
cardinally measurable and interpersonally
comparable and aggregated individual utilities additively to derive social welfare.
Utilitarianism implies that resources be allocated first to the person who derives the
greater marginal utility. Consider question 2
in table 2. According to utilitarianism, A is
the preferred choice among these three
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because the largest amount goes to the person who derives the greatest pleasure. In
fact, a large minority of respondents (40 percent) identifies this as fairest. Alternative B,
which is chosen by only 4 percent, suggests
equality across individuals, not at the margin, but in total levels of utility, a concept of
justice implied by Sen’s Weak Equity Axiom
(1973, p. 18). Nevertheless, a small majority
(56 percent) selects an equal split of the
resource.
Utilitarianism proposes that welfare comparisons be made, not on the basis of goods
or money, but rather using the subjective
values derived from goods, money, etc. This
raises the question of the appropriate metric
of justice, that is, of the unit of account for
justice evaluation, and whether it should be
allocable variables such as goods and money,
or derived values such as health, satisfaction,
pleasure and happiness. The results to question 2 seem mixed: the majority choice of C
suggests a preference for equality in goods,
but the relatively strong showing for A
implies that pleasure has significant pull.
Another possibility is that utilitarianism correctly emphasizes subjective values but that
C strikes a compromise between maximizing
total utility and equalizing utility across individuals along the lines Sen suggests.
The close split on question 2 is not typical
of survey findings on this issue or on fairness
preferences, in general.10 Most evidence
favors Sen’s thesis. Yaari and Bar-Hillel
(1984) present college applicants in Israel
with a scenario in which two individuals
metabolize the nutritional value of two foods
differently. Different versions of the question
10
A clear and significant majority response emerges
for almost all questions in our survey. The evidence indicates that more evenly divided responses are due, not to
major divisions of opinion among respondents, but rather
to the fact that the views of most are close to indifference
between the response categories (e.g., see the results of
question 8 in Konow 2001; see footnote 11 for other reasons). The close splits found in question 2 and versions of
question 3 are less typical but are reported here to
demonstrate with brevity the effects of multiple goals or
principles.
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vary the benefit to one of the individuals and
ask subjects to choose the fairest of five
quantitative allocations. In two versions (Q1
and Q2), an identical 82 percent of the
respondents (N=163 and N=146, respectively) choose unequal quantities of the foods to
each person in order to equalize the total
derived health benefit to them.11 Other studies provide support for the use of subjective
values. 69 percent of 81 college respondents
to question 1D in Konow (1996) regard as
fair an unequal distribution of food that produces an equal level of satisfaction. Similarly,
Gerald Leventhal, Jurgis Karuza, and
William Fry (1980) conclude based on survey
studies that “The emphasis is on equalizing
the members’ psychic gratification rather
than actual outcomes” (pp. 182–83). Overall,
the evidence suggests that derived values are
important for justice evaluation and that
maximization of these values holds some
sway, but that fairness is associated more
with the equalization of derived totals.
3.2. Pareto Principles
Around the turn of the twentieth century,
Vilfredo Pareto (1906) defined a means for
analyzing social welfare that does not rest on
the strong cardinality and comparability
assumptions of utilitarianism. Although utilitarianism continues to find its defenders
(e.g., see Harsanyi 1955, 1975), the Pareto
Principle has been more widely embraced by
11

The other questions in this study, however, generate
disperse responses, and no single category garners the support of a significant majority. Yaari and Bar-Hillel conclude
that “The only general conclusion which we are prepared
to draw from our work so far is that a satisfactory theory of
distributive justice would have to be endowed with considerable detail and finesse” (p. 22). Their seminal study
makes important contributions by employing survey techniques for the comparison of justice concepts, by
approaching fairness research as an ongoing process of discovery and revision and by establishing some important
findings in this area. I believe that the inability to draw
clearer conclusions from many of their questions is probably due to the facts that the theories they set out to test are
not specifically justice theories, and that many of the scenarios are too complex for most respondents to evaluate
with reference to their moral intuition, indeed perhaps for
many to evaluate by any standard.
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economists as embodying an ostensibly
innocuous value judgment, namely, it
endorses any change that makes someone
better off without making anyone else worse
off. Despite the fact that this concept is touted as relying on weaker informational and
ethical conditions than utilitarianism, certain
of its deficiencies have also been noted,
among others, that it does not produce a
complete ordering of allocations. In (not
entirely successful) attempts to overcome
this shortcoming, variations and refinements, generically known as the
Compensation Principle, have been proposed by Nicholas Kaldor (1939), John
Hicks (1940), Scitovsky (1941), and Paul
Samuelson (1950). The Compensation
Principle endorses any change in which the
gains of some are more than sufficient to
compensate any losses of others, even if the
prescribed compensation does not actually
occur.12 In a further step away from the
Pareto Principle, all measurable gains and
losses are often treated equally, in which
case the Pareto Principle reduces to the
maximization of allocable variables such as
surplus or wealth. Pareto himself did not
portray his principle as a justice theory, but
this version of his principle has been interpreted as such, e.g., by Richard Posner in his
book The Economics of Justice (1981).
Although careful to set his views apart from
utilitarianism, Posner defends the claim that
justice be equated with economic efficiency,
specifically, with wealth maximization.
Certain experimental results intimate a
concern for Pareto efficiency. In prisoner’s
dilemma experiments subjects make a
discrete decision about whether to cooperate with one another, whereas in the more
12
The basic Pareto construct is the strong Pareto
Criterion, which states that an allocation, X, is Pareto preferred to (or Pareto dominates) another, Y, if at least one
person is better off, and no one is worse off, with X than
with Y. The simple version of the Compensation Principle
states that an allocation, X, is preferred to another, Y, if it
is potentially Pareto preferred, that is, if it is hypothetically possible to undertake lump-sum redistribution from X to
achieve an allocation that Pareto dominates Y.

continuous public goods analogues subjects
choose a level of cooperation through
amounts contributed to a public good. In
either case, the equilibrium of rational, selfinterested subjects is Pareto dominated by a
cooperative outcome. Alvin Roth (1995)
reports that prisoner’s dilemma experiments
usually yield cooperation bounded well away
from both zero and 100 percent. John
Ledyard (1995) finds that total contributions
in public goods experiments typically lie
between 40 and 60 percent of the group
optimum. These results are favorable to the
Pareto Criterion, although, of course, cooperation in these studies might also be motivated by altruism or equity. Comparing, say,
public goods experiments to dictator experiments, however, a distinguishing feature of
the former is the size of total surplus, a concern that is reinforced by (the possibility of)
partial compensation for cooperation.
Moreover, public goods contributions tend
to run higher than the usual average dictator
contributions of about 5 to 25 percent.
Bargaining experiments provide more
compelling evidence of an efficiency motive.
In Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer (1985) two
subjects are presented with sets of allocations that generate different individual and
joint payoffs. One of the subjects is the controller, the person who can choose unilaterally the payoffs. The controller is selected by
winning a preliminary game or randomly by
a coin flip, depending on the treatment. In
face-to-face negotiations, however, the other
subject can attempt to persuade the controller to choose specific payoffs and to agree
to transfers of payoffs between the parties.
Although the controller is essentially a dictator, 91 percent of Hoffman and Spitzer’s 86
pairs reach agreements that maximize joint
surplus, and about one-half of the transfer
decisions result in equal or near equal splits,
meaning that efficiency was often achieved
at some sacrifice to controllers. Prompted by
the Hoffman and Spitzer experiment, Paul
Burrows and Graham Loomes (1994)
explore a variation that allows pairs of
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subjects (N  104) to engage in mutually
beneficial trades from guaranteed initial
earnings. They find that 97 percent of their
584 negotiations maximize joint payoffs.
These experiments with direct negotiation
support surplus maximization under conditions that, through the availability of transfers,
permit, not only potential, but actual Pareto
improvements. How is this goal affected in
the absence of transfers and direct negotiation? Gary Charness and Brit Grosskopf
(2001) conduct dictator-like experiments in
which the “dictators” face anonymous counterparts and select between two allocations:
one gives equal payoffs to both and the other
involves unequal payoffs, usually favoring the
counterpart, that sum to more than the equal
payoffs. Between 66 percent and 88 percent
of dictators (N  61) choose allocations that
maximize total surplus, giving their counterparts up to twice as much as themselves,
sometimes even at a small sacrifice. Charness
and Rabin (2002) find a similar willingness to
sacrifice in order to increase the total,
although in the games they study this willingness varies with relative payoffs and with the
previous choices of counterparts. Alexander
Kritikos and Friedel Bolle (2001) similarly
find that 58–100 percent of dictators (N  80)
in a binary choice dictator game prefer allocations that maximize earnings over ones that
are more equal or even that favor themselves.
Perhaps the most thorough study related
to the efficiency motive is that of James
Andreoni and John Miller (2002). In their
variation on the dictator game, dictators
select gifts under conditions that differ
according to budget size and price of giving
money to counterparts. The latter is manipulated in the sense that one dollar foregone
by the dictator increases the counterpart’s
payoff by $0.25, $0.33, $0.50, $1, $2, $3, or
$4. Andreoni and Miller find that the vast
majority of subjects (N  176) have wellbehaved preferences for giving, falling into
one of three categories: about 47 percent act
selfishly, keeping nearly all for themselves,
30 percent tend to allocate so as to achieve
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equal splits, and around 22 percent act efficiently, tending to maximize total surplus.
On average, though, dictators give themselves a larger payoff than their counterparts
when giving lowers or does not change the
total (at four of four such prices) and give
their counterparts a larger payoff than themselves when giving increases the total (at two
of three such prices).
These experiments suggest that many
subjects are motivated to maximize surplus,
but they do not resolve whether people
regard this motive as fair. In table 3, question 3, which appears in different versions,
seeks to address this. Question 3A asks subjects to decide whether it is fair to adopt the
more efficient policy X, which produces a
total of 240 but creates unequal benefits,
over policy Y, which produces a smaller total
of only 200 but divides the benefits equally.
Sixty-two percent of respondents deem the
choice of the efficient policy fair.
Nevertheless, this support is quite labile, as
revealed by two other versions of the question. These versions are identical to A except
for variations in the size of the total benefits
from policy X, which are identified by italicized passages. In version B the total under
X decreases to 210, whereas in C the total
under X rises to 290, and in both cases support for X slips versus version A.13 Although
these shifts are not significant, stronger
results have been reported for a similar scenario. Four versions of question 5 in Konow
(2001) identify solid support for the strong
Pareto Criterion but weaker backing for the
Compensation Principle. Moreover, the
fragility of efficiency as it conflicts with
other principles of justice is demonstrated
there by statistically significant shifts in
support across versions.
At the macro level, efficiency appears to
figure more prominently in views of fairness.
McCloskey and Zaller (1984) report that 78
13
The weakened support in version B reflects perhaps
the view that the efficiency benefit is insufficient to justify
the inequality, whereas the increased inequality in version
C is perhaps seen as intolerably large.
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TABLE 3. Question 3

3A. Suppose, as used to be the case, that the US government makes land available to farmers at no cost provided
they reside on their claim and cultivate it. Each farmer may sell whatever he produces. Suppose as well that there
are just two applicants, Farmer Adams and Farmer Brown, interested in two tracts of land, 1 and 2. Tract 1 is more
productive than tract 2 and the tracts are located too far apart for one applicant to work both. The government may
choose among one of the following two policies, X or Y:
X. Farmer Adams gets tract 1 and produces 150 bushels of wheat and Farmer Brown gets tract 2 and produces
90 bushels for a total of 240.
Y. Farmer Adams and Farmer Brown share tract 1 evenly whereby each then produces 100 bushels for a total
of 200.
The government chooses policy X. Please rate this as fair or unfair:
Fair 62%
Unfair 38%
N  104
3B. …
X. Farmer Adams gets tract 1 and produces 120 bushels of wheat and Farmer Brown gets tract 2 and produces
90 bushels for a total of 210. …
Fair 52%
Unfair 48%
N  105
3C. …
X. Farmer Adams gets tract 1 and produces 200 bushels of wheat and Farmer Brown gets tract 2 and produces
90 bushels for a total of 290. …
Fair 55%
Unfair 45%
N  109

percent of 938 respondents find that “Under
a fair economic system people with more
ability would earn higher salaries.” This is
presumably because, as 85 percent of 967
persons surveyed agree, “Giving everyone
about the same income regardless of the
type of work they do would destroy the
desire to work hard and do a better job.”
3.3. Absence of Envy
The theory of fairness with the purest economic pedigree, and the usual definition of
equity in welfare economics, is the absence
of envy criterion. The concept was first formally stated by Duncan Foley (1967) and
was further developed by Hal Varian (1974),
Elisha Pazner and David Schmeidler (1978),
William J. Baumol (1986), and others. Part
of the motivation for this research agenda is
as a way to narrow the set of permissible
Pareto optima, thereby identifying allocations that are both efficient and equitable. In
the simplest form, an allocation is envy-free
if no agent prefers (i.e., envies) the bundle of

another. The no envy criterion has been generalized to include considerations of number
of agents, groups of agents, common choice
sets, envy-free trades, leisure, output and
labor ability and has spawned the concept of
egalitarian equivalence.
Absence of envy is an appealing construct
and seems like a reasonable goal. The question asked in this study, however, is whether
it describes allocations people call fair, or
whether it is distinct. Robin Boadway and
Neil Bruce (1984) are skeptical about equating the two: “I might envy a friend’s lucky
find in an antique store yet perceive no
‘unfairness’ that he, not I, owns it” (p. 175).
This inspired question 4 in table 4, which
tests the simple envy-free concept that
applies to final allocations only. Even though
respondents are encouraged in this scenario
to “envy” the other’s allocation, a sizable 87
percent judge it fair. It is possible, though,
that respondents would be envy-free if one
interpreted the bundle more broadly, e.g., to
include the time spent searching for the
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TABLE 4. Questions 4 and 5
4. You and an acquaintance would both like to have a rare record album. Your acquaintance spends several hours
a week looking in used record stores whereas you never bother to look. The acquaintance finds the album.
Fair 87%
Unfair 13%
N  299
5. Chris, who is blind, does not like TV and Pat, who is a vegetarian, does not like hamburger. Suppose that Chris
and Pat work for the same company in the same capacity and earn the same base salary. The time comes for the
end of the year bonus. Chris, who works much harder than Pat, receives a $2 coupon for a hamburger. The less
productive Pat, on the other hand, receives as a bonus a $2000 wide screen television.
Fair 10%
Unfair 90%
N  260

album.14 Question 5, also in table 4, however, is free of this concern. In this scenario,
although one person works harder, both
individuals receive as bonuses goods that the
other could not possibly desire regardless of
work effort, but 90 percent of respondents
find this unfair.
Absence of envy is questionable not only
as a description of justice but also of what is
meant by envy in common parlance: it seems
quite possible that I would like to have
another person’s allocation, but that I do not
experience the resentful feeling about his
advantage that the word envy typically connotes. Randall Holcombe (1997) similarly
rejects equating fairness with absence of
envy. He faults the envy-free criterion for
examining only outcomes and argues that
justice requires that one look at the process
by which the outcome obtains. This seems
consistent with the results of questions 4 and
5, in which rewards conflict with individual
contributions. These results support the
claim that justice requires consideration of
relative merits associated with the process by
which outcomes are generated as well as of
the magnitude of the outcomes.
3.4. The Efficiency Principle
Various studies have demonstrated that
people often seek to maximize surplus,
sometimes at a personal cost, and that this
goal is regarded as “fair.” These findings
suggest that efficiency in this sense is not
14

I am indebted to a referee for this point.

necessarily at odds with justice but instead is
itself a type of justice. Results reported in
McCloskey and Zaller (1984) show that efficiency figures prominently in popular conceptions of a fair economic system. At the
micro-justice level, however, support for the
Pareto Principles is sensitive to the size of
benefits, and other results (Konow 2001)
indicate that efficiency can be overturned by
competing justice principles. Utilitarianism
challenges us to think of efficiency, and justice, not only in terms of goods or wealth
but, where possible, of the subjective values
derived from them. The metric, or the unit
of account, of justice turns out to be an
important issue and one to which we will
return in section 5. The evidence in this section also indicates that the maximization of
derived values does exercise some pull on
views of justice, although the mixed results
suggest that, as with goods or wealth, the
maximization of these values is not the single goal of fairness. Many of the counterexamples to efficiency point toward equalizing
values, which seems to contradict the rejection of egalitarianism in section 2. As we will
see in the following sections, however,
equality can be relegated to a special case
within justice principles that generally call
for inequality. The evidence on the absence
of envy criterion underscores the main conclusion of this section: although justice
requires consideration of the consequences
of acts, specifically, of the size of total surplus, the efficiency criterion is too austere to
serve as a general theory of justice. One

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1206

1206

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI (December 2003)

must also attend to the process by which
outcomes obtain, and this is central to the
theories discussed in the following section.
4. Equity and Desert
The common thread in this class of theories is the presumed dependence of fair allocations on individual actions. This contrasts
with the motive investigated in section 2 to
satisfy needs or in section 3 to maximize surplus, with no necessary dependence on individual actions. Theories of equity and desert
are the intellectual progeny of two philosophical traditions: the distributive justice theory
of Aristotle and the natural law/desert theory
of John Locke. This section presents theories
and explores evidence on the questions of
desert, i.e., which individual characteristics
are relevant to justice, and of equity, i.e.,
what, exactly, the functional relationship is of
individual characteristics to just allocations.
4.1. Nozick
The political philosopher Robert Nozick
occupies a position at one extreme in this
class of theories. In Anarchy, State and
Utopia (1974), Nozick argues that justice is
exclusively concerned with rights that are
determined by the historical acquisition by
and transfer of property among individuals.
Thus, he argues that justice has nothing to
do with Rawls’s original position, in which
history does not yet exist, or with end-state
theories, such as utilitarianism, which ignore
history. Each approach is, in a sense, either
too early or too late. Moreover, Nozick is a
fervent advocate of individually based fairness over attempts to promote the social
good. Individual choice is paramount, as
demonstrated in his modification of the
Marxian maxim “From each as they choose,
to each as they are chosen” (p. 160).
Nozick’s “entitlement” theory of justice
concerns the rights of individuals to their
possessions or “holdings.” The core of his
theory is two principles: the principle of justice in acquisition, or how things originally

became owned, and the principle of justice
in transfer, which addresses the transfer of
holdings from one person to another. Nozick
cites as violations of these principles holdings that result from theft, fraud, enslavement and forcible exclusion from competing
in exchange. Nevertheless, he fails to spell
out details of how his theory applies to specific situations or social systems. What is
emphasized and exposited with some specificity, however, is the asserted justice of
holdings that result from free choices, best
illustrated by Nozick’s often cited “Wilt
Chamberlain” example. In this thought
experiment, the reader is first asked to suppose that the initial distribution, call it D1,
perfectly satisfies whatever justice principle
the reader favors. Then fans drop a separate
admission price into a special box for
Chamberlain, which results in his receiving
much larger income than anyone else.
Nozick challenges the reader to find the new
distribution, D2, unjust since people voluntarily moved to it. Note there is no conflict in
this example with just acquisition because
the reader is free to presuppose any original
distribution, D1. Instead, this example
addresses justice in transfer.
I know of no previous empirical tests of
the entitlement theory, even of the celebrated Chamberlain case, so I asked a somewhat
updated variation on this scenario. Question
6 in table 5 considers the case of Michael
Jordan, who in a similar manner receives
$25 million (actually modest, in comparison
to his actual earnings) from one million fans
who drop $25 each into his box during one
season. In version A, this follows a redistribution of wealth according to the respondent’s favorite distribution, along the lines of
Nozick’s D1. Nevertheless, 59 percent of
respondents judge the post-season distribution, D2, unfair, in contradiction to the principle of justice in transfer. In version B of
this question, the assumed redistribution to
fair levels follows, rather than proceeds, the
basketball season, and there is a significant
increase in the proportion of respondents
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TABLE 5. Question 6
6A. Suppose that you are able to change the wealth of everyone in the world to the levels that you consider most
fair. Let us say that you do so. Now suppose that Michael Jordan, being greatly in demand, signs the following contract with a team: in each home game, $25 from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him. The season starts,
and as people buy their tickets, they drop a separate $25 of their admission price into a special box with Jordan’s
name on it. At the end of the season, 1 million people attend his home games, and Michael Jordan winds up with
$25 million. Please rate Jordan’s earnings as:
Fair 41%
Unfair 59%
N  137
6B. Suppose that Michael Jordan, … Now suppose that you are able to change the wealth of everyone in the world
to the levels that you consider most fair. Let us say that you do so. Would Jordan still earn $25 million?
Yes 24%
No 76%
N  83

(76 percent) who deem Jordan’s salary
unfair (P  .01).15 One reading of this
increased opposition to D2 in version B versus A is that respondents also expect the initial distribution, D1, to be unfair, i.e., the
final distribution in B results not only from
the current unfair transfers but, presumably,
from previous unfair acquisitions and transfers. That is, people mistrust not only historical transfers but perhaps also original acquisitions. These results cast doubt on broad
support for Nozick’s minimal role for wealth
redistribution.16
Nozick has a very broad conception of the
individual choices that may be construed as
just. The minimal role he foresees for the
state suggests the view that allocations
resulting from unencumbered processes do
not, except to a minor degree, diverge from
those prescribed by justice. As a description
of actual justice views, Nozick’s theory has
merit for highlighting the individual and the
role of choice. Its focus on process makes
it an early treatment of procedural justice
(see section 5.2). The entitlement theory,
however, says that all allocations resulting
from freely chosen transfers are fair, a claim
15
In this paper, P-values refer to significance levels
from two-tailed tests of differences in cited proportions.
16
Another interpretation of the difference in the magnitude of opposition to the entitlement theory between
these two versions of question 6 is that version A makes the
ostensible justice of the voluntary transfer process more
salient. But then its failure to find strong support when it
comes under closer scrutiny is even more significant.

that is not supported by the evidence. The
following section attempts to clarify desert,
i.e., the quality that makes certain variables
relevant to justice, and to demonstrate that
justice is related to choice, but not in the
broad sense implied by Nozick.
4.2. Theories of Desert
A good point of departure for a discussion
of desert is the justice theory of James
Buchanan (1986). Of the theories discussed in
this section, Buchanan’s is closest to Nozick’s
in terms of the wide berth given to individual
action and the limited role envisioned for
state intervention. Nevertheless, Buchanan,
in contrast to Nozick but similar to Rawls, formulates a contractarian theory, although his
builds upon a very different set of claims
about individual preferences from Rawls’s.
Justice is chiefly relevant in the constitutional
phase in which people establish a contract for
the rules of the game. Buchanan identifies
four factors that determine the distribution of
claims on economic income and wealth: luck,
choice, effort, and birth. He considers the relevance of effort least controversial but
believes that the only inequalities that conflict
with common views of justice are ones caused
only by the fourth factor, birth (pp. 129–30).
At the opposite extreme, a common view
is that differences owing to birth, luck and
choice are all unfair and that only differences attributable to effort are fair. A frequent finding (and claim) of social scientists
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is that individual effort affects the perceived
fairness of allocations. This is consistent with
the results to Questions 1B, 1C, 4, and 5 of
this paper. Some argue that those who
expend greater effort are more deserving
but that other characteristics, such as talent,
intelligence, physical skill, educational
opportunities, etc., are irrelevant and should
not affect rewards. A corollary is that for
each “type,” i.e., set of irrelevant characteristics, rewards should vary positively with
effort and be equal for those who expend the
same effort. Indeed, John Roemer (1998)
argues for taking this one step further: he
sees effort partially as a characteristic of type
and one for which a person should not be
held entirely accountable.
Most evidence casts doubt on birth and
emphasizes effort as a determinant of justice.17 For example, Leventhal and James
17
One finding that is anomalous in several respects is
reported in Schokkaert and Capeau (1991). A scenario
there calls for respondents to select the most fair division
of a bonus between two salesmen. In one version of this
question, one of the salesmen brings in more orders than
the other, which is attributed to differences in effort, and
85 percent of students (N  40) and 90 percent of parents
(of a different group of students, N  50) distribute most of
the bonus to the salesman who exerts greater effort. The
results for another variation on this question, though, suggest a role for innate traits, which even Buchanan considers irrelevant: in this version the difference in orders is due
to the fact that one of the salesmen has greater “natural
charm.” Interestingly, a majority of both students and parents support an unequal division favoring the more charming salesman. As previously mentioned, Schokkaert and
Capeau conclude that subject pool effects are not serious,
but here we see that this support is significantly stronger
(P  .02) among parents (76 percent, N  55) than among
students (56 percent, N  39), where most of the remaining students (41 percent) favor equality. These results are
based on small samples, but, assuming they are robust, a
plausible explanation for them, and for the difference
between the two populations, is the presence of an efficiency concern: rewarding the more talented individual
promotes productivity by giving the person with the
greater marginal product an incentive to work harder and
by encouraging an efficient allocation of labor, perhaps by
prompting the less talented individual to switch to a job in
which his comparative talents are greater. This seems more
likely to be a concern of parents than of students since the
former typically have more work experience and are more
sensitized to such issues (section 5 discusses how justice
preferences can be both based on general principles but
context- and, therefore, experience-dependent).

Michaels (1971) conduct an experiment with
32 college students who are paid a fixed fee
to evaluate rewards to different hypothetical
individuals. In this study, subjects are told
(erroneously) that their responses will determine the payments that will be given to participants in a later study of physical performance (a vertical jump test), and that the goal
is to devise the fairest schedule of payments.
The hypothetical individuals differ along
four dimensions: body height, training,
effort and performance. The results of
Leventhal and Harold Whiteside (1973) suggest that performance is rewarded as a distinct concern from desert, as a kind of efficiency motive. For a given level of
performance, though, Leventhal and
Michaels find that desert varies directly with
effort and inversely with height, which is
mostly a characteristic of birth, and training,
which is chosen for and not by the hypothetical individuals.
Numerous studies have examined the role
of effort versus luck in fair allocations. For
example, in the Hoffman and Spitzer (1985)
experiment discussed in section 3.2, one
person from each of the 86 bargaining pairs
(the controller) is in an advantaged position
because of either winning a game of skill or
because of the toss of a coin, depending on
the treatment. In the coin toss treatment,
most subjects agree to equal or near equal
splits, whereas in the game treatment, there
is a significant tendency for the controller to
receive a larger fraction, a tendency that is
reinforced if subjects are told that the controllers “earned” that right. Hoffman and
Spitzer conclude that subjects care about
expenditure of effort but not about luck.
Burrows and Loomes (1994) come to similar
conclusions based on a two-stage bargaining
experiment. Specifically, in Stage 1, 104 subjects are assigned random endowments after
which they engage pairwise in face-to-face
bargaining over trades designed to generate
mutual benefits. In Stage 2, 47 subjects who
had participated in Stage 1 earn their
endowment based on their performance in a
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word search task before bargaining over
trades. After Stage 1 bargaining, 64 percent
of trades generate equal final payoffs. After
Stage 2 bargaining, however, 72 percent of
final payoffs are unequal and favor the subject with the better performance in the task.
Burrows and Loomes conclude “that many
people believe that when different individuals have a similar ability and opportunity to
put in effort, those that put in more effort
should get a greater reward because they are
relatively deserving. … By contrast, when
initial endowments were determined by
chance, the majority of participants did not
attempt to sustain the differentials in the
bargaining that followed” (pp. 220–21).
Finally, Bradley Ruffle (1998) conducts dictator and ultimatum experiments (N  108
and N  102, respectively) involving a coin
toss in one set of treatments and relative performance on a general knowledge and skilltesting quiz in another set of treatments. He
also concludes that giving is motivated mostly by a concern for fairness that is based on
effort, not luck.
Thus far, desert appears to be related to
effort but not to birth or luck. What of
Buchanan’s fourth characteristic, choice?
Ronald Dworkin proposes a political theory
that emphasizes equality but that tolerates
the limited measure of inequality that he
argues would follow by allowing the effects
of choice alone to operate. He states that
“individuals should be relieved of consequential responsibility for those unfortunate
features of their situation that are brute bad
luck, but not from those that should be seen
as flowing from their own choices” (2000, p.
287). He makes a helpful distinction
between two types of luck: “Option luck is a
matter of how deliberate and calculated
gambles turn out—whether someone gains
or loses through accepting an isolated risk he
or she should have anticipated and might
have declined. Brute luck is a matter of how
risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles” (1981, p. 293). Option luck,
then, is a matter of choice, whereas brute
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luck is not, such that the consequences of
the former are fair whereas those of the latter are not.
The fact that option luck and brute luck are
often intertwined complicates the task of
finding clear measures of each. The level and
quality of one’s education, for example, are
affected partly by the hazards of birth, e.g.,
parents’ education, local schools, etc. On the
other hand, education also reflects individual
choices that involve calculated gambles, e.g.,
effort expended, years of schooling, and
degree programs selected, which in turn
affect one’s productivity. Schokkaert and Leo
Lagrou (1983) asked 180 adult professional
active men to estimate the actual average
income as well as the fair income for twelve
well-known occupations. With few exceptions, individuals whose occupations require
greater training or education are generally
seen as deserving higher incomes. In addition, the rankings of fair and actual incomes
are strikingly similar, although the distribution of fair incomes is much more compressed
than that of estimated actual incomes.
A conjecture suggested by this and similar
studies is that fair incomes roughly preserve
the ranking of actual incomes because the
latter reflect fairly well the value (mediated
by markets) that society places on individual
contributions, i.e., a more temperate version
of Nozick’s idea that rewards should depend
on being chosen. Moreover, incomes correlate positively with education because of the
usual increased productivity. Education
does not confer higher fair income, however,
if it is not accompanied by greater productivity, consistent with the findings that 83
percent (N  670) agree to pay workers
more for producing more, but that 74 percent (N  668) disagree with paying more to
the person with more education when two
people are doing the same type of work
(Kluegel and Smith 1986). In Overlaet
(1991) respondents choose the fairest distribution of a bonus between two workers who
perform the same job and work equally
hard. Equal splits are chosen by 68 percent
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of respondents (N  50) when the workers
differ by education and by 88 percent (N 
52) when they differ by position. In another
variant, however, 86 percent (N  52) give
more to the worker who exerts greater
effort. Thus, equal splits are preferred when
the descriptions of education and position
suggest they do not impact productivity, but
a greater contribution, and therefore
reward, is implied when one worker exerts
greater effort.18
These results indicate that desert incorporates effort and choices that affect an individual’s contribution, but it disregards birth,
(brute) luck, and choices that do not affect
productivity. This suggests a general characteristic for distinguishing variables relevant
to justice along the lines of attribution theory (e.g., Fritz Heider 1958, Julian Rotter
1966; and Bernard Weiner and Andy Kukla
1970). Attribution theory is a social psychology theory that purports to explain behavior
based on causal attributions of responsibility.
That is, attribution theorists say that people
infer causes of events and are motivated to
assign responsibility to agents for those
events. When so doing, people evaluate the
extent to which an agent has contributed to
the outcome, specifically, they hold an agent
accountable only for those factors that the
agent can influence. Although its creators
envisioned attribution theory as a general
behavioral theory, its application in the current context to justice is obvious: desert is
directly related to individual responsibility
for contributions to outcomes. Those who
contribute more are more deserving if their
contribution is due to factors for which they

are responsible, but not if it is due to factors
outside their control.19
This concept of desert helps explain various experimental results. For instance,
responders in the ultimatum games of Kagel,
Chung Kim, and Donald Moser (1996) are
significantly more likely to reject low offers
when proposers make deliberately low and
unfair offers than when proposers are not
aware of, and therefore not responsible for,
the meager offers. The design of Sally
Blount’s (1995) ultimatum experiments on
231 MBA students is explicitly informed by
attribution theory. In different treatments,
responders are told that the proposed split
was made by a random number generator, a
neutral third party or a proposer.
Responders are significantly more willing to
accept unfair offers that are random than
ones that come from the proposer or a third
party, consistent with attribution of responsibility. Using results of attitude surveys from
a random national sample of 3626 laborforce participants, Fong (2001) finds a
strong positive relationship between support
for income redistribution and beliefs that
one’s fortune is determined by forces outside
one’s control. Advocates of redistribution,
for example, believe that wealth is caused by
external circumstances and that bad luck as
opposed to lack of effort causes poverty. In
this spirit, Samuel Bowles and Herbert
Gintis (1998) propose a system of assetbased redistribution that tends toward
equality while compensating agents for their
actions.
Studies that explicitly elicit fairness preferences have come to similar conclusions,

18
The result that 68 percent (N  50) believe seniority
warrants greater pay is less clear-cut as respondents might
infer several factors. For instance, the more senior worker
might be more productive because of experience.
Rewarding this worker’s choice to remain with the employer could also promote efficiency because it helps the
employer avoid search and training costs. In addition,
respondents might assume that the more senior worker’s
needs are greater than those of a presumed newcomer to
the labor market, i.e., that she is more likely to have
children, a mortgage, etc.

19
The nomenclature of this school implies that the
motivation of interest resides with the individual assessing
the outcome rather than the agent, and that it is not solely
or even mostly an ethical theory. The desert concept we
are investigating here, on the other hand, focuses on the
responsibility of the agent, rather than another’s attribution of the agent’s responsibility, and views this primarily as
a moral issue. Regardless of these different points of view,
however, attribution theory offers a promising criterion for
distinguishing the variables that determine desert.
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much of which is summarized in Ronald
Cohen (1982) and Weiner et al. (1971).
More recently, Lisa Farwell and Weiner
(1996) conduct six survey studies with 948
undergraduates that examine the effect of
perceived responsibility on fair rewards and
punishments in a variety of contexts. Their
scenarios include poor class performance
because of low effort versus low aptitude,
spilling a drink at a party because of gesturing carelessly versus being bumped, and
acquiring AIDS because of promiscuous sex
versus from a blood transfusion. They find
that “a responsibility-based equity rule was
considered an appropriate basis for allocations even in the case of AIDS” (p. 878). The
Schokkaert and Lagrou (1983) study asks
180 adults to evaluate the fairness of fifteen
possible justifications for income differences. The majority responses are generally
consistent with rewarding choices that are
more highly valued and for which agents
may be held accountable, e.g., for responsibility, carrying risks, effort, and education,
but not for intellectual versus manual labor,
private versus public employment, or whitecollar versus blue-collar. Some other results
are more ambiguous, such as the support for
income differences based on family size or
being a scarce specialist. These probably
reflect the impact of non-desert justice concerns such as need, in the case of family size,
and efficiency, in the case of scarce specialists. This is consistent with the findings of
Jasso and Peter Rossi (1977) whose survey
indicates that fair earnings increase not only
with education but also with number of children and for being married.
To summarize, the evidence from experiments and surveys generally indicates that
someone whose contribution is more highly
valued is more deserving if that person bears
responsibility for the contribution but not if
it is due to factors outside his or her control.
What still remains unanswered is how,
exactly, relevant factors are related to fair
allocations. We turn to this question in the
following section.
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4.3. Equity Theory
Equity theory originated with the work of
sociologists and social psychologists including George Homans (1958); J. Stacy Adams
(1965); and Elaine Walster, G. William
Walster, and Ellen Berscheid (1973). Similar
to attribution theory, proponents of equity
theory had ambitions for developing a general theory of social interaction. Unlike attribution theory, however, equity theory was,
from its inception, designed with the intent
to elucidate the role of justice in social interaction. It has also informed the work of
economists, including Reinhard Selten
(1978) and Güth (1994). Equity theorists
typically trace the origins of their approach
to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1925). In
the fourth century B.C., Aristotle explicated
a theory of justice based on proportionality.
In equity theory, Aristotle’s proposition is
usually expressed for two persons, A and B,
in terms of outcomes, denoted O, and
inputs, denoted I, as the equity formula:
O A OB
=
.
IA
IB
Inputs are usually thought of as a participant’s
contributions to an exchange and outcomes as
the consequences, potentially positive or negative, that a participant has incurred in this
connection. Equity theorists posit that people
are motivated in their social interactions not
only by self-interest but also by a desire to
establish or restore perceived equity and to
reward or punish others for behavior they
perceive as just or unjust, respectively.
Despite the clarity of its theoretical formulation, the predictions of equity theory
have rarely been tested with equal rigor.
Most studies of equity theory have been theoretical or have attempted to confirm the
hypothesized relationship between inputs
and outcomes in general terms without
specifically establishing the strict proportionality mandated by the equity formula
(see, for example, Walster, Walster, and
Berscheid 1978). One piece of evidence that
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is indicative of the proportionality rule for
micro-justice is reported in table 5 of
Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989). There one
finds different versions of a vignette in which
two salesmen are working at a fair, and
respondents are to select the fairest division
of a premium among them. When the two
make equal contributions to the success of
the fair, 69 percent to 73 percent of respondents (N  39 and N  41, respectively) split
the premium equally or nearly equally (i.e.,
within 4 percent of the total premium).
When, on the other hand, one salesman
(Peters) has been at the stand twice as much
as the other (Johnson), 60 percent to 63 percent of respondents (N  40 and N  38,
respectively) give Peters approximately
twice the amount of Johnson, i.e., they distribute in proportion to work time (within 
4 percent of the total premium).
Proportionality emerges even though
Johnson normally earns more than Peters
and despite the fact that, in one version of
this question, Peters is Johnson’s assistant
and, in the other version, Peters is described
as “unqualified” and Johnson as having a
“university degree.” Along similar lines,
Question 5 in Konow (1996) asks 295
respondents to divide $1200 between two
grocery store managers, one of whom works
twice as many hours as the other. Here 85
percent choose an exact $800/$400 proportional split over a $600/$600 equal split or a
$700/$500 intermediate division. In a
macro-justice context, Lisa Ordóñez and
Barbara Mellers (1993) find survey respondents prefer income distributions with
stronger work-salary correlations.
Economics experiments have also
addressed proportionality. In Jeremy Clark’s
study (1998), 120 subjects vote for one of
two plans that generate different distributions of payoffs. In some treatments initial
incomes are “earned” based on relative performance on a multiple choice general
knowledge quiz. Final payoffs result from
initial incomes that are adjusted for costs
and benefits that differ within and across

plans. Clark concludes that equality is the
standard when initial incomes are random
but that proportionality can matter when
benefit levels are earned. In an experiment
with a total of 360 students (Konow 2000),
subjects first generate earnings by performing a task, viz., by preparing letters for mailing. Each subject is paired with an anonymous counterpart with whom their joint
earnings are divided in the next phase. In
one treatment, each subject is credited with
50 cents per letter prepared, and a third
party, the so-called “benevolent dictator,” is
paid a fixed fee to decide how much of the
joint earnings to allocate to each of the subjects. Because of substantial differences in
task performance, the percentage of joint
earnings attributable to one of the paired
subjects ranges from 29 percent to 73 percent of the total. The allocations by the
benevolent dictators are, on average, in proportion to subject earnings. In fact, depending on the version of this treatment, the fraction of benevolent dictators allocating
exactly, and not merely approximately, in
proportion to earnings runs as high as 79
percent.
Other evidence, however, strongly contradicts proportionality. In a different treatment of the Konow (2000) study, one of the
paired subjects earns from 25 percent to 75
percent of the joint total. Nevertheless, 87
percent of benevolent dictators choose equal
splits, and the mean division of earnings
does not significantly differ from one-half.
The difference in this treatment compared
to the one described above is that all subjects have time to prepare an equal number
of envelopes (viz., ten), and their earnings
differ solely because of arbitrary differences
in the per-letter credits (e.g., one subject in
a pair is credited with, say, 65 cents per letter whereas the other is credited with, say,
35 cents per letter). This contradicts the proportionality of allocations to earnings found
in the treatment discussed earlier (although
note that it is consistent with proportionality
of allocations to letters prepared). Thus,
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results of economics experiments suggest
that proportionality can be found, but that
its applicability in different contexts requires
further specification.
That the evidence on proportionality from
psychology and sociology is not more decisive
is probably due, in part, to the fact that those
disciplines are primarily concerned with
behavior that does not easily yield to quantification, e.g., the quality of marital, race, or
workplace relations. In part, though, the challenge to equity theory across all disciplines
and the reason, I believe, for its failure to
prosper after its initial popularity in the 1960s
and 1970s, is the difficulty in identifying a criterion for determining what may serve as an
“input.” As originally formulated, equity theory permits people to avail themselves of any
variables they perceive as relevant to justice.
This version is able to explain everything but
then, of course, it also explains nothing, since
it does not generate refutable propositions.
In subsequent work, equity theory has often
been interpreted as stating that outcomes be
proportional to actual, as opposed to perceived, contributions (e.g., Güth 1994). This
rendering, however, runs counter to evidence
that not all contributions count for purposes
of justice (e.g., Burrows and Loomes 1994;
Konow 2000). A growing number of social
scientists, however, have merged equity theory with the attribution theory discussed in the
previous section as a means to solving this
problem, an approach we examine below.
4.4. The Equity Principle
Leventhal and Michaels (1971) were perhaps the first equity theorists to recognize
the need to narrow the class of inputs relevant to fair outcomes and to propose that
this distinction be based on the control an
agent exercises over inputs. Although equity
theorists and attribution theorists have generally gone their separate ways, the suggestion of Leventhal and Michaels is precisely
what a synthesis of these two schools
implies. Brenda Major and Kay Deaux
(1982) report that the fairness of using

1213

inputs to determine allocations depends on
whether observers view those differences in
inputs as within the control of agents. Jerald
Greenberg (1979) asks 72 students to choose
fair compensation for four workers who differ according to work duration and productivity. He finds that respondents pay more
for greater duration and greater productivity, generally proportionately. The strength
with which they employ the proportionality
rule varies, however, in a patterned way.
Previous to the study, subjects completed a
so-called Protestant Ethic Scale that measures the degree of agreement or disagreement with various statements about the
causal relationship between hard work and
success or productivity. Those who scored in
the lower quarter on this scale (i.e., see this
causal link as weak) tend, in the subsequent
survey, to choose significantly more equal
payments regardless of productivity,
although they still pay proportionately for
work duration. These results suggest that
fair allocations are in proportion to the
inputs an agent is perceived as controlling,
but that the classification of manipulable
inputs is open to some individual interpretation. Nevertheless, the fact that subject
interpretation of relevant inputs varies consistently with their beliefs about individual
control over productivity supports the claim
that it is the perceived degree of control that
governs the choice of inputs.
The accountability principle is a precept
of justice based on the distinction between
factors one can influence, or discretionary
variables, and those one cannot, or exogenous variables.20 This leads to a generalization of the equity formula, the entitlement
formula, which expresses the fair allocation,
or entitlement, of an individual in terms of
outputs, inputs, endowments and costs.
Simply put, it calls for an agent’s allocation to
be in direct proportion to his or her relevant
discretionary variables but to be free of any
effects of exogenous variables. The results of
20

This is a principle I proposed in my 1996 paper.
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written questionnaires and telephone interviews support this principle. The accountability principle can also be advanced as an
explanation for the aforementioned dictator
experiment results (Konow 2000). In that
study, benevolent dictators allocate in proportion to subject earnings when differences
in those earnings are due to discretionary
variables, i.e., the number of letters subjects
prepare, but allocate equal splits when earnings differences are due solely to exogenous
variables, i.e., arbitrary differences in per
letter credits.
Extension of this thinking to bargaining
and markets suggests a theory of the “just
price.” Robert Frank (1988) proposes that a
fair transaction is one that produces an equal
distribution of the surplus from the transaction. This definition has much explanatory
power, although I would modify “equal” to
“fair,” i.e., a fair distribution of surplus is in
proportion to each person’s discretionary
inputs to the transaction. Moreover, one
must specify that fair costs are determined
by each individual’s responsibility for those
costs and not necessarily according to opportunity costs or even incurred costs. This
interpretation is consistent with survey
results reported by Frey and Pommerehne
(1993). They ask German and Swiss households to judge the fairness of a price increase
for bottled water at a sightseeing point on a
particularly hot day when the number of hikers demanding water outstrips the available
supply. 78 percent of respondents (N  452)
find such a price increase unfair (Question
2), but 64 percent (N  148) consider the
increase more acceptable when a hot day
normally occurs during the season considered than when it is unforeseeable (implied
by Question 5). When the heat is unexpected, the hikers cannot be held responsible,
and since the suppliers have not taken any
relevant discretionary action, a price
increase is not fair. When the heat is to be
expected, however, the hikers have the
option of bringing their own beverage, and
the suppliers could increase their stock of

water, possibly at a higher cost that justifies
the price increase and results in a fairer distribution of surplus. The results to survey
question 2A in Konow (2001) indicate that
the fair price adjusts for fair costs and creates a fair distribution of surplus. Similar
evidence about the just price comes from
the ultimatum game experiments of Marc
Knez and Colin Camerer (1995) who conclude that subjects determine fair terms of
transaction based on fair costs plus a fair
division of surplus (which, in their study,
subjects appear to interpret egocentrically
exacerbated by ambiguity about the value of
surplus).
The studies discussed in this section
examine the dependence of justice on individual actions. In Nozick’s theory, individual
choice determines both fair and, in unconstrained exchange, actual allocations. For
Buchanan, the chief adversary of justice in
free markets is birth, whereas the influences
of choice, luck and effort are just. Sorting
through the forces that have some claim to
relevance, we find that attribution theory
provides a powerful criterion for describing
desert according to the views of most people. Combined with equity theory, it implies
the Equity Principle, i.e., fair allocations
across individuals are proportionate only to
the inputs they control, a claim that also
finds support from surveys and experiments.
Therefore, when we refer in our further discussion to equity, it will be in this specific
sense. Nevertheless, the results of various
studies (e.g., Schokkaert and Capeau 1991;
Leventhal and Michaels 1971) indicate that
people do not value this precept to the
exclusion of other distributive goals but
rather weigh this concern against a desire for
efficiency and need. The conclusion of the
previous three sections is that a descriptive
theory of justice should incorporate the
three corresponding distribute motives we
have discussed. So far we have neglected,
however, to tackle certain crucial and difficult questions that have to be answered by
anyone evaluating justice in the real world.
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For example, among what group of persons
should one make the comparisons, how does
one judge when relevant information is missing, and what determines the relative importance of each of the principles? These are
some of the issues addressed in the following
section.
5. Context
Many investigations into justice have
emphasized how views of fairness vary with
contextual elements such as the historical
terms of transactions, the group of individuals being compared, the type of good being
distributed and the framing of information.
This section examines the impact of these
and other aspects of context on the interpretation of just allocations. A concept
defended here is that justice is context
dependent, i.e., impartial justice obeys general principles, but these principles require
a set of people and variables that the context
provides.
5.1. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler
Probably the most widely cited descriptive study of justice in economics is that of
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, hereafter
KKT, (1986). This paper is significant for a
number of reasons, including its original use
of rich vignettes, inductive method, and
many findings. In this section I will outline
KKT’s theory, examine evidence on it, and
suggest lessons from their research that, in
a broader framework, prove crucial in
understanding views of fairness.
KKT propose a theory of fair transactions
that depends on the roles of economic
agents, the history of transaction terms and
framing effects. In particular, their approach
deals with the case of firms (merchants,
landlords or employers) and transactors
(customers, tenants or employees). From
their examples, in which a firm often consists
of a single person, it appears that firm means
price setter and transactor means price taker.
An important construct in their analysis is
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the reference transaction, “a relevant precedent that is characterized by a reference
price or wage, and by a positive reference
profit to the firm” (p. 729). They propose a
principle of dual entitlement that governs
community standards of fairness:
Transactors have an entitlement to the terms of
the reference transaction and firms are entitled
to their reference profit. A firm is not allowed to
increase its profits by arbitrarily violating the
entitlement of its transactors to the reference
price, rent or wage. When the reference profit of
a firm is threatened, however, it may set new
terms that protect its profit at transactors’
expense (pp. 729–30).

KKT offer results from Canadian telephone interviews in support of the dual entitlement principle. Two of their questions
appear in table 6 along with results from my
survey, whereby KKT’s questions have been
renumbered to maintain proper sequencing
here and their results are indicated in parentheses to distinguish them from mine.
Question 7 (KKT’s question 14) illustrates
the unfairness, according to 91 percent of
respondents, of a firm’s arbitrary violation of
a transactor’s reference rent. Question 8A
(KKT’s question 8) is a similar scenario,
which I replicated (P  .56), that differs significantly from 7 (P  .01). This provides an
example of a firm’s right, in the view of 72
percent (75 percent) of my (KKT’s) telephone respondents, to change transaction
terms at the transactor’s expense in order to
protect the firm’s reference profit.21
These and other results from KKT’s study
(e.g., questions 1, 2A, 2B, 3, 7, 9A, 9B, 10,
and 12) are consistent with their claims that
firms are entitled to receive a positive surplus but not to change historical terms of
transaction arbitrarily, or even due to
changes in opportunity costs or demand
shifts. More specifically, though, the dual
entitlement principle implies a lexicographic
21
Actually, KKT used four, rather than two, response
categories (Completely Fair, Acceptable, Unfair, and Very
Unfair) in their study, which they reported in condensed
form as Acceptable and Unfair in their paper.
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TABLE 6. Questions 7 (KKT 14) and 8A (KKT 8), 8B and 8C

7. A landlord rents out a small house. When the lease is due for renewal, the landlord learns that the tenant has
taken a job very close to the house and is therefore unlikely to move. The landlord raises the rent $40 per month
more than he was planning to do.
Fair (9)%
Unfair (91)%
N  (157)
8A. A landlord owns and rents out a single small house to a tenant who is living on a fixed income. A higher rent
would mean the tenant would have to move. Other small rental houses are available. The landlord’s costs have
increased substantially over the past year and the landlord raises the rent to cover the cost increases when the tenantís lease is due for renewal.
Fair 72 (75)%
Unfair 28 (25)% N  131 (151)
8B. A landlord owns and rents out apartments to tenants who are living on fixed incomes. Higher rents would mean
the tenants would have to move. Other apartments are not available. The landlord’s costs have increased over the
past year. The landlord raises the rent to cover the cost increases when the tenant’s leases are due for renewal, even
though he could cover his costs with a positive but reduced profit without raising rents.
Fair 38%
Unfair 62%
N  126
8C. A well-to-do landlord owns numerous buildings, one of which is a small retirement home whose tenants are all
living on small fixed incomes. A higher rent would mean significant sacrifice to the retirees, and most are too ill to
move elsewhere. Nevertheless, the landlord raises their rent to reflect recent cost increases, even though he could
still cover his costs and enjoy a healthy profit on the retirement home without raising rent.
Fair 12%
Unfair 88%
N  100

ordering of the firm’s reference profit over
the transactor’s reference transaction when
the two conflict, as opposed, for example, to
a tradeoff between firm and transactor surplus. My question 8B from written questionnaires explores this aspect of the theory: several tenants are affected by the rent
increase, other apartments are not available
and it is explicitly stated that the landlord
could receive a positive but reduced profit
without raising rents. Now only 38 percent
find it fair for the firm to raise the rent in
order to protect its reference profit, a significant 34 percent point drop from 8A (P 
.01). Question 8C from telephone interviews
pushes this point further by stating that the
landlord is the well-to-do owner of numerous buildings, that some of the tenants are
too ill to move, and that the landlord could
still enjoy a healthy profit without raising the
rent, and only 12 percent now judge a rent
increase fair, significantly below both 8A and
8B (P  .01). These findings suggest that the
firm/transactor distinction does not drive
these results.

A crucial issue for dual entitlement theory
is the determination of reference transactions. KKT argue that, where there is a history of transactions between a firm and transactor, recent transactions are adopted, unless
the terms were explicitly temporary. For new
transactions, competitive prices are used.
Their question 2 illustrates this distinction
between established and new transactions
with the case of a shop owner who lowers the
wage he pays to an employee from $9 per
hour to $7 per hour in response to a decrease
in the labor market wage. In version A of this
question, the employee has worked in the
shop for six months, and 83 percent of 98
respondents judge the wage decrease unfair.
In version B, the current employee leaves,
the employer offers the lowered wage only to
the replacement, and only 27 percent of the
125 surveyed find this unfair.
Nevertheless, they find that this rule is not
always straightforward. KKT’s question 3,
which I report in table 7 as question 9A,
involves the same decrease vis-à-vis a reference wage for the same reason as in KKT’s
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TABLE 7. Questions 9A (KKT 3), 9B and 9C; 10A and 10B
9A. A house painter employs two assistants and pays them $9 per hour. The painter decides to quit house painting
and go into the business of providing landscape services, where the going wage is lower. He reduces the workers’
wages to $7 per hour for the landscaping work.
Fair (63)%
Unfair (37)%
N  (94)
9B. … landscape services. With about the same time and effort, the former house painter’s profits fall significantly
in his new business. In landscape services the going wage is lower so he reduces …
Fair 67%
Unfair 33%
N  220
9C. … landscape services. With about the same time and effort, the former house painter’s profits rise significantly in his new business. Nevertheless, in landscape services the going wage is lower so he reduces …
Fair 34%
Unfair 66%
N  213
10A. An independently owned fast food restaurant faces competition from a number of other local fast food restaurants. The restaurant’s prices have been stable for some time. Would you expect the restaurant’s prices to its customers to be fair or unfair?
Fair 91%
Unfair 9%
N  259
10B. … fast food restaurant is located in an airport where there are limited dining opportunities. …
Fair 29%
Unfair 71%
N  227

2A, but now a 63 percent majority finds this
fair. They conclude that “the entitlement of
an employee to a reference wage does not
carry over to a new labor transaction, even
with the same employer” (p. 730). Questions
9B and 9C, which were posed in my written
questionnaires, examine the robustness of
this interpretation by stating explicitly the
effect on the employer’s profit of his changing businesses. Compared to 9A, the wage
decrease is viewed as fair by 67 percent of
respondents if the employer’s profits fall
(P  .49) but as unfair by an almost identical
66 percent if his profits rise (P  .01). These
results refute KKT’s explanation and suggest
that this approach can only be saved by
amending it with exceptions that seem
increasingly ad hoc.
Another more parsimonious statement of
the reference transaction is this: “It should
perhaps be emphasized that the reference
transaction provides a basis for fairness judgments because it is normal, not necessarily
because it is just. Psychological studies of
adaptation suggest that any stable state of
affairs tends to become accepted eventually,
at least in the sense that alternatives to it no

longer readily come to mind” (KKT, pp.
730–31). I think the relationship between
adaptation of fairness judgments, stability
and information that KKT identify is an
important one, and I will return to it below.
Let us ask, however, whether normality is all
that is needed for fairness. In table 7, 91 percent of respondents to version A of question
10 from my survey expect stable prices to be
fair if they persist in the face of competition,
whereas version B demonstrates that only 29
percent expect stable prices to be fair if they
emerge under conditions of limited competition (P  .01). Thus, stability or normality
per se does not confer fairness.
The most significant contribution of
KKT’s study, I believe, is to our understanding of what one might call contextual effects.
These are the ways in which information
about context affects fairness judgments.
Specifically, their research contains astute
observations about justice and established
versus new transactions, the duration of
transactions, competitive prices, stability and
adaptation. Indeed, given the seemingly
capricious nature of some results and the
disagreements sometimes observed, one
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might conclude that justice is itself merely a
kind of contextual effect. An alternative view
is that justice is guided by general principles
that are impacted by contextual effects. As
KKT point out, “Agreement on general principles of fairness … does not preclude disputes about specific cases” (p. 730). In any
case, as evidence presented in this paper
suggests, justice is also a phenomenon outside the domain originally addressed by
KKT of price changes between firms and
transactors: patterned values are observed in
levels (e.g., income, wealth, output) and not
just changes, in non-market distributions
(e.g., gifts, sharing of joint production, government grants) as well as market transactions, and among agents in other roles (colleagues, friends, students). This does not in
itself represent a flaw in KKT’s theory, but it
does indicate the need for a more general
approach to account for many findings about
justice.
The discussion that follows presents what I
think are the main lessons from KKT’s study
and the research it spawned. This is organized around three groups of issues. First, we
consider fairness in transactions including
fair costs, fair prices and the role of competition. Second, we examine information effects,
or how people process information about
variables relevant to justice in forming their
views. Third, we look at how justice views are
determined when the metric, or standard of
measurement, is the derived subjective value.
• Transactions. The results to questions 8
and 9 above cast doubt on the lexicographic
rule protecting firm profit that is embedded
in dual entitlement theory: the fairness of a
change in transaction terms is sensitive to
the relative benefits to and burdens on the
buyers and sellers. An explanation for these
results was proposed in section 4.4 of this
paper: the just price produces a fair division
of the surplus from a transaction. Thus,
prices should be adjusted, in questions 8 and
9, in order to share more fairly the lesser or
greater surplus associated with the new circumstances. The fair division of surplus, in

turn, is governed by the same considerations
as other distributions, i.e., one must consider prices in relation to need, efficiency and
equity. This interpretation is also consistent
with additional KKT results. For example,
they find in their (not my) questions 9A and
9B that it is fair for a firm to lower workers’
wages to market levels if the firm is making
a loss but not if it is making a profit. Also, it
is unfair to auction a popular Christmas gift
to the highest bidder (question 15), which
presumably distributes the surplus disproportionately (and, therefore, inequitably) to
the seller, unless the proceeds go to
UNICEF, which benefits the needy.
An important question is whether just
prices have any impact on actual prices. KKT
answer in the affirmative, citing several additional survey results (to questions 17A, 17B,
18A, and 18B). Aiming to test KKT’s theory,
Steven Kachelmeier, Stephen Limberg, and
Michael Schadewald (1991) employ a multiperiod market experiment using 64 subjects
with posted bid pricing, i.e., buyers post bids
and sellers choose whether to sell. In the first
ten periods, the competitive equilibrium
results in an equal split between buyers and
sellers of total surplus. In the following ten
periods, a sales tax increases both the equilibrium price as well as sellers’ share of profit in equilibrium. Three treatments are conducted with different subjects under
different information conditions. In one
treatment, all subjects are informed of the
sellers’ share of total surplus, in another they
are informed of the increased marginal cost
and in a control they are informed of neither.
Based on KKT, they argue that in the second
ten periods buyers will resist price increases
under profit disclosure more than under
marginal cost disclosure. The former reveals
that profit now exceeds the reference profit,
whereas the latter provides a rationale for
fair price increases based on cost increases.
Their predictions are confirmed: although
market prices eventually approach the higher equilibrium level for all conditions, the
adjustment under profit disclosure is more
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gradual and the average price remains lower
even in the final period than under marginal
cost disclosure. Robert Franciosi et al.
(1995) replicate this experiment with 144
subjects and a few alterations, notably posted
offer pricing, i.e., sellers, not buyers, post
prices and buyers choose whether to purchase. Their results are mostly consistent
with those of Kachelmeier et al. except that
Franciosi et al. find that the fairness effect
dissipates over time as prices converge to the
competitive equilibrium. Thus, these studies
imply that fairness influences market prices
in the short run, but this impact is more likely to be sustained when buyers set prices
(e.g., typical labor markets) than when sellers
set prices (e.g., usual product markets).
Nothing in the procedures of the
Kachelmeier et al. and Franciosi et al. experiments suggests any moral asymmetry
between buyers and sellers, i.e., there is no
obvious basis for unequal shares of surplus
because of, say, need or desert. In the initial
periods, price quickly converges to the equilibrium level, which coincidentally produces
an equal split of the surplus. In the second
set of periods, subjects resist the movement
toward an equilibrium that generates
unequal shares, when they are aware of this
inequality. These findings are consistent
with the notion of a fair division of surplus
from transactions. In addition, the results
suggest a lesson about competition and fairness: in the absence of any explicit information to the contrary, subjects have no basis
for resisting competitive prices on fairness
grounds. In fact, KKT observe that prices in
competitive markets tend to be regarded as
fair, according to versions of their questions
2, 3, 4, 9, 13, and of my question 10. We will
return to these points below.
• Information Effects. As KKT point out,
fairness judgments are sensitive to the
information provided in a scenario. When
information is incomplete, historical, market or stable prices can influence the
assumptions people make about factors relevant to justice principles. Here we will
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consider information effects, or how the
explicit information in a context affects the
evaluation of justice through its impact on
the implicit assumptions of the evaluator.
One response to sparse information is simply to assume away any differences across
persons relating to justice. This ceteris
paribus assumption seems most appropriate
when the available information provides no
basis for such differences. There are many
examples from written and telephone surveys
of ceteris paribus assumptions about need,
efficiency, equity and surplus from transactions.22 Further evidence is implied by the
Roth and Keith Murnighan (1982) experiment, in which pairs of subjects bargain over
“lottery tickets” or opportunities to win prizes
that differ in value to each player. When the
prize values are common knowledge to both
players, they tend to allocate lottery tickets
unequally so as to equalize expected dollar
payoffs. On the other hand, when neither
knows the value of the other player’s prize,
they tend to equalize the lottery tickets, consistent with their making the ceteris paribus
assumption about the values of the prizes.
The results of the Kachelmeier et al. and
Franciosi et al. experiments suggest that subjects make the ceteris paribus assumption
about shares of surplus until explicit information to the contrary is revealed. Similarly, one
probable reason competition is commonly
regarded as fair is because it lacks the disproportionate power explicitly present in
non-competitive markets.
At other times, information, although
incomplete, can provide a basis for extrapolation. That is, the context may contain information from which people can extrapolate to
form reasonable assumptions about relevant
differences. For example, Weiner and Kukla
(1970) find that subjects, using a quantitative
scale, infer effort from relative performance.
Survey respondents have also been found to
extrapolate from a seller’s profession to its
profitability (Konow 2001). In the current
22

For instance, see Konow (2001).
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study, the results to question 9 in table 7 suggest that respondents use information about
the new industry, and perhaps the lower
wage rate there, to form the assumption that
the employer’s profits would fall in his new
business were he not to lower his employees’
wages. Such extrapolation also provides one
explanation for the relevance of historical
terms for current transactions: current payments can be based on past ones if the latter
are assumed to be fair. This effect is implied
by the bargaining experiment of Simon
Gächter and Arno Riedl (2001). Their ninety subjects take a general knowledge quiz
and are told that past pay was according to
performance, where “winner” earnings were
double those of the “loser.” They then bargain over a fixed sum from positions of
strategic equality in which these historical
claims are sunk. Nevertheless, both winners
and losers largely accept historical payments
as the standard for fair and actual compensation (although the two groups also exhibit a
self-serving bias).
Finally, KKT note that fairness is often
associated with stability. If people adapt to
stable values because, as they state, “alternatives to it no longer readily come to mind”
(pp. 730–31), this represents an information
effect. As the results to question 10 in table
7 indicate, however, stable outcomes can
also be unfair. Only under a regime of competition is stability associated with fairness in
that scenario. One factor that probably contributes to the perceived fairness of stable
outcomes is the implicit assumption that
they usually obtain because they can withstand or have actually survived competitive
threats. At a minimum, stable prices are
opposed to expedient pricing policies that
respond to unexpected shifts in supply or
demand and that, as several KKT examples
demonstrate, tend to be viewed as opportunistic and unfair. The mail surveys of a
representative sample of 407 Swiss households by Frey and Beat Gygi (1988) lead to
similar conclusions. Their results show raising price in response to a demand increase is

perceived as less unfair if the demand shift
occurs at predictable intervals, alternative
supplies exist, buyers are previously
informed of and able to prepare themselves
against the price increase, and sellers do not
profit from the price increase. These results
suggest that people oppose price changes
that are suspected of forcing an unfair redistribution of surplus to the benefit of the
price setter.
• Subjective Values. As discussed in section
3.1, people prefer to use derived values as
the metric, or unit of account, for justice
evaluation. Where possible, then, fairness
will be measured in terms of subjective values such as pleasure, happiness or utility
rather than objective values such as income,
wealth or goods. What is the correspondence between the former and the latter? I
will discuss three possibilities.
First, as illustrated in examples in section
3.1, people often use levels of satisfaction,
pleasure or happiness to form judgments
about fair allocations. In economics this is
commonly modeled using a function that represents endstate utility, whereby subjective
values are a function of the final allocations of
objective variables. In this case, fair allocations measured in subjective terms may differ
from those measured in objective terms
because of differences across individuals in
utility. As suggested by the discussion of information effects above, however, unless such
differences are explicit, people tend to make
the ceteris paribus assumption about total
and marginal utility such that subjective and
objective values lead to the same allocations.
KKT offer evidence of a different avenue
of influence for subjective values: the fairness of a change in transaction terms sometimes depends on features that seem inconsequential for final allocations. One instance
of this is the difference in fair wages
between an established and a new employee
in KKT’s question 2. Another is their question 4 where a company’s 7 percent real
salary reduction is unfair according to 62
percent of those surveyed when there is no
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inflation (version A, N  125) but fair
according to 78 percent when accomplished
through salary increases that fail to keep up
with inflation (version B, N  129), a significant shift (P  .01). Yet another case is
based on whether transaction terms are
framed as normal or as temporary. For
example, in their question 5, a car dealer
responds to a shortage of a popular model.
In version A, the dealer sells the car at $200
above the list price, which 71 percent of
respondents (N  130) consider unfair,
whereas in version B the dealer eliminates a
previous $200 discount, which only 42 percent (N  123) judge unfair (P  .01). In
their question 6, the business of a small
company has recently not increased as
before, and in version A it reduces workers’
wages by 10 percent, which 61 percent (N 
100) deem unfair, whereas in B it eliminates
a previous 10 percent annual bonus, which
only 20 percent (N  98) find unfair (P 
.01). KKT characterize these as framing
effects and incorporate this last case into
their fairness theory by excluding explicitly
temporary transactions from serving as reference transactions.
Consider the following explanations for
these effects (i.e., money illusion, established versus new transactions, and normal
versus temporary transaction terms) within a
framework of justice principles. Various
studies (e.g., Kahneman and Amos Tversky
1979) suggest that preferences are determined by gains or losses relative to some
reference value as opposed to endstates,
whereby losses are coded more heavily than
gains of equal magnitude. Survey respondents evaluate the fairness of these changes
anticipating their subjective effects on the
implicated parties. Specifically, they may
incorporate an endowment effect (Thaler
1980), that is, they take as the reference
value the transaction terms to which the parties have adapted based on agreements or
understandings about relevant values. Thus,
since the established employee in KKT’s
question 2 has an endowed wage but the
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newcomer does not, it is unfair to reduce the
wage of the former, since it unjustly imposes
a loss on him and provides a gain to the
employer. Similarly, workers are typically
endowed with a nominal, not real, salary, so
the salient reference point for gains and losses in KKT’s question 4 is nominal. Finally, it
is fair to eliminate a discount (KKT 5) or a
bonus (KKT 6), since they are explicitly temporary and not endowed, whereas it is unfair
to impose unfavorable terms on another that
deviate from the norm. Max Bazerman
(1985) reports evidence suggesting that such
an endowment effect influences the wage
decisions of real arbitrators. Sixty-nine experienced arbitrators are asked to evaluate 25
hypothetical wage cases and to assign subjective weights to various criteria. Although
arbitrators differ among themselves about
the significance of each factor, the most
common decision is to maintain the status
quo in levels by adjusting wages by the average negotiated increase in the industry. This
policy distributes the changes fairly across
wage earners. Casual empiricism, I believe,
also supports the endowment effect as a persuasive explanation for many rules that are
defended as fair. For example, certain rights
and benefits are often “grandfathered,” or
available to previous recipients but not to
newcomers. Such clauses, frequently codified in law, protect the endowment of established beneficiaries without imposing a subjective loss on unendowed newcomers.
These two approaches, endstate utility
and endowment effect, offer different, and
often conflicting, subjective values for judging fairness. Evidence has been presented in
favor of both effects. Which will serve as the
metric of justice seems to be resolved in the
same manner as the choice of objective versus subjective values: it depends on the
information provided by the context. If the
stated context emphasizes levels rather than
changes, justice evaluators tend to focus on
endstate utility. If, on the other hand,
changes and endowments are salient, people
will be sensitive to endowment effects. A
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third possibility is that people form a composite judgment involving both effects, each
weighted according to its salience in the context. This is exactly the conclusion at which
Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond, and Tversky
(1997) arrive in their study of money illusion: people tend to adopt the frame that is
presented but, when confronted with multiple representations, they form an average
that is weighted by the salience of each.
Thus, the wage cut in KKT’s question 2A is
unfair because the worker’s explicit tenure
with the employer stresses the endowment
effect, whereas it is fair to offer the reduced
wage to the newcomer in version 2B since he
will not experience that as a loss, and the
employer can achieve fair levels by complying with the more salient (presumably competitive) market wage. Although Bazerman
finds that arbitrators focus on the fairness of
wage changes, consistent with an endowment effect, he also finds that the financial
health of the firm figures prominently in
their considerations, suggesting a concern
about fairness in levels of surplus between
firms and workers.
This subsection sought to illustrate how
the empirical work of Kahneman, Knetsch,
and Thaler helps to clarify important contextual effects. These involve the interpretation
of fairness when transactions are salient,
information effects, including the ceteris
paribus assumption, extrapolation and stability, and subjective values, including endstate
utility, the endowment effect and a weighted
average of these two.
5.2. Theories of Local Justice
Some researchers have concluded that
justice does not yield to the level of abstraction that is associated with “general” or
“global” theories. Instead, they argue that,
at best, one can uncover an array of principles that are “local,” or specific to individual
contexts. These advocates of what are sometimes dubbed “phenomenological” theories
of justice point to the wide variation in
rules, arguments, legislation, court rulings,

practices and customs pertaining to the distribution of socially valued goods. They
claim the principles of justice differ according to the set of persons, good, institution,
culture, country, region, historical context
and precedents. Carried to the extreme, this
approach views justice as atomistic and precludes any theory of it. The usual more
moderate version entails many unrelated
principles, each confined to its own specific
context.
We begin by examining briefly the work of
three scholars of local justice: Jon Elster
(1992), Michael Walzer (1983), and H.
Peyton Young (1994). These authors share
certain common interests, goals and conclusions. They all articulate a context specific
view of justice. They also define justice as in
very broad terms, encompassing a very wide
range of issues including the distribution of
not only material wealth but also political
power, family privileges and public duties. In
particular, they tend to focus on fair rules of
distribution, especially for goods the allocation of which is problematic. For example, all
three deal with military service (conscription
and/or demobilization) and access to higher
education, Elster and Young examine kidney
transplants and allocation of building space,
and Walzer and Elster treat immigration.
On the other hand, there are certain differences among the three, if only in their
method and emphasis. To some extent, they
vary in the degree of context specificity they
argue, where Walzer challenges most vigorously the applicability of any theory. In terms
of approach and method, Elster views justice
more from the perspective of sociology,
Walzer from political philosophy and history,
and Young from economics and mathematics. Finally, although applications of justice
are highlighted in the work of all three, I
think it is fair to say that Walzer’s emphasis
relative to the others is normative, Elster’s
descriptive and Young’s policy-oriented.
Taken together, the major works of these
three authors on justice form an excellent
and wide-ranging case for local justice. I will

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1223

Konow: A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
begin by summarizing briefly the arguments
of each.
Michael Walzer begins his book, Spheres of
Justice (1983), by defining the subject matter
of distributive justice very broadly: “Nothing
can be omitted” (p. 3). He rejects the possibility of a theory of justice and argues “that to
search for unity is to misunderstand the subject matter of distributive justice” (p. 4).
Instead he advances the radical claim that
“the principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form; that different social goods
ought to be distributed for different reasons,
… and that all these differences derive from
different understandings of the social goods
themselves—the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism” (p. 6).
In terms of identifying what justice is (as
opposed to what it is not), Walzer distinguishes “simple equality,” or equal allocations of a
social good across all individuals, from “complex equality.” Under complex equality, given
the socially understood autonomy of each
sphere, it is not necessarily unjust that some
in the sphere of politics are more powerful or
that some in the sphere of money are more
wealthy, but it is unjust, for example, for
politicians to use their power outside their
sphere to acquire money, or for the rich to use
their wealth to secure political influence. The
most important distributive issue is membership, i.e., who belongs to a sphere, including
family, industry, neighborhood, and, first and
foremost, the political community.
Within each sphere, justice might require
simple equality, e.g., equal basic education,
or inequality, e.g., unequal professional
training, which he also calls complex equality. Walzer seems to use complex equality in
at least two senses: to denote the autonomy
of spheres and to connote a deviation from
simple equality within a sphere. It is unclear
where the equality is in this second type of
complex equality. Perhaps it means the further subdivision of spheres into members
who are then equal within each sphere, but
what guides this division and delineation?
Presumably these questions are determined,
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as with social goods, by the understandings
or meanings people attach to them. But
from whence do these meanings derive, and,
if from history and culture, how? It seems
they are given wide berth: although Walzer
downplays such cases, he notes that one can
think of a society with a moral right to haircuts (p. 88 n.) and even the Indian caste system can be just (pp. 313–15). Ultimately, it is
unclear what qualifies here as first principles
and, consequently, what, if anything, is generated in the way of refutable propositions.
In his book Local Justice (1992), Jon
Elster’s goal is more descriptive and narrow
than Walzer’s: “I consider the conceptions of
justice held by actors who are in a position to
influence the selection of specific procedures
or criteria to allocate scarce resources” (p. 5).
Although he also expresses skepticism about
the prospects for a robust theory of justice,
he is more optimistic than Walzer. Elster
favors a list of allocative principles over global theories. In his book Equity: In Theory
and Practice (1994), H. Peyton Young’s goal
is closer to Elster’s than Walzer’s: “The aim of
this book, then, is to examine how societies
solve ‘everyday’ distributive problems” (p.
xii). Although Elster and Young emphasize
justice principles as mechanisms, Young in
particular concentrates on the technical difficulties of putting justice into practice. Much
of the motivation behind Young’s work (and,
to some extent, Elster’s) are problems of
indivisibility and heterogeneity that crop up
in designing policies for the distribution of
scarce resources such as kidneys, apportionment of congressional seats, real assets in
inheritances and child custody. They note the
large assortment of mechanisms that have
been used to regulate the allocation of such
resources including proportionality, queuing,
rotation, lottery, seniority and precedent.
The rich description and incisive analysis
of Elster and Young instill a profound
appreciation of the challenges facing allocators. The problems and their solutions are
not transparent, and the consequences are
often not trivial. There are many situations,
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however, in which such problems are not
insurmountable or even significant. For
example, many goods are, for all intents and
purposes, arbitrarily divisible, e.g., food,
energy, money denominated assets. Other
goods are convertible into a divisible and
homogeneous form, e.g., the assets of an
estate may be sold and divided among the
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, it is quite correct that attributes such as indivisibility (or
lumpiness) and heterogeneity may require
special measures. In fact, these problems
might obstruct any solution that most
people would consider genuinely fair.
A lack of uniformity and exactitude in practical rules for achieving justice does not, however, imply that the values that underlie and
motivate those rules are equally diverse and
ambiguous. There are really two distinct
questions. An analogy may be drawn to efficiency. The Pareto and Compensation
Principles, for example, are conceptually clear
standards even if, say, institutional constraints
prevent their full implementation. Similarly, if
context precludes a “first-best” justice solution, principles of justice may guide one to a
“second-best” justice solution. Elster and
Young seek rules or mechanisms for implementing just outcomes. The concern of the
present paper, on the other hand, is with the
shared views of justice, even if its realization is
problematic or impossible. The former topic
is crucial if justice is to be more than merely
an abstract concept. The latter question, however, is also important, not only because of the
frequent consensus on what measures justice
requires, but also as a means of evaluating
alternative mechanisms precisely when there
are practical obstacles, discord or uncertainty.
I believe that there are at least four important lessons about contextual effects that can
be gleaned from these theories of local justice. Views of justice are affected by how the
context affects or produces scope effects,
which pertain to the choice of which individuals and allocations to compare, competing
forces such as self-interest, the weighting of
justice principles, or the relative importance

of different justice principles in a given context, and procedural justice, or process fairness, which includes the study of mechanisms aimed at implementing the justice
principles. Below I will explore these themes
as well as evidence that bears on each.
• Scope Effects. When making fairness judgments, people must choose the set of individuals and allocations to compare. Scope
effects refer to how context affects perceived
fairness through its impact on these choices.
Walzer treats the choice of persons, which
he calls membership, extensively. His concern is with how membership influences and
is influenced by distributive decision-making. He argues that no aspects of justice,
including membership, are immutable, but
boundaries will emerge, which will be
regarded for some time by implicated parties
as fair. Moreover, he claims that there is a
moral asymmetry between members and
non-members: for example, citizens of a
country have certain rights and privileges
that are not accorded non-citizens. Walzer
asks how the boundaries between individuals should be constituted, whereas the current paper asks how the choice of individuals
being compared affects views of justice.
Although this paper promotes a general
theory of justice, empirical results and
everyday observations suggest that, in a particular sense, people solve justice problems
in a “local” way. Specifically, membership, or
the “reference group” as it is known in social
psychology, is handled as other contextual
issues: people take the group that seems
most proximate in terms of comparability
and salience and then apply general principles. Thus, workers make comparisons to
co-workers, children to their siblings or
peers, residents to neighbors and experimental subjects to other subjects. This bolsters Walzer’s claim about the importance of
membership. On the other hand, I am
unaware of any evidence on the putative
fairness of the privileged status of members.
So far as Walzer’s examples accord with
intuition, however, one need not appeal to a
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separate principle of justice. The maintenance of boundaries around nations, firms,
labor unions, families, etc., can be traced to
a practical requirement for efficient social
planning and coordination as well as to the
endowment effect.23
Is membership, as Walzer suggests, usually well-defined, or is it sensitive to the information available? The results to survey question 9 of Konow (2001) suggest the latter.
Here the CEO of a multinational corporation earns $9 million per year, which is
described in version A as “around that of
CEOs at comparable corporations” and in
version B as “around 300 times that of the
average worker at his corporation.” The
same salary is judged fair by 70 percent of
137 respondents in version A but by only 43
percent of 150 respondents in version B
(P  .01). It appears that the salient reference group in version A is the CEO’s professional cohorts whereas in version B it is his
fellow employees. Dictator experiments by
Eckel and Grossman (1996) and myself
(2002) have also demonstrated that the generosity of decision makers depends on the
identity of counterparts. In those studies,
dictators contribute significantly more when
their counterparts are charities than when
they are student cohorts. Thus, casual
empiricism, surveys and experiments suggest that membership is important for justice, that people typically resolve it locally,
relying on the available context, but that
membership is neither uniquely defined nor
necessarily stable.
The second issue is the scope of comparison for allocations. For example, scope
effects can materialize in determining
whether a family’s income is relevant to the
price it should pay for telephone services or
electricity. Here the just price might be a
23
That is, as previously explained, current disparities in
levels across different groups may be justified on fairness
grounds if the levels are endowed. Opening up membership to unequal groups in order to equalize levels causes
gains and losses that generate unequal subjective values
that are dependent on changes rather than levels.
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function not only of the surplus from this
transaction but also of the distribution of
income or profit external to it. The set of relevant allocations might also vary intertemporally and include past or future allocations,
e.g., should income taxes be based on lifetime income or be adjusted by income averaging? The scope of both allocations and
individuals can be involved, e.g., should
descendents of slaves be compensated for
the unfairly appropriated product of their
ancestors’ labor?
Survey and experimental studies help
address such matters. In question 8 of
Konow (2001), a furniture manufacturer sells
chairs to a retailer subject to price controls
that allow the furniture manufacturer only a
very small and unfair profit on the chairs.
This is judged unfair by 79 percent of 88
respondents when chairs are the only item
the furniture manufacturer produces but as
unfair by only 35 percent of 85 respondents
when chair sales represent a small fraction of
the furniture producer’s otherwise profitable
business (P  .01). Thus, the fairness of this
transaction is sensitive to information about
the parties’ allocations from other transactions. Håkan Holm and Peter Engseld (2001)
conduct ultimatum and dictator experiments
in which responders (recipients) are identified as low income (having annual incomes
below about $10,000) or high income (having
incomes above about $30,000). Similar to the
dictator experiments with charities and students reported previously, they find that proposers (dictators) make significantly greater
proposals to low-income responders than to
high-income responders and, in treatments
that permit this choice, are significantly more
likely to choose as their responders low
income subjects. Here again, the fairness of
one allocation, viz., the division of the experimental earnings, is affected by information
about other allocations, viz., income from
non-experimental sources. These results
support a type of locality, not in the sense of
context specific, but rather as general principles that are interpreted in the context. In
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particular, scope effects indicate that people
evaluate fairness using both the individuals
and the allocations suggested by the context.
• Competing Forces. By definition, the only
general proposition about justice that phenomenological theories produce is that none
exists. One way, therefore, to test them is to
examine differences and similarities in justice
values across different “boundaries.” One
boundary that Walzer, Elster, and Young all
identify as relevant to justice is that of nations.
Various studies have drawn conclusions about
justice based on surveys or bargaining experiments conducted in different countries. Here
I will review evidence from several such studies and examine whether the pattern of
behavior and attitudes they uncover is best
explained by culture specific conceptions of
justice or, alternately, by the influence of goals
that compete with universal justice principles.
Roth et al. (1991) run a multi-round ultimatum game in the United States, Slovenia,
Japan, and Israel, and find significant differences in offers and that tend to increase over
rounds. Nevertheless, modal offers are still all
in the range of 50 percent to 40 percent by
the final round. Offers in the same range
emerge from a replication by Robert Slonim
and Roth (1998) in the Slovak Republic and
from a two-round ultimatum experiment by
Lisa Cameron (1999) in Indonesia with stakes
that vary by factors of 25 and 40, respectively.
Probably the most dramatic cross-cultural
study of this sort is Joseph Henrich’s (2000)
single round ultimatum experiment with 21
pairs of the Machiguenga, a people of the
Peruvian Amazon, and fifteen pairs of UCLA
graduate students using stakes equivalent to a
little more than two days labor. Comparing
his results to those of Roth et al., Cameron
(1999), and Hoffman et al. (1994), Henrich
finds small and sometimes significant differences across subject pools, but the
Machiguenga are the most notable outliers
where the modal offer is 15 percent, the
mean offer is 26 percent, and low offers are
rarely rejected. In a subsequent paper that
expands this experiment to 15 small-scale

societies, Henrich et al. (2001) find that
offers vary widely but the mean offers of the
Machiguenga remain the lowest of any
society studied.
Several explanations are possible for
observed differences across cultures. Roth
and his colleagues consider the hypothesis
that subjects share the same fairness values
but differ in degrees of bargaining aggressiveness. If that were the case, though, one would
expect higher rates of disagreement in countries where offers tend to be low, which they
do not find. Thus, they conjecture that “the
observed subject-pool differences are cultural in character” (p. 1092). Similarly, Henrich
concludes that the Machiguenga do not possess the same sense of fairness as Westerners,
indeed, perhaps no such sense at all.
An alternate hypothesis is that subjects
share a common concept of fairness but that
they differ in their willingness to act on it.
Even within countries there is wide variation
in levels of generosity, so why should there
not be similar differences across countries?
This simply suggests that the tradeoff
between self-interest and justice differs on
average across cultures, but not that selfinterest and justice mean something different in different places. Moreover, a greater
role for self-interest, as opposed to the bargaining aggressiveness Roth et al. mention,
does not imply higher rates of disagreement
in the ultimatum game: in the case of
extreme self-interest, the proposer always
offers the smallest unit, the responder
always accepts, and disagreement never
occurs. This is a close description of the
Machiguenga where only one of 21 offers
was rejected, even though their average
offers were much lower than among other
cultures. In fact, Henrich et al. seem to
move in this direction, attributing the
observed experimental differences to the
effects of social institutions on incentives to
act on self-interest, fairness or reciprocity,
and noting how the experiment, therefore, is
likely construed by subjects given the contexts familiar to them.
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Bargaining experiments might prompt a
distinct motive, usually called reciprocity,
that leads agents to reward or punish others
for their compliance with or deviation from
social norms such as fairness (see Rabin
1993 for a formal model of this). Numerous
experimental and theoretical studies have
examined reciprocity as a force separate
from distributive motives such as fairness,
e.g., Fehr, Gächter, and Georg Kirchsteiger
(1997); Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and
Kevin McCabe (1995); James Cox (2003);
Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher (1998);
Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000);
Fehr and Gächter (2000) and references
therein. Although reciprocity experiments
have been replicated in several countries,
there is still little in the way of cross-cultural
studies. But the central question of the current study is not whether there are variations
in the willingness to reciprocate fair behavior in different societies, or in the relative
importance of self-interest versus fairness,
or even in expectations of fairness, but
rather whether the justice concepts themselves differ across cultures. Unfortunately,
these studies on bargaining and reciprocity,
while shedding light on important behavioral
phenomena, do not provide an answer to this
question.24 The Frohlich and Oppenheimer
24
I believe there are a number of additional reasons to
be skeptical of the Machiguenga results as they bear on
this question. There is not only the possibility that the
Machiguenga are more self-interested, but also several
other explanations. For instance, the goal of the experiment was explicitly presented to the Machiguenga as
“playing a fun game for money.” Presumably familiar with
games but not laboratory experiments, they (more than
U.S. college students) might have understood this to be a
game of luck, the goal of which was to win the jackpot, not
to distribute earnings. In fact, responders indicated they
viewed their random selection into that role simply as bad
luck, and those few proposers who did offer 50 percent
later explained it based on fairness. Moreover, as Henrich
reports, the Machiguenga are self-sufficient: they produce
mostly for their own needs, and “anonymous transactions
are almost unknown.” They have little need for money and
rarely work for it. Consequently, even though they live in a
developing country, the stakes of less than $7 they played
for might not have presented them with as significant a
moral decision as that faced by UCLA students who played
for $160.
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(1992) experiments and replications discussed in section 2.2, which seek to reveal
distributive preferences by inducing objectivity, bring us closer to this question. The
similarity of results across five countries suggests that, when subjects are distanced from
their self-interest, cross-cultural differences
diminish, although there is no uniform evidence on whether fairness motivates their
decisions. The bargaining study of Nancy
Buchan, Eric Johnson, and Rachel Croson
(2003), on the other hand, also elicits fairness attitudes from U.S. and Japanese students, but since subjects express their views
following the bargaining phase, these judgments are likely biased by rationalization
(see Babcock et al. 1995 on this).
Survey studies of justice attitudes further
separate subjects from their self-interest by
removing any material stake. In addition,
they can address what objective parties
consider fair for others, not what they
would choose for themselves, not what they
consider fair for themselves, and not even
what they think should be done (which is
potentially distinct). The results of such
studies across different countries are
remarkably similar, often identical. For
example, several of the hypothetical scenarios Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler ask in
Canada have been presented to diverse
populations in other countries. When asked
about an increase in the price of snow shovels after a snowstorm, 82 percent of 107
Canadian respondents view it as unfair
(KKT 1986) versus a virtually identical 83
percent of 215 in Germany and Switzerland
(Frey and Pommerehne 1993). Cutting an
established worker’s wage because of
increased unemployment is seen as unfair
by 83 percent of KKT’s 98 Canadian
respondents and also by an identical 83
percent of 258 U.S. respondents (Konow
2001; question 8A in the current paper provides another example of similar responses
with these two subject pools). Robert
Shiller, Maxim Boycko, and Vladimir
Korobov (1991) pose several questions
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inspired by KKT in telephone interviews
with U.S. and Russian respondents. Even in
countries with such disparate economic and
political histories and before the implementation of fundamental market reforms
in Russia (interviews were administered in
May 1990), people express strikingly similar
views of fairness. Sixty-six percent of 131
Russians and 68 percent of 119 Americans
find it unfair to raise the price of flowers
because of a holiday (P  .78), 66 percent of
131 Russians and 70 percent of 120
Americans deem it unfair to raise the price
of tables without a change in costs (P  .46),
and 57 percent of 98 Russians and 61 percent of 115 Americans judge it fair to raise
rents on summer homes that are now more
conveniently located because of a new railway line (P  .58). Not all such studies have
revealed such a high level of international
agreement (I will consider some others
below). But the increased coincidence of
results usually found when justice values
are more specifically targeted is noteworthy. It lends credence to the view that whatever variation in generosity one observes in
experiments is due more to differences
across cultures in the willingness to act on
justice than to differences in the concept of
justice itself.
Justice is one part of the whole—it does
not exhaust the forces that impact allocations. The danger, if one construes justice
too broadly, is of failing to see the trees for
the forest. Fairness often competes with
self-interest, and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
suggest how the strategic environment can
affect which motive dominates. In other
social interactions, such as parenting, other
motives such as love and unconditional altruism might figure more prominently.
Similarly, kind and harmful acts among colleagues or neighbors are probably motivated
less by love or fairness than by opportunities
for reciprocity. As this subsection has
attempted to demonstrate, it is important to
be vigilant about identifying the distinct role
of justice among distributive forces.

• Weighting of Justice Principles. In contrast
to the evidence presented above, some survey studies suggest significant cultural differences in justice attitudes. For example,
Gaertner et al. (2001) construct a scenario in
which a small society can fund the basic
training of a handicapped person, which
evokes a concern for need, or finance the
more advanced education of an intelligent
child, which implies a greater economic benefit and, hence, a concern for efficiency. A
majority of university students in all countries studied prefers helping the handicapped person but the strength of support
differs by up to 27 percent, being weakest in
two newly liberalized Eastern European
economies. Conclusions about fairness from
this study, however, must be tempered by
the fact respondents are asked to choose the
alternative they think should be realized, not
the one they consider most fair. This opens
the door for the competing forces mentioned
above. Virginia Murphy-Berman et al.
(1984), on the other hand, explicitly elicit
fairness judgments about the distribution of
a bonus between a needy worker and a
deserving worker. They find college students
in India were significantly more inclined
than their U.S. counterparts to favor the
needy worker.
Although the authors of these two studies
lean toward the view that justice norms are
culturally relative, this does not follow if justice is a multi-criterion concept. By analogy,
the assumption of self-interest does not
imply that everyone derives the same utility
from the same set of goods. There are national differences in commodity preferences—
why should the same not be true of preferences for justice principles? This does not
mean that justice is idiosyncratically valued
(in fact, there is probably less cultural variation in preferences for justice than for
goods). Instead, it merely implies that the
information, experiences and expectations
given by the context determine the interpretation of the principles and the weight
attached to each. The national differences
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observed in the Gaertner et al. study could
be due, not only to differences in forces other
than justice, but also to the greater wishes
and expectations of inhabitants of economies
in transition for efficiency and growth.
Similarly, the greater emphasis of Indian students on need presumably reflects the
greater awareness and reality of substantial
material need in that society.
In a survey study of the general public in
thirteen countries that include the United
States, Japan, and Western and Eastern
European countries, Duane Alwin, Galin
Gornev, and Ludmila Khakhulina (1995)
predict variations in fairness judgments
based both on justice principles as well as on
culturally determined perceptions. They
find significant differences, including with
respect to equal opportunity and need satisfaction. Nevertheless, a majority in each
country agrees that equal shares of income
and wealth are not fair and that those who
work harder deserve to earn more. Yoshihisa
Kashima et al. (1988) report that Japanese
and Australian university students exhibit
preferences for equality, equity, and need,
but that there is a weakly significant difference in the emphasis each places on the first
two goals. These and previously discussed
results seem more convincingly explained by
culturally dependent weights on justice principles than by ad hoc assumptions about culture specific norms, because the former provides a more plausible account of the pattern
both of similarities as well as of differences
across countries. Indeed, the greatest challenge with cross-cultural studies is typically
to explain, not the differences, but the striking preponderance of similarities between
people in different countries. These similarities surface, not only in views expressed in
surveys (responses to questions in the
Fair/Unfair format reported here are no
more than 4 percent apart), but also in
behavior from experiments (in six of seven
countries Henrich 2000 cites, modal offers
in the ultimatum game are 40 percent to 50
percent).
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We have examined some evidence on the
claim of local justice of culture specificity,
but the strongest argument against phenomenological theories is probably a persuasive
general theory. It is interesting that, when
pressed to generalize, advocates of local justice often come up with rules that resemble
the same three principles we have identified
here. Walzer, for example, lists three distributive principles: need, desert, and free
exchange (pp. 21–26). In his scheme, free
exchange replaces efficiency, but this substitution makes sense if one considers Walzer’s
emphasis on mechanisms and the putative
strength of free markets as the usual mechanism for achieving efficient outcomes. Elster
states four lexicographic propositions (p.
240), which I paraphrase as follows: (1) maximize total welfare, (2) deviate from (1) if
necessary to ensure a minimum level of welfare, (3) deviate from (2) if people fall below
the minimum level because of their own
choices, and (4) deviate from (3) if the failed
choices are due to conditions beyond their
control. Although our principles are not
ranked, Elster’s proposition (1) is a clear call
for efficiency, and (2) is a statement of basic
needs. Propositions (3) and (4) are reminiscent of desert, whereby individuals are
rewarded or punished for the choices they
control but not for the ones they do not.
Young’s list is more a set of policy rules than
values, but it is interesting that he supports
the notion of trade-offs among a few principles and that he cites the use of rules that
reflect the three principles of this study (p.
28). He notes that the point system for allocating kidneys in the United States is based
on three criteria: (1) efficacy, or the likelihood the transplant will be a success, (2)
need, or the lack of alternatives such as dialysis, and (3) disadvantage, which compensates for the bad luck of having a kidney that
is hard to match. Efficacy is an obvious
counterpart for efficiency in this context: a
higher probability of success, ceteris
paribus, means a greater expected benefit.
Need is even more obvious. Disadvantage
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reflects the desert norm: individuals with
difficult to match kidneys are compensated
because they are not responsible for that
unfortunate fact.
• Procedural Justice. Studies of local justice
frequently treat not only distributive justice,
or fair outcomes, but also procedural justice,
or fair processes. In fact, one of the most significant dividends from this school is what it
teaches about fair practices, customs, rules,
policies and laws. Procedural justice can be
viewed in two ways: as the application of distributive justice or as something distinct.
On the one hand, just procedures can help
realize just outcomes. The procedures are
then means for fulfilling distributions prescribed by the principles of distributive justice. It should be noted that, as a matter of
terminology, principle and procedure are
sometimes used in different senses in the
justice literature. For example, many advocates of local justice refer to lotteries, rotation and queuing as principles, whereas I call
them procedures or mechanisms and
reserve the term principle for a higher level
of abstraction, both for distributive and procedural justice. Local justice theorists do,
however, distinguish levels of generality.
Elster and Young note that, when an item is
indivisible, a lottery gives equally deserving
individuals an equal chance. This can be
seen as a second best solution: when the
context complicates or precludes ex post justice, this mechanism at least creates ex ante
justice. Rotation might similarly help with
indivisible or imperfectly divisible benefits
or burdens. Young points out that rotation
also eliminates the tension between the ex
ante and ex post justice of a lottery. Viewed
as means to an end, the desirability of a procedure depends on how well it satisfies
potentially conflicting distributive principles
in the context. For example, shared custody
might be a practical solution in the case of
divorce, whereas it could simply be too costly in efficiency terms to train all draft-age
men for, say, a few months of service rather
than simply selecting at random the needed

number to serve for several years. Elster
traces queuing to desert and need. The relationship to desert seems correct in situations
in which purchasing power depends mostly
on variables for which people are not
responsible (e.g., luck, birth) and willingness
to wait depends more on variables for which
they are responsible (e.g., effort, choices).
Queuing probably also improves allocations
to more needy persons. Even efficiency
might be served to some degree (although
presumably less than with price rationing) as
higher valued buyers, ceteris paribus, will be
more willing to wait. Thus, fair processes
may be grounded, in part, on these principles of distributive justice.
On the other hand, some argue that procedural justice is valued for itself, independent of outcomes. Indeed, Nozick’s
approach (section 4.1) has been characterized as the extreme case of procedural justice since allocations are judged (almost)
entirely based on the processes by which
they obtained. Juridical applications have
figured prominently in much of this literature from the pioneering work of John
Thibaut and Laurens Walker (1978) to that
of Tom R. Tyler and E. Allan Lind (2000).
The growing significance of process over
outcome is also observed in the arena of
political philosophy and theory, where the
theme of discourse looms large.
Philosopher and social theorist Jürgen
Habermas (1984) proposes a theory of communicative action, which introduces a
process of inclusive and rational discourse
aimed at attaining agreement among parties. Habermas and political scientists, such
as John S. Dryzek (1990), advocate an application of this to the public sphere called
“deliberative democracy.” This design has
been associated with justice, and morality in
general. In fact, political scientists Tracy
Sulkin and Adam Simon (2001) conduct
ultimatum games the results of which indicate that deliberative opportunities create
both more just outcomes as well as
enhanced perceptions of fairness.
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In economics, Sen has been an important
contributor to clarifying the distinction
between process and outcome and to stressing the importance of process for social
choice theory (1995). Frey and Stutzer
(2001a,b) distinguish outcome utility from
process utility and propose measuring the
latter using reported “satisfaction with life.”
Specifically, in support of claims regarding
deliberative democracy, they offer evidence
that people derive procedural utility from
the ability to participate more directly in the
political decision making process. Using data
from Swiss cantons, they report that in jurisdictions with higher degrees of direct
democracy, the population is more satisfied,
both because of more satisfactory outcomes
as well as enjoyment of greater participation
rights. One outcome they cite (2001b) concerns compensation of public employees:
more directly democratic institutions restrict
the ability of politicians to “buy” the support
of low-ranked public employees, resulting in
lower compensation to them. High-ranked
public employees, on the other hand, must
be compensated with higher pay for their
reduced power under direct democracy. A
second outcome they note is that inhabitants
of more directly democratic cantons are
more satisfied, controlling for demographic
variables, income and population size. As
evidence of procedural utility, Frey and
Stutzer (2001a) point to the greater benefit
to Swiss nationals in comparison to foreign
residents. In particular, they attribute this
difference to the existence, rather than the
activation, of participation rights of the
nationals.
Do people not only value procedures
above and beyond their outcomes but also
specifically value them as being fair? A frequent refrain in this paper is that social
behavior and social preferences do not necessarily signify a concern for justice but
instead could be motivated by reciprocal
altruism, familial responsibility, friendship or
even self-interest. Paul Anand (2001) offers
evidence from a survey of 130 British voters
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that both outcomes and procedures matter to
perceptions of justice. Using scenarios from
politics, healthcare, the market and the workplace, he concludes that people view as more
fair procedures that permit them greater participation, freedom and information. The
empirical study of procedural justice by economists is in its infancy, but it represents an
exciting and important direction of research.
5.3.Context Dependence
We have examined contextual approaches
to justice and some lessons derived from evidence on them. The work of Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler contributes to our
understanding of fair transactions, information effects and subjective values. The studies of Elster, Walzer, Young, and Frey and
Stutzer, among others, help to clarify issues
of membership, competing forces, the
weighting of justice principles and process.
Social scientists, and economists in particular, are relative newcomers to the study of
justice. It should not be surprising, then, if
time and effort are needed to sort through
these so-called contextual effects and to
identify the general forces at work. This is
not unlike past experience where, in the
early stages of developing theories of markets or efficiency, general principles were
obscured by indivisibilities, discontinuities,
heterogeneity, informational imperfections
and institutional constraints. Nevertheless,
as Walzer acknowledges, the existence and
validity of a general theory of justice can only
be determined by means of empirical work:
“It may be the case … that certain internal
principles, certain conceptions of social
goods, are reiterated in many, perhaps in all,
human societies. That is an empirical matter.
It cannot be determined by philosophical
argument among ourselves—nor even by
philosophical argument among some ideal
version of ourselves” (p. 314, n.).
The idea running through this section is
that justice is a context dependent, but not
context specific, phenomenon. That is, its
principles do not change according to
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context. Instead, justice is a general phenomenon, and it is a potential, if not always
realized, force across many contexts. The
effects of context should also not be seen as
contamination of some ideal, because no
such pristine context-free justice exists.
Justice evaluation, for example, requires a
reference group, or choice of relevant individuals, to which to apply the principles,
whether it be one’s friends, colleagues,
neighbors, citizens or all the people of the
world, and justice principles provide no
guidance on such questions. Context is the
indispensable element that supplies the people, variables, time framework and weighting of principles that result in justice preferences. Because individuals may interpret
context differently, unanimity is rarely
found, but the high level of agreement usually observed and the patterned variations
consistent with the contextual effects discussed here indicate that justice is not arbitrary,
idiosyncratic
or
capricious.
Nevertheless, the study of justice requires
an acute awareness of the important but
often subtle role of context.
6. Pluralistic Justice
Previous sections have classified and aimed
to synthesize theories of justice within four
distinct elements of an integrated theory. We
conclude with an even broader attempt at
synthesis that places the proposed theory in
the context of multi-criterion, or pluralistic,
justice theories, and considers evidence on
preferences over the multiple principles.
In social psychology, one of the leading
pluralistic approaches is that of Morton
Deutsch (1985), who proposes three principles, viz., equality, equity (or proportionality)
and need, which in his scheme are specific to
different contexts. David Miller (1976) advocates a system based on desert and need in
which, similar to the current paper, social
context affects in a systematic manner the
weight attached to each justice principle as
well as the importance of justice relative to
other goals (he also names rights as a princi-

ple but argues that it mostly falls away in
modern market economies). To my knowledge, the first statement of three principles
resembling those here is due to Frohlich and
Oppenheimer. Based on their experimental
study of preferences for distribution mechanisms, they speculate that “distributive justice involves the competing claims of entitlements, need, and the desirability of
preserving incentives” (1992, p. 176), which
they later call just deserts, need and efficiency (1994, p. 152). Moreover, they conclude
that “If an ethically problematic situation
involves a conflict between competing values, then the strength and weight of those
values have to be taken into consideration in
the determination of what is fair” (1992, p.
176). Frohlich and Oppenheimer do not formally state the three motives in detail or test
them empirically, but such a formulation has
been proposed and tested using surveys
(Konow 2001). Dictator experiments
designed to test equity and need (Konow
2000, 2002) establish the relevance of those
principles when monetary stakes are
involved.
John T. Scott et al. (2001) propose a theory based on four principles that form the
union of the sets listed above, i.e., equality,
equity/merit, efficiency and need. As equality has played such a prominent role in justice
research, let us consider briefly whether its
omission from the three principle theory
defended here is justified. To clarify, I
acknowledge that equality is a common rule
of fairness, i.e., a frequently used mechanism. Indeed, Skyrms (1996; 1999 with
James Alexander) demonstrates the attractive properties of replicator dynamics for
explaining the emergence of equality when
agents have no special claim based, say, on
need or desert. What is in dispute is whether
equality is a principle of fairness, i.e., a distinct goal that holds generally and not merely as a special case of general principles.
Equality is obviously fair when individuals
are equal based on the salient justice principle(s), i.e., equal desert, need or efficiency.
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As discussed in section 2, equality is probably most often associated with need as people’s basic needs are usually assumed equal,
consistent with the Murphy-Berman et al.
finding that Indian subjects tend more
toward equality than Americans. Echoing
Leventhal (1976), they conjecture “that
when the level of resources is low, need may
become more salient as an allocation strategy. In such situations, maintaining minimal
standards for all recipients may become
more important than increasing the standards for a few meritorious individuals”
(p. 1270).
The more significant hindrance to determining whether equality is a general principle or merely a special case is the presence
of contextual effects that complicate these
efforts. As Miller writes, “In the case of
equality, on the other hand, there is potentially always an ambiguity: is equality being
valued as positively the right thing in the circumstances, or is it being chosen by default,
as it were, in the absence of reliable information about desert or need?” (1992, pp.
559–60). The latter is consistent with the
evidence cited in section 5.1 of this paper
about the ceteris paribus assumption: survey
and experimental evidence suggest that people, when they lack information about factors relevant to evaluating justice based on
its principles (e.g., effort, choices, costs,
luck, basic needs, productivity), assume that
such factors are equal across individuals. In
that case, the best possible estimate of fair
allocations is equal splits.
Güth (1988) notes that equality sometimes emerges as a rule when contributions
or rewards are not very important. This
could be explained by efforts to avoid costly
information search or, consistent with the
motives if not outcomes of the Orley
Ashenfelter et al. (1992) experiment, costly
disputes. Deutsch argues that equality is the
justice principle that applies in the context of
solidarity relationships such as friendships. If
equality is chosen to avoid information and
dispute costs, however, it seems likely that
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this claim about equality and solidarity is
apocryphal.25 Even if equality were accorded status as a general principle in solidarity
relationships, however, that would still not
make it a general principle of justice.
Habitual use of equality among friends, for
example, does not necessarily imply that it is
just, but only that it is friendly.
A final point about equality pertains to
the frequent pleas for equality of opportunity based on appeals to fairness. Note,
though, that the stated goal in this case is
not to equalize allocations but only opportunities, whereby no final outcome, let alone
an equal one, is guaranteed. Indeed, such
arguments are often accompanied by proposals to allocate resources unequally in
favor of the disadvantaged in order to “level
the playing field” (e.g., Roemer 1998). This
concern figures prominently in the discussion of allocations to minors, especially of
general education. Equality of opportunity
is easily reconciled with the Equity
Principle: the goal is to compensate people
for factors not under their control such that
those who contribute more will benefit
more, but two persons who bear equal
responsibility will experience equal outcomes. This explains why equal opportunity
policies are so persuasively argued with
respect to basic education. Children are in a
formative phase in which they are acquiring
important skills that will favorably or unfavorably impact their future welfare in dramatic ways. Both because of their developmental level and their constrained freedom
of choice, we typically do not hold children
accountable for relevant circumstances such
25
For example, consider a group of friends settling the
bill after dinner together in a restaurant. The frequent
choice of equal splits is probably due in no small part to a
desire by the parties not to incur the cost of calculating
each diner’s individual responsibility including tax and tip
as well as the (perhaps more significant) cost to friendships
in the form of potential disputes and the appearance of
pettiness. Indeed, if more were at stake, e.g., if one party
had ordered a small salad with a glass of water whereas the
other party had ordered a four-course meal with wine, the
friends would probably discard the equality rule and agree
to a more accurate tallying of accounts.
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as family income, school district, exposure
to educational resources at home, etc.
Adjustments for these morally arbitrary factors are consistent with the Equity
Principle. This and the other cases above,
however, require no appeal to a separate
principle of equality.
A final matter for a multi-criterion theory
of justice is the precise relationship
between the various principles in the preferences of individuals. Does the salient
principle reign absolute or do people entertain several principles contemporaneously?
If the latter, are preferences over principles,
for example, lexicographic or do they reflect
trade-offs? Evidence previously presented
in this paper, as well as the comments of
Miller, and Frohlich and Oppenheimer,
point toward the second answer to each of
these questions. Here we will specifically
consider studies that examine preferences
when the degree of conflict between the
three principles is varied.
A vignette study (Konow 2001) examines
pair-wise trade-offs between the three principles of equity, efficiency and need.26 The
results are consistent with the simple model
of convex preferences proposed there in
which agents are averse to allocations that
deviate from the levels prescribed by the
principles. Regarding their relevance to
micro-justice, Linda Skitka and Philip
Tetlock (1992) find trade-offs among 235
student subjects who quantitatively rate allocations to hypothetical recipients who differ
with respect to their responsibility for or control over their circumstances, the efficiency
26
The study by Gaertner, Jungeilges, and Neck (2001)
provides especially thorough evidence on the trade-off
between two of these principles: need and efficiency.
Subjects in five countries face two hypothetical situations
involving the allocation of scarce resources to one of two
policies. One policy addresses basic needs while the level
of benefits from the other policy are varied across four different versions of each scenario. Depending on the question and country, between 26 percent and 79 percent of
respondents who initially chose the first policy switch to
the second as the benefits of the second rise, consistent
with a trade-off between need and efficiency.

of providing resources to each, and the
severity of the need of each. Ordóñez and
Mellers (1993) corroborate these trade-offs
for macro-justice. Although they motivate
their study with reference to the equalityefficiency trade-off, the income distributions
their 150 student respondents evaluate
quantitatively reflect different degrees of
concurrence with the three motives discussed here. Subjects compare societies that
differ with regard to mean salary, which
reflects an efficiency concern, the correlation between work (which includes merit,
effort, etc.) and salary, which corresponds
roughly to the Equity Principle, and the
height of the minimum salary, which may be
below or at the poverty level, evoking a concern for basic needs. The results indicate
subjects value each of these goals and weigh
one against the other.
Ordóñez and Mellers elicit two sets of
responses: one for the “more fair” society
and the other for the society in which the
respondents would “prefer to live.” They
find that fair and preferred income distributions do not necessarily coincide.
Specifically, fair distributions correlate most
strongly with the work-salary correlation,
reflecting a concern for the Equity Principle.
Preferred distributions, on the other hand,
correlate most strongly with minimum salary
and mean salary, in that order, pointing
toward the Need and Efficiency Principles,
respectively. This implies that people value
equity but prefer to live in societies that sacrifice some equity in order to provide for
higher minimum and mean earnings.
This finding dovetails with a subtle but
important property of justice that has been
traced to Aristotle. The argument is that justice terminology is used in different senses,
the more specific sense corresponding to the
Equity (or Accountability) Principle and the
most general sense connoting the whole of
morality. Thus, in one sense, “fair” refers
only to equity, and, in another sense, means
“good” and also includes need and efficiency. Typically, the terms fair and just connote
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a mixture of these two senses.27 By comparing preferences for “fair” versus “right” allocations when equity, need and efficiency
conflict, one finds support for these claims
(Konow 2001). The implication of these
studies is that equity (i.e., justice in the specific sense) guides but does not monopolize
distributive preferences: people care about
equity, but the allocations they prefer for
themselves and consider right are also influenced by concerns for efficiency and need.
This paper has examined the descriptive
power of many influential positive and normative theories of justice employing numerous results that have now been collected by
social scientists. The theories, as well as the
empirical evidence on them, contribute to
an understanding of shared concepts of justice, although no single theory suffices to
that end. A multi-criterion theory of justice
is proposed in which three justice principles
are interpreted, weighted and applied in a
manner that depends on the context. This
integrated theory purports to offer a broad
and systematic account of popular views of
justice. Probably the most significant challenge to this or any theory, however, is to
incorporate the impact of context on justice
evaluation, and much work remains in this
regard. If these issues can be resolved, the
resulting theory of justice would provide
immeasurable assistance in many ways: it
could help to explain phenomena impacted
by it, to distinguish distributive preferences
from other motives such as self-interest, reciprocity and altruism, and to guide social
policies.
REFERENCES
Adams, J. Stacy. 1965. “Inequality in Social Exchange,”
in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol.

27
Actually, fair in the general sense can include any
moral criterion, e.g., familial duty, friendship, love, reciprocity, etc. The current paper adopts an intermediate
approach: justice encompasses preferences over allocations but not over behavior. This might conflict with some
uses of justice terminology, but my sense is that this level
of specificity comes closest to common usage while making
a useful distinction from that which is merely “good.”

1235

2. Leonard Berkowitz, ed. NY, London: Academic
Press Inc, pp. 267–99.
Akerlof, George A. and Janet Yellen. 1990. “The Fair
Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,”
Quart. J. Econ. 105:2, pp. 255–83.
Alexander, James, and Brian Skyrms. 1999. “Bargaining
with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?” J.
Philosophy 96:1, pp. 588–98.
Alwin, Duane F.; Galin Gornev and Ludmila
Khakhulina. 1995. “Comparative Referential
Structures, System Legitimacy, and Justice
Sentiments: An International Comparison,” in Social
Justice and Political Change. James R. Kluegel,
David S. Mason and Bernd Wegener, eds. NY:
Walter de Gruyter, Inc, pp. 109–31
Amiel, Yoram, and Frank A. Cowell. 1999. Thinking
About Inequality: Personal Judgment and Income
Distributions. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.
Anand, Paul. 2001. “Procedural Fairness in Economic
and Social Choice: Evidence from a Survey of
Voters,” J. Econ. Psych. 22, pp. 247–70.
Andreoni, James, and John H. Miller. 2002. “Giving
According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism,”
Econometrica 70:2, pp. 737–53.
Aristotle. 1925. Ethica Nicomachea. Trans. W. D. Ross.
London: Oxford U. Press.
Arrow, K.J. 1973. “Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes
on Rawls’s Theory of Justice,” J. Philosophy 70:9, pp.
245–63.
Ashenfelter, Orley; Janet Currie, Henry S. Farber and
Matthew Spiegel. 1992. “An Experimental
Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative
Arbitration Systems,” Econometrica 60:6, pp.
1407–33.
Babcock, Linda; George Loewenstein, Samuel
Issacharoff and Colin Camerer. 1995. “Biased
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining,” Amer. Econ.
Rev. 85:5, pp. 1337–43.
Babcock, Linda; Xianghong Wang and George
Loewenstein. 1996. “Choosing the Wrong Pond:
Social Comparisons in Negotiations that Reflect a
Self-Serving Bias,” Quart. J. Econ. 111:1, pp. 1–19.
Ball, Sheryl B. and Paula-Ann Cech. 1996. “Subject
Pool Choice and Treatment Effects in Economic
Laboratory Research,” Research Experiment. Econ.
6, pp. 239–92.
Barry, Brian M. 1989. Democracy, Power, and Justice:
Essays in Political Theory. NY, Oxford: Clarendon
Press and Oxford U. Press.
Baumol, William J. 1986. Superfairness: Applications
and Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bazerman, Max H. 1985. “Norms of Distributive
Justice in Interest Arbitration,” Ind. Lab. Relat. Rev.
38, pp. 558–70.
Bentham, J. 1789. An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation. London: Payne.
Berg, Joyce; John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe. 1995.
“Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,” Games
Econ. Behav. 10:1, pp. 122–42.
Binmore, Ken. 1994. Game Theory and the Social
Contract, Vol 2: Just Playing. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1236

1236

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI (December 2003)

Blinder, Alan S. and Don H. Choi. 1990. “A Shred of
Evidence on Theories of Wage Stickiness,” Quart. J.
Econ. 105:4, pp. 1003–15.
Blount, Sally. 1995. “When Social Outcomes Aren’t
Fair: The Effect of Casual Attributions on
Preferences,” Org. Behav. Human Decision
Processes 63:2, pp. 131–44.
Boadway, Robin and Neil Bruce. 1984. Welfare
Economics. Oxford, NY: Basil Blackwell.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels. 2000. “ERC: A
Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition,”
Amer. Econ. Rev. 90:1, pp. 166–93.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. 1998. Recasting
Egalitarianism: New Rules for Communities, States
and Markets. The Real Utopias Project, vol. 3. Erik
Olin Wright, ed. NY: Verso.
Buchan, Nancy R.; Rachel T.A. Croson and Eric J.
Johnson. 2003. “When Do Fairness Beliefs Influence
Bargaining Behavior: Experimental Evidence from
Japan and the United States,” forthcoming, J.
Consumer Res.
Buchanan, Allen E. 1981. “The Marxian Critique of
Justice and Rights,” Canadian J. Philosophy 7:Supp.,
pp. 269–306.
Buchanan, James M. 1986. Liberty, Market and State:
Political Economy in the 1980s. NY: NYU. Press,
Columbia U. Press.
Burrows, Paul, and Graham Loomes. 1994. “The
Impact of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior,” Empir.
Econ. 19, pp. 201–21.
Cameron, Lisa A. 1999. “Raising the Stakes in the
Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from
Indonesia,” Econ. Inquiry 37:1, pp. 47–59.
Charness, Gary and Brit Grosskopf. 2001. “Relative
Payoffs and Happiness: An Experimental Study,” J.
Econ. Behav. Org. 45:3, pp. 301–28.
Charness, Gary and Matthew Rabin. 2002.
“Understanding Social Preferences with Simple
Tests,” Quart. J. Econ. 117:3, pp. 817–69.
Clark, Jeremy. 1998. “Fairness in Public Good
Provision: An Investigation of Preferences for
Equality and Proportionality,” Canadian J. Econ.
31:3, pp. 708–29.
Cohen, Ronald L. 1982. “Perceiving Justice: An
Attributional Perspective,” in Equity and Justice in
Social Behavior. Jerald Greenberg and Ronald L.
Cohen, eds. NY: Academic Press, pp. 119–60.
Cox, James C. 2003. “How to Identify Trust and
Reciprocity,” forthcoming, Games, Econ. Behav.
Cullen, Bernard. 1994. “Philosophical Theories of
Justice,” in Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives.
Klaus R. Scherer, ed. Chippenham, Wiltshire, UK:
Antony Rowe Ltd, pp. 15–64.
Dahl, Gordon B. and Michael R. Ransom. 1999. “Does
Where You Stand Depend on Where You Sit?
Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Beliefs,” Amer.
Econ. Rev. 89:4, pp. 703–27.
Deutsch, Morton. 1985. Distributive Justice.
Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou Press.
Dryzek, John S. 1990. Discursive Democracy: Politics,
Policy, and Political Science. Cambridge and NY:
Cambridge U. Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 1981. “What Is Equality? Part 2:

Equality of Resources,” Philosophy Public Affairs
10:1, pp. 283–345.
———. 2000. Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and
Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.
Press.
Eckel, Catherine C. and Philip J. Grossman. 1996.
“Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games,” Games
Econ. Behav. 16, pp. 181–91.
Ellingsen, Tore and Magnus Johannesson. 2003. “Sunk
Costs, Fairness, and Disagreement,” Stockholm
School Econ.
Elster, Jon. 1992. Local Justice: How Institutions
Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens. NY:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Falk, Armin and Urs Fischbacher. 1998. “A Theory of
Reciprocity,” U. Zurich manuscript.
Farwell, Lisa, and Bernard Weiner. 1996. “SelfPerceptions of Fairness in Individual and Group
Contexts,” Personality Social Psych. Bull. 22:9, pp.
867–991.
Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter. 2000. “Fairness and
Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,” J. Econ.
Perspect. 14:3, pp. 159–81.
Fehr, Ernst; Simon Gächter and Georg Kirchsteiger.
1997. “Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement
Device: Experimental Evidence,” Econometrica
65:4, pp. 833–60.
Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt. 1999. “A Theory of
Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,” Quart. J.
Econ. 114:3, pp. 817–68.
Foley, Duncan K. 1967. “Resource Allocation and the
Public Sector,” Yale Econ. Essays 7, pp. 45–98.
Fong, Christina. 2001. “Social Preferences, SelfInterest, and the Demand for Redistribution,” J.
Public Econ. 82:2, pp. 225–46.
Forsythe, Robert; Joel L. Horowitz, N.E. Savin and
Martin Sefton. 1994. “Fairness in Simple
Bargaining Experiments,” Games Econ. Behav. 6,
pp. 347–69.
Franciosi, Robert; Praveen Kujal, Roland Michelitsch,
Vernon Smith and Gang Deng. 1995. “Fairness:
Effect on Temporary and Equilibrium Prices in PostOffer Markets,” Econ. J. 105:431, pp. 938–50.
Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions within Reason. NY:
W.W. Norton Co.
Frey, Bruno S. and Beat Gygi. 1988. “Die Fairness von
Preisen,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift Volkswirtschaft
Statistik 124:4, pp. 519–41.
Frey, Bruno S.; Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Reiner
Eichenberger. 1996. “The Old Lady Visits Your
Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets,” J. Polit.
Econ. 104:6, pp. 1297–313.
Frey, Bruno S. and Werner W. Pommerehne. 1993.
“On the Fairness of Pricing–an Empirical Survey
Among the General Population,” J. Econ. Behav.
Org. 20, pp. 295–307.
Frey, Bruno S. and Alois Stutzer. 2001a. “Beyond
Bentham—Measuring Procedural Utility,” CESifo
work. paper 492, Center Econ. Studies and Institute
for Econ. Research, Munich.
———. 2001b. “Outcome, Process and Power in
Direct Democracy,” Public Choice 107, pp. 271–293.
Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1992.

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1237

Konow: A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to
Ethical Theory. Berkeley and LA: U. California Press.
———. 1994. “Preferences for Income Distribution
and Distributive Justice: A Window on the Problems
of Using Experimental Data in Economics and
Ethics,” Eastern Econ. J. 20:2, pp. 147–55.
Frohlich, Norman; Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Cheryl L.
Eavey. 1987. “Laboratory Results on Rawls’s
Distributive Justice,” Brit. J. Polit. Sci. 17, pp. 1–21.
Gaertner, Wulf; Jochen Jungeilges and Reinhard Neck.
2001. “Cross-Cultural Equity Evaluations: A
Questionnaire-Experimental Approach,” Europ.
Econ. Rev. 45, pp. 953–63.
Gauthier, David. 1985. “Bargaining and Justice,” in
Ethics and Economics. Ellen Frankel Paul, Jeffrey
Paul, and Fred D. Miller, Jr., eds. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, pp. 29–47.
Gächter, Simon and Arno Riedl. 2001. “Moral Property
Rights in Bargaining,” dept. econ. and econometrics,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands; St. Gallen,
Switzerland. U. Amsterdam, U. St. Gallen.
George, Henry. 1879 [1914]. Progress and Poverty. San
Francisco, NY: Random House.
Goldstein, William M. and Elke U. Weber. 1995.
“Content and Discontent: Indication and Implications
of Domain Specificity in Preferential Decision
Making,” Psych. Learning Motivation 32, pp. 83–136.
Greenberg, Jerald. 1979. “Protestant Ethic
Endorsement and the Fairness of Equity Inputs,” J.
Research Personality 13, pp. 81–90.
Güth, Werner. 1988. “On the Behavioral Approach to
Distributive Justice: A Theoretical and Experimental
Investigation,” in Aspects of Distributive Justice.
Shlomo Maital, ed. NY: NYU Press, pp. 703–17.
———. 1994. “Distributive Justice: A Behavioral
Theory and Empirical Evidence,” in Essays on
Economic Psychology. H. Brandstätter and Werner
Güth, eds. pp. 153–75.
Güth, Werner and Reinhard Tietz. 1990. “Ultimatum
Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of
Experimental Results,” J. Econ. Psych. 11, pp. 417–49.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative
Action. (Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns)
Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.
Harsanyi, John C. 1955. “Cardinal Welfare,
Individualistic
Ethics,
and
Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility,” J. Polit. Econ. 63, pp. 309–21.
Harsanyi, John C. 1975. “Can the Maximin Principle
Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John
Rawls’s Theory,” Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 69, pp.
594–606.
Heider, Fritz. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal
Relations. NY: John Wiley & Sons.
Heller, Agnes. 1974. The Theory of Need in Marx.
London: Allison & Busby Limited.
Henrich, Joseph. 2000. “Does Culture Matter in
Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining
among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon,”
Amer. Econ. Rev. 90:4, pp. 973–79.
Henrich, Joseph; Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin
Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis and Richard
McElreath. 2001. “In Search of Homo Economicus:
Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,”

1237

Amer. Econ. Rev. 91:2, pp. 73–78.
Hicks, John R. 1940. “The Valuation of Social Income,”
Economica 7, pp. 105–24.
Hoffman, Elizabeth; Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat
and Vernon Smith. 1994. “Preferences, Property
Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,”
Games Econ. Behav. 7, pp. 346–80.
Hoffman, Elizabeth and Matthew L. Spitzer. 1985.
“Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An
Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of
Distributive Justice,” J. Legal Stud. 14, pp. 259–97.
Holcombe, Randall G. 1997. “Communications:
Absence of Envy Does Not Imply Fairness,” South.
Econ. J. 63:3, pp. 797–802.
Holm, Håkan and Peter Engseld. 2001. “Choosing
Bargaining Partners: An Experimental Study on the
Impact of Information About Income and Gender,”
econ. dept. Lund U. Sweden.
Homans, George C. 1958. “Social Behavior as
Exchange,” Amer. J. Sociology 63, pp. 597–606.
Jasso, Guillermina. 1999. “How Much Injustice Is
There in the World? Two New Justice Indexes,”
Amer. Sociol. Rev. 64:1, pp. 133–68.
Jasso, Guillermina and Peter H. Rossi. 1977.
“Distibutive Justice and Earned Income,” Amer.
Sociol. Rev. 42, pp. 639–51.
Kachelmeier, Steven J.; Stephen T. Limberg and
Michael S. Schadewald. 1991. “A Laboratory Market
Examination of the Consumer Price Response to
Information About Producers’ Costs and Profits,”
Account. Rev. 66:4, pp. 694–717.
Kagel, John H.; Chung Kim and Donald Moser. 1996.
“Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric
Information and Asymmetric Payoffs,” Games Econ.
Behav. 13:1, pp. 100–10.
Kahneman, Daniel; Jack L. Knetsch and Richard
Thaler. 1986. “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” Amer. Econ.
Rev. 76, pp. 728–41.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky. 1979. “Prospect
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,”
Econometrica 47:2, pp. 273, 277–78.
Kaldor, Nicholas. 1939. “Welfare Propositions of
Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility,” Econ. J. 49, pp. 549–51.
Kashima, Yoshihisa; Michael Siegal, Kenichiro Tanaka
and Hiroko Isaka. 1988. “Universalism in Lay
Conceptions of Distributive Justice: A CrossCultural Examination,” Int. J. Psych. 23, pp. 51–64.
Kluegel, James R. and Eliot R. Smith. 1986. Beliefs
About Inequality: Americans’ Views of What Is and
What Ought To Be. NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
Knez, Marc J. and Colin F. Camerer. 1995. “Outside
Options and Social Comparison in Three-Player
Ultimatum Game Experiments,” Games Econ.
Behav. 10:1, pp. 65–94.
Kolm, Serge-Christophe. 1985. Le Contrat Social
Libéral: Philosophie et Pratique du Libéralisme.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Konow, James. 1996. “A Positive Theory of Economic
Fairness,” J. Econ. Behav. Org. 31:1, pp. 13–35.
———. 2000. “Fair Shares: Accountability and
Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions,”

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1238

1238

Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI (December 2003)

Amer. Econ. Rev. 90:4, pp. 1072–92.
———. 2001. “Fair and Square: The Four Sides of
Distributive Justice,” J. Econ. Behav. Org. 46:2, pp.
137–64.
———. 2002. “Mixed Feelings: Theories and Evidence
of Warm Glow and Altruism,” econ. dept., Loyola
Marymount U.
Kravitz, David A. and Samuel Gunto. 1992. “Decisions
and Perceptions of Recipients in Ultimatum
Bargaining Games,” J. Socio-Econ. 21:1, pp. 65–84.
Kritikos, Alexander and Friedel Bolle. 2001.
“Distributional Concerns: Equity- or EfficiencyOriented?” Econ. Letters 73:3, pp. 333–38.
Krosnick, Jon A. 1991. “Response Strategies for Coping
with the Cognitive Demands of an Attitude Measure
in Surveys,” Applied Cognitive Psych. 5, pp. 213–36.
Lamm, Helmut and Thomas Schwinger. 1980. “Norms
Concerning Distributive Justice: Are Needs Taken
Into Consideration in Allocation Decisions?” Social
Psych. Quart. 43:4, pp. 425–29.
Lanza, Marilyn Lewis; James Carifio, Ivor Pattison and
Carol Hicks. 1997. “Validation of a Vignette
Simulation of Assault on Nurses by Patients,” J.
Nursing Scholarship 29:2, pp. 151–54
Ledyard, John O. 1995. “Public Goods: A Survey of
Experimental Research,” in The Handbook of
Experimental Economics. John H. Kagel and Alvin E.
Roth, eds. Princeton: Princeton U. Press, pp. 111–94.
Leventhal, Gerald S. 1976. “The Distribution of
Rewards and Resources in Groups and
Organizations,” in Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, Vol. 9. Leonard Berkowitz and Elaine
Walster, eds. NY: Academic Press, pp. 92–131.
Leventhal, Gerald S.; Jurgis Karuza and William Rick
Fry. 1980. “Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Allocation
Preferences,” in Justice and Social Interaction:
Experimental and Theoretical Contributions from
Psychological Research. Gerold Mikula, ed. NY:
Springer Verlag, pp. 167–218.
Leventhal, Gerald S. and James W. Michaels. 1971.
“Locus of Cause and Equity Motivation as
Determinants of Reward Allocation,” J. Personality
Social Psych. 17:3, pp. 229–35.
Leventhal, Gerald S. and Harold D. Whiteside. 1973.
“Equity and the Use of Reward to Elicit High
Performance,” J. Personal. Social Psych. 25:1, pp. 75–83.
Levine, David I. 1993. “Fairness, Markets, and Ability
to Pay: Evidence from Compensation Executives,”
Amer. Econ. Rev. 83:5, pp. 1241–59.
Major, Brenda and Kay Deaux. 1982. “Individual
Differences in Justice Behavior,” in Equity and Justice
in Social Behavior. Jerald Greenberg and Ronald L.
Cohen, eds. NY: Academic Press, pp. 43–76.
Malthus, Thomas R. 1798 [1914]. An Essay on the
Principle of Population. London: J.M. Dent & Sons.
Martin, Elizabeth and Anne Polivka. 1992. “The Effect
of Questionnaire Redesign on Conceptual Problems
in the Current Population Survey,” Proceedings of
Amer. Statist. Assoc. Section on Survey Methods,
Aug., pp. 655–60.
Marx, Karl. 1875 [1993]. “Critique of the Gotha
Programme,” in Justice. Alan Ryan, ed. Oxford:
Oxford U. Press, pp. 159–63.

Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1958. Selected
Works. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
McCloskey, Herbert and John Zaller. 1984. The
American Ethos: Public Attitudes Toward Capitalism
and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press.
Messick, David M. and Keith P. Sentis. 1979. “Fairness
and Preference,” J. Exper. Social Psych. 15:4, pp. 418–34.
———. 1983. “Fairness, Preference, and Fairness
Biases,” in Equity Theory: Psychological and
Sociological Perspectives. David M. Messick and
Karen Cook, eds. NY: Praeger Publishers, pp. 61–94.
Mikula, Gerold, ed. 1980. Justice and Social Interaction:
Experimental and Theoretical Contributions from
Psychological Research. NY: Springer-Verlag.
Mikula, Gerold and Thomas Schwinger. 1973.
“Sympathie zum Partner und Bedürfnis nach
sozialer Anerkennung als Determinanten der
Aufteilung gemeinsam erzielter Gewinne,”
Psychologische Beiträge 15:3, pp. 396–407.
Mill, John Stuart. 1861 [1979]. Utilitarianism.
Indianapolis and Cambridge, MA: Hackett Pub. Co.
Miller, David. 1976 [1979]. Social Justice. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
———. 1992. “Distributive Justice: What the People
Think,” Ethics 102, pp. 555–93.
Murphy-Berman, Virginia; John J. Berman, Purnima
Singh, Anju Pachauri and Pramod Kumar. 1984.
“Factors Affecting Allocation to Needy and Meritorious
Recipients: A Cross-Cultural Comparison,” J. Personal.
Social Psych. 46: 6, pp. 1267–72.
Nielsen, Kai. 1985. Equality and Liberty. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman and Allanheld.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. NY:
Basic Books.
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix; Iris Bohnet and Bruno Frey.
1997. “Fairness and Competence in Democratic
Decisions,” Public Choice 91:1, pp. 89–105.
Oleson, Paul E. 2001. “An Experimental Examination
of Alternative Theories of Distributive Justice and
Economic Fairness,” unpub. dissertation, U. Arizona.
Ordóñez, Lisa D. and Barbara A. Mellers. 1993.
“Trade-Offs in Fairness and Preference Judgments,”
in Psychological Perspectives on Justice. Barbara A.
Mellers and Jonathan Baron, eds. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge U. Press, pp. 138–54.
Overlaet, Bert. 1991. “Merit Criteria as Justification for
Differences in Earnings,” J. Econ. Psych. 12:4, pp.
689–706.
Pareto, Vilfredo. 1906 [1971]. Manual of Political
Economy. NY: Augustus M. Kelley.
Pazner, Elisha A., and David Schmeidler. 1978.
“Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept
of Economic Equity,” Quart. J. Econ. 92, pp. 671–87.
Posner, Richard A. 1981. The Economics of Justice.
Cambridge: Harvard U. Press.
Rabin, Matthew. 1993. “Incorporating Fairness into
Game Theory and Economics,” Amer. Econ. Rev.
83:5, pp. 1281–302.
Raphael, D.D. 1980. Justice and Liberty. London:
Athlone Press.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press.
Reiman, Jeffrey H. 1981. “The Possibility of a Marxian

dec03_Article 3 12/4/03 11:18 AM Page 1239

Konow: A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories
Theory of Justice,” Canadian J. Philosophy 7: Supp.,
pp. 307–22.
Roemer, John E. 1998. Equality of Opportunity.
Cambridge: Harvard U. Press.
Roth, Alvin E. 1995. “Introduction to Experimental
Economics,” in The Handbook of Experimental
Economics. John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds.
Princeton: Princeton U. Press, pp. 3–109.
Roth, Alvin E. and J. Keith Murnighan. 1982. “The
Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental
Study,” Econometrica 50:5, pp. 1123–42.
Roth, Alvin E.; Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro OkunoFujiwara and Shmuel Zamir. 1991. “Bargaining and
Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana,
Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study,”
Amer. Econ. Rev. 81:5, pp. 1068–95.
Rotter, Julian B. 1966. “Generalized Expectancies for
Internal versus External Control of Reinforcement,”
Psychological Monographs 80:1, p. 609.
Ruffle, Bradley J. 1998. “More Is Better, but Fair is
Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games,”
Games Econ. Behav. 23, pp. 247–65.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1950. “Evaluation of Real National
Income,” Oxford Econ. Papers 2, pp. 1–29.
Schokkaert, Erik. 1994. “The Economics of
Distributive Justice, Welfare and Freedom,” in
Justice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Klaus R.
Scherer, ed. Chippenham, Wiltshire, UK: Antony
Rowe Ltd, pp. 65–113.
Schokkaert, Erik and Bart Capeau. 1991.
“Interindividual Differences in Opinions about
Distributive Justice,” Kyklos 44:3, pp. 25–45.
Schokkaert, Erik and Leo Lagrou. 1983. “An Empirical
Approach to Distributive Justice,” J. Public Econ. 21,
pp. 33–52.
Schokkaert, Erik and Bert Overlaet. 1989. “Moral
Intuitions and Economic Models,” Social Choice
Welfare 6, pp. 19–31.
Scitovsky, Tibor. 1941. “A Note on Welfare
Propositions in Economics,” Rev. Econ. Stud. 9, pp.
77–88.
Scitovsky, Tibor. 1986. Human Desire and Economic
Satisfaction: Essays on the Frontiers of Economics.
NY: NYU Press.
Scott, John T.; Richard Matland, Philip Michelbach
and Brian Bornstein. 2001. “Just Deserts: An
Experimental Study of Distributive Justice Norms,”
Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 45:4, pp. 749–67.
Selten, Reinhard. 1978. “The Equity Principle in
Economic Behavior,” in Decision Theory and Social
Ethics; Issues in Social Choice. H. Gottinger and W.
Leinfellner, eds. Dordrecht: Reifel Pub., pp. 289–301.
Sen, Amartya. 1973 [1997]. On Economic Inequality,
Expanded Edition with a Substantial Annexe by
James E. Foster and Amartya Sen. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
———. 1979. “The Welfare Basis of Real Income
Comparisons: A Survey,” J. Econ. Lit. 17:1, pp. 1–45.
———. 1995. “Rationality and Social Choice,” Amer.
Econ. Rev. 85:1, pp. 1–24.
Shafir, Eldar, Peter Diamond, and Amos Tversky. 1997.
“Money Illusion,” Quart. J. Econ. 112:2, pp. 341–74.

1239

Shiller, Robert J.; Maxim Boycko and Vladimir
Korobov. 1991. “Popular Attitudes toward Free
Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States
Compared,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 81:3, pp. 385–400.
Skitka, Linda J. and Philip E. Tetlock. 1992. “Allocating
Scarce Resources: A Contingency Model of
Distributive Justice,” J. Exper. Social Psych. 28:6, pp.
491–522.
Skyrms, Brian. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract.
NY: Cambridge U. Press.
Slonim, Robert, and Alvin E. Roth. 1998. “Learning in
High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in
the Slovak Republic,” Econometrica 66:3, pp.
569–96.
Smith, Adam. 1759 [1809]. The Theory of Moral
Sentiments. Glasgow: R. Chapman.
Sulkin, Tracy and Adam Simon. 2001. “Habermas in
the Lab: A Study of Deliberation in an Experimental
Setting,” Polit. Psych. 22:4, pp. 809–26.
Thaler, Richard H. 1980. “Toward a Positive Theory of
Consumer Choice,” J. Econ. Behav. Org. 1, pp. 39–60.
Thibaut, John and Laurens Walker. 1978. “A Theory of
Procedure,” California Law Rev. 66, pp. 541–66.
Tucker, Robert C. 1969. The Marxian Revolutionary
Idea. NY: W.W. Norton.
Tyler, Tom R. and E. Allan Lind. 2000. “Procedural
Justice,” in Handbook of Justice Research in Law.
Joseph Sanders and V. Lee Hamilton, eds. NY:
Kluwer Academic/Plenum Pub., pp. 65–92.
Varian, Hal R. 1974. “Equity, Envy and Efficiency,” J.
Econ. Theory 9, pp. 63–91.
Walster, Elaine; G. William Walster and Ellen
Berscheid. 1973. “New Directions in Equity
Research,” J. Personal. Social Psych. 25:2, pp. 151–76.
———. 1978. Equity: Theory and Research. Boston,
London, Sydney, Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of
Pluralism and Equality. NY: Basic Books, Inc.
Weiner, Bernard; Irene Frieze, Andy Kukla, Linda
Reed, Stanley Rest and Robert M. Rosenbaum. 1971.
“Perceiving the Causes of Success and Failure,” in
Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.
Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Richard E.
Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Barbara Weiner, eds.
Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, pp.
95–120.
Weiner, Bernard and Andy Kukla. 1970. “An
Attributional Analysis of Achievement Motivation,”
J. Personal. Social Psych. 15:1, pp. 1–20.
Wood, Allen. 1981. Karl Marx. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Yaari, Menahem E. and Maya Bar-Hillel. 1984. “On
Dividing Justly,” Social Choice Welfare 1:1, pp. 1–24.
Young, Gary. 1981. “Doing Marx Justice,” Canadian J.
Philosophy 7:Supp., pp. 251–68.
Young, H. Peyton. 1994. Equity in Theory and
Practice. Princeton: Princeton U. Press.
Zajac, Edward E. 1985. “Perceived Economic Justice:
The Example of Public Utility Regulation,” in Cost
Allocation: Methods, Principles, Applications. H.
Peyton Young, ed. North-Holland: Elsevier Science
Pub. B.V, pp. 119–53.

This article has been cited by:
1. Lasse Loft, Dung Ngoc Le, Thuy Thu Pham, Anastasia Lucy Yang, Januarti Sinarra Tjajadi, Grace
Yee Wong. 2017. Whose Equity Matters? National to Local Equity Perceptions in Vietnam's Payments
for Forest Ecosystem Services Scheme. Ecological Economics 135, 164-175. [CrossRef]
2. Malte Dold, Menusch Khadjavi. 2017. Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences.
Games and Economic Behavior 102, 127-137. [CrossRef]
3. Hirofumi Takesue. 2017. Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm. Journal
of Theoretical Biology 416, 45-51. [CrossRef]
4. Inês Cosme, Rui Santos, Daniel W. O’Neill. 2017. Assessing the degrowth discourse: a review and
analysis of academic degrowth policy proposals. Journal of Cleaner Production . [CrossRef]
5. Qingyun Jiang, Lixian Qian, Min DingIntroduction to Fair Development in China 1-7. [CrossRef]
6. Lucas Bretschger. 2017. Equity and the convergence of nationally determined climate policies.
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 19:1, 1-14. [CrossRef]
7. Gianluca Grimalda, Anirban Kar, Eugenio Proto. 2016. Procedural fairness in lotteries assigning initial
roles in a dynamic setting. Experimental Economics 19:4, 819-841. [CrossRef]
8. Anita Gantner, Kristian Horn, Rudolf Kerschbamer. 2016. Fair and efficient division through
unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective. Journal of Economic Psychology 57, 56-73. [CrossRef]
9. Christian Pfeifer, Gesine Stephan, Matthias Dütsch, Olaf Struck. 2016. Do workers perceive high
wage settlements of craft unions as fair?. Applied Economics Letters 1-4. [CrossRef]
10. Anita Gantner, Rudolf Kerschbamer. 2016. Fairness and efficiency in a subjective claims problem.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 131, 21-36. [CrossRef]
11. Michele Lombardi, Kaname Miyagishima, Roberto Veneziani. 2016. Liberal Egalitarianism and the
Harm Principle. The Economic Journal 126:597, 2173-2196. [CrossRef]
12. Erik Schokkaert, Tom Truyts. 2016. Preferences for redistribution and social structure. Social Choice
and Welfare . [CrossRef]
13. Ismael Rodriguez-Lara. 2016. Equity and bargaining power in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 130, 144-165. [CrossRef]
14. Elena Cettolin, Arno Riedl. 2016. Justice Under Uncertainty. Management Science . [CrossRef]
15. Mark Sheskin, Nicolas Baumard. 2016. Switching Away from Utilitarianism: The Limited Role of
Utility Calculations in Moral Judgment. PLOS ONE 11:8, e0160084. [CrossRef]
16. Cynthia L. Gramm, John F. SchnellRemedy-Seeking Responses to Discrimination: Does
Management-Employee Similarity Matter? 69-103. [CrossRef]
17. Kerri Brick, Martine Visser, Zoe Van der Hoven. 2016. Cooperation and Climate Change: Can
Communication Facilitate the Provision of Public Goods in Heterogeneous Settings?. Environmental
and Resource Economics 64:3, 421-443. [CrossRef]
18. Torben M. Andersen, Marias H. Gestsson. 2016. LONGEVITY, GROWTH, AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY: THE DETERMINISTIC CASE. Macroeconomic Dynamics
20:04, 985-1021. [CrossRef]
19. Robert Akerlof. 2016. Anger and enforcement. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 126,
110-124. [CrossRef]

20. Li Yan, Xianchen ZhuImpact of “Horizontal—Vertical” social norms on performance behavior: Based
on a Simplified Trust Experiment 1-4. [CrossRef]
21. Sylvie Thoron. 2016. Morality Beyond Social Preferences: Smithian Sympathy, Social Neuroscience
and the Nature of Social Consciousness. OEconomia :6-2, 235-264. [CrossRef]
22. Jonas Colliander, Magnus Söderlund, Stefan Szugalski. 2016. Multi-level loyalty program rewards and
their effects on top-tier customers and second-tier customers. Journal of Consumer Marketing 33:3,
162-171. [CrossRef]
23. Antonino Galati, Maria Crescimanno, Luciano Gristina, Saskia Keesstra, Agata Novara. 2016. Actual
provision as an alternative criterion to improve the efficiency of payments for ecosystem services for C
sequestration in semiarid vineyards. Agricultural Systems 144, 58-64. [CrossRef]
24. Abigail Barr, Luis Miller, Paloma Ubeda. 2016. Moral consequences of becoming unemployed.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 201521250. [CrossRef]
25. Jared Rubin, Roman Sheremeta. 2016. Principal–Agent Settings with Random Shocks. Management
Science 62:4, 985-999. [CrossRef]
26. Gaute Torsvik. 2016. Workplace Productivity and Bonus Preferences: Why Do Men With Low
Productivity Prefer Individual Pay?. Economica . [CrossRef]
27. David C. Kingsley. 2016. Endowment heterogeneity and peer punishment in a public good experiment:
Cooperation and normative conflict. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 60, 49-61.
[CrossRef]
28. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Björn-Ola LinnérPrinciples and Best Practices for Climate Change Adaptation
136-161. [CrossRef]
29. Daniel Arenas, Pablo Rodrigo. 2016. On Firms and the Next Generations: Difficulties and Possibilities
for Business Ethics Inquiry. Journal of Business Ethics 133:1, 165-178. [CrossRef]
30. Erwin Ooghe, Andreas Peichl. 2015. Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control. The Economic
Journal 125:589, 2024-2051. [CrossRef]
31. Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino, Mariano Sigman. 2015. Conveniently Upset:
Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism. American Economic Review 105:11,
3416-3442. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
32. Athanasios Kampas. 2015. Combining fairness and stability concerns for global commons: The case
of East Atlantic and Mediterranean tuna. Ocean & Coastal Management 116, 414-422. [CrossRef]
33. Valérie Clément, Hélène Rey-Valette, Bénédicte Rulleau. 2015. Perceptions on equity and
responsibility in coastal zone policies. Ecological Economics 119, 284-291. [CrossRef]
34. Michalis Drouvelis, Nattavudh Powdthavee. 2015. Are happier people less judgmental of other people's
selfish behaviors? Experimental survey evidence from trust and gift exchange games. Journal of
Behavioral and Experimental Economics 58, 111-123. [CrossRef]
35. Pamela Jakiela. 2015. How fair shares compare: Experimental evidence from two cultures. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 118, 40-54. [CrossRef]
36. Smriti Sharma. 2015. Gender and distributional preferences: Experimental evidence from India.
Journal of Economic Psychology 50, 113-123. [CrossRef]

37. Fredrik Carlsson, Olof Johansson-Stenman, Pham Khanh Nam. 2015. Funding a new bridge in rural
Vietnam: a field experiment on social influence and default contributions. Oxford Economic Papers
67:4, 987-1014. [CrossRef]
38. Jeremiah Hurley. 2015. Reflecting on ‘Equity in health care: the Irish perspective’. Health Economics,
Policy and Law 10:04, 443-447. [CrossRef]
39. Zhicheng Phil Xu, Marco A. Palma. 2015. Consequential egalitarianism vs. accountability principle:
an experimental investigation. Applied Economics Letters 1-4. [CrossRef]
40. Jeremy Pitt, Dídac Busquets, Régis Riveret. 2015. The pursuit of computational justice in open
systems. AI & SOCIETY 30:3, 359-378. [CrossRef]
41. Jaime Hoogesteger, Philippus Wester. 2015. Intensive groundwater use and (in)equity: Processes and
governance challenges. Environmental Science & Policy 51, 117-124. [CrossRef]
42. Tanja Hennighausen, Friedrich Heinemann. 2015. Don't Tax Me? Determinants of Individual
Attitudes Toward Progressive Taxation. German Economic Review 16:3, 255-289. [CrossRef]
43. Arthur Schram, Gary Charness. 2015. Inducing Social Norms in Laboratory Allocation Choices.
Management Science 61:7, 1531-1546. [CrossRef]
44. Pedro Francés-Gómez, Lorenzo Sacconi, Marco Faillo. 2015. Experimental economics as a method
for normative business ethics. Business Ethics: A European Review 24, S41-S53. [CrossRef]
45. Magnus Söderlund, Jonas Colliander. 2015. Loyalty program rewards and their impact on perceived
justice, customer satisfaction, and repatronize intentions. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services
25, 47-57. [CrossRef]
46. Russell Cropanzano, Marion Fortin, Jessica F. KirkHow do We Know When We are Treated Fairly?
Justice Rules and Fairness Judgments 279-350. [CrossRef]
47. Shintaro Tamate. 2015. External Norms and Systematically Observed Norms. Japanese Economic
Review 66:2, 247-259. [CrossRef]
48. S. Debove, J.-B. Andre, N. Baumard. 2015. Partner choice creates fairness in humans. Proceedings of
the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 282:1808, 20150392-20150392. [CrossRef]
49. Dennie van Dolder, Martijn J. van den Assem, Colin F. Camerer, Richard H. Thaler. 2015. Standing
United or Falling Divided? High Stakes Bargaining in a TV Game Show. American Economic Review
105:5, 402-407. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
50. Clémence Moreau, Jean-Daniel Rinaudo, Patrice Garin. 2015. La justice sociale dans la construction
du jugement d’acceptabilité. Analyse des réactions d’agriculteurs face à différentes règles de partage de
l’eau souterraine. Économie rurale :346, 31-48. [CrossRef]
51. Utteeyo Dasgupta, Subha Mani. 2015. Only Mine or All Ours: Do Stronger Entitlements Affect
Altruistic Choices in the Household. World Development 67, 363-375. [CrossRef]
52. Yoram Amiel, Michele Bernasconi, Frank Cowell, Valentino Dardanoni. 2015. Do we value mobility?.
Social Choice and Welfare 44:2, 231-255. [CrossRef]
53. John E. Roemer, Alain TrannoyEquality of Opportunity 217-300. [CrossRef]
54. Rudolf Kerschbamer. 2015. The geometry of distributional preferences and a non-parametric
identification approach: The Equality Equivalence Test. European Economic Review 76, 85. [CrossRef]
55. Bernhard Kittel, Fabian Paetzel, Stefan Traub. 2015. Competition, Income Distribution, and the
Middle Class: An Experimental Study. Journal of Applied Mathematics 2015, 1-15. [CrossRef]

56. Ismael Rodriguez-Lara. 2015. An experimental study of gender differences in distributive justice.
Cuadernos de Economía 38:106, 27-36. [CrossRef]
57. Eric van Damme, Kenneth G. Binmore, Alvin E. Roth, Larry Samuelson, Eyal Winter, Gary E.
Bolton, Axel Ockenfels, Martin Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger, Uri Gneezy, Martin G. Kocher,
Matthias Sutter, Alan G. Sanfey, Hartmut Kliemt, Reinhard Selten, Rosemarie Nagel, Ofer H. Azar.
2014. How Werner Güth's ultimatum game shaped our understanding of social behavior. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 108, 292-318. [CrossRef]
58. Matthias Dütsch, Cathrin Gückelhorn, Gesine Stephan, Olaf Struck. 2014. Hohe
Gehaltssteigerungen durch Berufsgewerkschaften – Gerechtigkeitsbewertungen und Folgewirkungen.
KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 66:4, 517-548. [CrossRef]
59. Jeremy Pitt, Dídac Busquets, Sam Macbeth. 2014. Distributive Justice for Self-Organised CommonPool Resource Management. ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems 9:3, 1-39.
[CrossRef]
60. Magnus Söderlund, Veronica Liljander, Johanna Gummerus, Pia Hellman, Michaela Lipkin, EevaLiisa Oikarinen, Marianne Sepp, Karina T. Liljedal. 2014. Preferential treatment in the service
encounter. Journal of Service Management 25:4, 512-530. [CrossRef]
61. Steven Pressman. 2014. A Tax Reform That Falls Flat. Challenge 57:4, 82-102. [CrossRef]
62. Urs Fischbacher, Simeon Schudy, Sabrina Teyssier. 2014. Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity
in returns from public goods. Social Choice and Welfare 43:1, 195-217. [CrossRef]
63. Huan Zhang. 2014. Explaining the perceived justice of disaster relief policy: An empirical study based
on the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in China. International Journal of Social Welfare 23:2, 150-164.
[CrossRef]
64. Mita Giacomini, Jeremiah Hurley, Deirdre DeJean. 2014. Fair reckoning: a qualitative investigation
of responses to an economic health resource allocation survey. Health Expectations 17:2, 174-185.
[CrossRef]
65. Johannes Diederich, Timo Goeschl. 2014. Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and Its
Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence. Environmental and Resource Economics 57:3, 405-429.
[CrossRef]
66. Alexander W. Cappelen, Rune Jansen Hagen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden. 2014. Do NonEnforceable Contracts Matter? Evidence from an International Lab Experiment. Review of Income and
Wealth 60:1, 100-113. [CrossRef]
67. Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán González. 2014. Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma
of Consultative Participation. Management Science 60:3, 560-585. [CrossRef]
68. Timothy Mathews. 2014. Historical trends in the degree of federal income tax progressivity in the
United States. The Social Science Journal 51:1, 90-99. [CrossRef]
69. Fernando Aguiar, Antonio Gaitán, Blanca Rodríguez-LópezRobust Intuitions, Experimental Ethics,
and Experimental Economics: Bringing Reflective Equilibrium into the Lab 191-208. [CrossRef]
70. Gesine Stephan, Matthias Dütsch, Cathrin Gückelhorn, Olaf Struck. 2014. When are bonus payments
for managers perceived as fair? Results from a quasi-experiment. Economics Letters 125:1, 130.
[CrossRef]
71. Torben M. Andersen, Michael Svarer. 2014. The Role of Workfare in Striking a Balance between
Incentives and Insurance in the Labour Market. Economica 81:321, 86-116. [CrossRef]

72. Wlodzimierz Ogryczak, Hanan Luss, Michał Pióro, Dritan Nace, Artur Tomaszewski. 2014. Fair
Optimization and Networks: A Survey. Journal of Applied Mathematics 2014, 1-25. [CrossRef]
73. Stephan Wolf, Alexander LengerUtilitarianism, the Difference Principle, or Else? An Experimental
Analysis of the Impact of Social Immobility on the Democratic Election of Distributive Rules 94-111.
[CrossRef]
74. Michael Kidd, Aaron Nicholas, Birendra Rai. 2013. Tournament outcomes and prosocial behaviour.
Journal of Economic Psychology 39, 387-401. [CrossRef]
75. Ulf Narloch, Unai Pascual, Adam G. Drucker. 2013. How to achieve fairness in payments for
ecosystem services? Insights from agrobiodiversity conservation auctions. Land Use Policy 35, 107-118.
[CrossRef]
76. Melanie McDermott, Sango Mahanty, Kate Schreckenberg. 2013. Examining equity: A
multidimensional framework for assessing equity in payments for ecosystem services. Environmental
Science & Policy 33, 416-427. [CrossRef]
77. Lucas Bretschger. 2013. Climate policy and equity principles: fair burden sharing in a dynamic world.
Environment and Development Economics 18:05, 517-536. [CrossRef]
78. ROBERT J. OXOBY, JOHN SPRAGGON. 2013. A CLEAR AND PRESENT MINORITY:
HETEROGENEITY IN THE SOURCE OF ENDOWMENTS AND THE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC GOODS. Economic Inquiry 51:4, 2071-2082. [CrossRef]
79. David Gill, Victoria Prowse, Michael Vlassopoulos. 2013. Cheating in the workplace: An experimental
study of the impact of bonuses and productivity. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization .
[CrossRef]
80. Jonas Colliander, Anders Hauge Wien. 2013. Trash talk rebuffed: consumers' defense of companies
criticized in online communities. European Journal of Marketing 47:10, 1733-1757. [CrossRef]
81. Tim Reeskens, Wim van Oorschot. 2013. Equity, equality, or need? A study of popular preferences
for welfare redistribution principles across 24 European countries. Journal of European Public Policy
20:8, 1174-1195. [CrossRef]
82. Gerald Eisenkopf, Urs Fischbacher, Franziska Föllmi-Heusi. 2013. Unequal opportunities and
distributive justice. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93, 51-61. [CrossRef]
83. Rudolf Vetschera, Guenther Kainz. 2013. Do Self-Reported Strategies Match Actual Behavior in a
Social Preference Experiment?. Group Decision and Negotiation 22:5, 823-849. [CrossRef]
84. Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Maria Brockhaus, Guillaume Lescuyer. 2013. Assessment of the
Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equity of Benefit-Sharing Schemes under Large-Scale Agriculture:
Lessons from Land Fees in Cameroon. The European Journal of Development Research 25:4, 641-656.
[CrossRef]
85. Magnus Hoffmann, Martin Kolmar. 2013. Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests.
Economics Letters 120:2, 276-279. [CrossRef]
86. Jordi Honey-Rosés, Marc Menestrel, Daniel Arenas, Felix Rauschmayer, Julian Rode. 2013. Enriching
Intergenerational Decision-Making with Guided Visualization Exercises. Journal of Business Ethics .
[CrossRef]
87. Blanca Rodríguez López. 2013. Por qué ser justos. ¿Son las normas de justicia sociales o morales?.
Revista Internacional de Sociología, ahead of print. [CrossRef]

88. IWAO HIROSE. 2013. Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 25:02, 182-205.
[CrossRef]
89. Xavier Calsamiglia, Teresa Garcia-Milà, Therese J. McGuire. 2013. Tobin meets Oates: solidarity and
the optimal fiscal federal structure. International Tax and Public Finance 20:3, 450-473. [CrossRef]
90. A. T. Hayashi. 2013. Occasionally Libertarian: Experimental Evidence of Self-Serving Omission Bias.
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 29:3, 711-733. [CrossRef]
91. Robert J. Oxoby. 2013. Paretian dictators: constraining choice in a voluntary contribution game.
Constitutional Political Economy 24:2, 125-138. [CrossRef]
92. Alexander W. Cappelen, Karl O. Moene, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden. 2013. NEEDS
VERSUS ENTITLEMENTS-AN INTERNATIONAL FAIRNESS EXPERIMENT. Journal of the
European Economic Association 11:3, 574-598. [CrossRef]
93. Philipp Doerrenberg, Andreas Peichl. 2013. Progressive taxation and tax morale. Public Choice
155:3-4, 293-316. [CrossRef]
94. Torben M. Andersen. 2013. Intergenerational redistribution and risk sharing with changing longevity.
Journal of Economics . [CrossRef]
95. Sonia M. Goltz. 2013. A Behavior Analysis of Individuals' Use of the Fairness Heuristic When
Interacting With Groups and Organizations. Journal of Organizational Behavior Management 33:1,
5-30. [CrossRef]
96. Nicolas Baumard, Jean-Baptiste André, Dan Sperber. 2013. A mutualistic approach to morality: The
evolution of fairness by partner choice. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36:01, 59-78. [CrossRef]
97. James J. Angel, Douglas McCabe. 2013. Fairness in Financial Markets: The Case of High Frequency
Trading. Journal of Business Ethics 112:4, 585-595. [CrossRef]
98. Caleb A. Cox. 2013. Inequity aversion and advantage seeking with asymmetric competition. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 86, 121-136. [CrossRef]
99. Ben D'Exelle. 2013. Conflicting Views of Fairness in Aid Distribution: Evidence from Rural Nicaragua.
The European Journal of Development Research 25:1, 112-128. [CrossRef]
100. Ivo Bischoff,, Friedrich Heinemann,, Tanja Hennighausen,. 2013. What Makes Me See Inequality as
Just?. Schmollers Jahrbuch 133:1, 1-21. [CrossRef]
101. Ernesto Reuben, Arno Riedl. 2013. Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with
heterogeneous populations. Games and Economic Behavior 77:1, 122-137. [CrossRef]
102. Tom Clements, Hugo Rainey, Dara An, Vann Rours, Setha Tan, Sokha Thong, W.J. Sutherland,
E.J. Milner-Gulland. 2013. An evaluation of the effectiveness of a direct payment for biodiversity
conservation: The Bird Nest Protection Program in the Northern Plains of Cambodia. Biological
Conservation 157, 50-59. [CrossRef]
103. Jens Großer, Ernesto Reuben, Agnieszka Tymula. 2013. Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An
Experimental Study. American Journal of Political Science no-no. [CrossRef]
104. Steven Henry DungaFinancing Higher Education in Malawi: Prospects, Challenges and
Opportunities 184-213. [CrossRef]
105. Ana M. Franco-Watkins, Bryan D. Edwards, Roy E. Acuff. 2013. Effort and Fairness in Bargaining
Games. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 26:1, 79-90. [CrossRef]

106. Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Luis Moreno-Garrido. 2012. Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game
with Production. Games 3:4, 138-149. [CrossRef]
107. Chaim Fershtman,, Uri Gneezy,, John A. List. 2012. Equity Aversion: Social Norms and the Desire
to be Ahead. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4:4, 131-144. [Abstract] [View PDF article]
[PDF with links]
108. Linda J. Skitka, Daniel C. WisneskiJustice Theory and Research: A Social Functionalist Perspective .
[CrossRef]
109. Taryn Dinkelman, Vimal Ranchhod. 2012. Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an
informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa. Journal of Development Economics 99:1, 27-45.
[CrossRef]
110. Lars Schwettmann. 2012. Competing allocation principles: time for compromise?. Theory and
Decision 73:3, 357-380. [CrossRef]
111. Linda Kamas, Anne Preston. 2012. Distributive and reciprocal fairness: What can we learn from the
heterogeneity of social preferences?. Journal of Economic Psychology 33:3, 538-553. [CrossRef]
112. Luis Miller, Paloma Ubeda. 2012. Are women more sensitive to the decision-making context?. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 83:1, 98-104. [CrossRef]
113. Olof Johansson-Stenman. 2012. Are most people consequentialists?. Economics Letters 115:2,
225-228. [CrossRef]
114. Tim Reeskens, Wim van Oorschot. 2012. Disentangling the ‘New Liberal Dilemma’: On the relation
between general welfare redistribution preferences and welfare chauvinism. International Journal of
Comparative Sociology 53:2, 120-139. [CrossRef]
115. Víctor Corral Verdugo. 2012. The positive psychology of sustainability. Environment, Development
and Sustainability . [CrossRef]
116. Marlies Ahlert, Katja Funke, Lars Schwettmann. 2012. Thresholds, productivity, and context: an
experimental study on determinants of distributive behaviour. Social Choice and Welfare . [CrossRef]
117. Bernhard Kittel, Kamil MarcinkiewiczVoting Behavior and Political Institutions: An Overview of
Challenging Questions in Theory and Experimental Research 17-53. [CrossRef]
118. Jeffrey Moriarty. 2012. Justice in compensation: a defense. Business Ethics: A European Review 21:1,
64-76. [CrossRef]
119. Coralie Chevallier, Nicolas Baumard. 2012. What Goes Around Comes Around: The Evolutionary
Roots of the Belief in Immanent Justice. Journal of Cognition and Culture 12:1-2, 67-80. [CrossRef]
120. MAHER HASAN, JEMMA DRIDI. 2011. THE EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS
ON ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL BANKS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. Journal of
International Commerce, Economics and Policy 02:02, 163-200. [CrossRef]
121. Courtney Carothers. 2011. Equity and Access to Fishing Rights: Exploring the Community Quota
Program in the Gulf of Alaska. Human Organization 70:3, 213-223. [CrossRef]
122. Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, Luis Moreno-Garrido. 2011. Self-interest and fairness: self-serving choices
of justice principles. Experimental Economics . [CrossRef]
123. Brice Corgnet, Angela Sutan, Róbert F. Veszteg. 2011. My teammate, myself and I: Experimental
evidence on equity and equality norms. The Journal of Socio-Economics 40:4, 347-355. [CrossRef]

124. Barry Bozeman, Catherine P. Slade, Paul Hirsch. 2011. Inequity in the distribution of science and
technology outcomes: a conceptual model. Policy Sciences . [CrossRef]
125. Sascha L. Schmidt, Bruno S. Frey, David A. Savage, Benno Torgler. 2011. Auswirkungen von Macht
auf das Überleben in Extremsituationen: Ein Vergleich der Titanic und Lusitania Schiffskatastrophen.
KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 63:2, 237-254. [CrossRef]
126. J. A. Jungeilges, T. Theisen. 2011. State dependence in sequential equity judgements. Social Choice
and Welfare 37:1, 97-119. [CrossRef]
127. Kristoffer W. Eriksen, Ola Kvaløy, Trond E. Olsen. 2011. Tournaments with Prize-setting Agents*.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics no-no. [CrossRef]
128. Julian Rode, Marc Le Menestrel. 2011. The influence of decision power on distributive fairness.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization . [CrossRef]
129. Jean-Baptiste André, Nicolas Baumard. 2011. THE EVOLUTION OF FAIRNESS IN A
BIOLOGICAL MARKET. Evolution no-no. [CrossRef]
130. Timothy N. Cason, Lata Gangadharan, Nikos Nikiforakis. 2011. Can real-effort investments inhibit
the convergence of experimental markets?. International Journal of Industrial Organization 29:1,
97-103. [CrossRef]
131. Johannes Abeler, Steffen Altmann, Sebastian Kube, Matthias Wibral. 2010. GIFT EXCHANGE
AND WORKERS' FAIRNESS CONCERNS: WHEN EQUALITY IS UNFAIR 5. Journal of the
European Economic Association 8:6, 1299-1324. [CrossRef]
132. JONATHON LEIGH HOWARD. 2010. Managing for justice in community-based water planning:
a conceptual framework. Environmental Conservation 37:03, 356-363. [CrossRef]
133. Jeremiah Hurley, Neil J. Buckley, Katherine Cuff, Mita Giacomini, David Cameron. 2010. Judgments
regarding the fair division of goods: the impact of verbal versus quantitative descriptions of alternative
divisions. Social Choice and Welfare . [CrossRef]
134. Lars Schwettmann. 2010. Marc Fleurbaey: fairness, responsibility, and welfare. Social Choice and
Welfare . [CrossRef]
135. Christina M. Fong, Erzo F.P. Luttmer. 2010. Do fairness and race matter in generosity? Evidence from
a nationally representative charity experiment. Journal of Public Economics . [CrossRef]
136. Ed Hopkins,, Tatiana Kornienko. 2010. Which Inequality? The Inequality of Endowments versus the
Inequality of Rewards. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2:3, 106-137. [Abstract] [View
PDF article] [PDF with links]
137. Olof Johansson-Stenman, James Konow. 2010. Fair Air: Distributive Justice and Environmental
Economics. Environmental and Resource Economics 46:2, 147-166. [CrossRef]
138. James Konow. 2010. Mixed feelings: Theories of and evidence on giving. Journal of Public Economics
94:3-4, 279-297. [CrossRef]
139. Unai Pascual, Roldan Muradian, Luis C. Rodríguez, Anantha Duraiappah. 2010. Exploring the
links between equity and efficiency in payments for environmental services: A conceptual approach.
Ecological Economics 69:6, 1237-1244. [CrossRef]
140. John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay . [CrossRef]
141. Jemma Dridi, Maher Hasan. 2010. The Effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and Conventional
Banks: A Comparative Study. IMF Working Papers 10:201, 1. [CrossRef]

142. Luigi Mittone, Matteo Ploner. 2010. Asset legitimacy and distributive justice in the dictator game:
An experimental analysis. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making n/a-n/a. [CrossRef]
143. Alice Becker, Luis M. Miller. 2009. Promoting justice by treating people unequally: an experimental
study. Experimental Economics 12:4, 437-449. [CrossRef]
144. Kristof Bosmans, Erik Schokkaert. 2009. Equality preference in the claims problem: a questionnaire
study of cuts in earnings and pensions. Social Choice and Welfare 33:4, 533-557. [CrossRef]
145. Dorothea K. Herreiner, Clemens D. Puppe. 2009. Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division
Problems. Theory and Decision 67:1, 65-100. [CrossRef]
146. Michel Forsé, Maxime Parodi. 2009. Distributive justice: an ordering of priorities. A comparative
analysis of European opinions. International Review of Sociology 19:2, 205-225. [CrossRef]
147. Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson. 2009. Justice and Fairness in the Dictator Game. Southern Economic
Journal 76:1, 130-145. [CrossRef]
148. John T. Scott, Brian H. Bornstein. 2009. What's Fair in Foul Weather and Fair? Distributive Justice
across Different Allocation Contexts and Goods. The Journal of Politics 71:03, 831. [CrossRef]
149. James Konow. 2009. Is fairness in the eye of the beholder? An impartial spectator analysis of justice.
Social Choice and Welfare 33:1, 101-127. [CrossRef]
150. Alexander W. Cappelen, Bertil Tungodden. 2009. Rewarding effort. Economic Theory 39:3, 425-441.
[CrossRef]
151. Marijke C. Leliveld, Ilja van Beest, Eric van Dijk, Ann E. Tenbrunsel. 2009. Understanding the
influence of outcome valence in bargaining: A study on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45:3, 505-514. [CrossRef]
152. Ravit Hananel. 2009. Distributive Justice and Regional Planning: The Politics of Regional RevenueGenerating Land Uses in Israel. International Planning Studies 14:2, 177-199. [CrossRef]
153. Charles Raux, Stéphanie Souche, Yves Croissant. 2009. How fair is pricing perceived to be? An
empirical study. Public Choice 139:1-2, 227-240. [CrossRef]
154. Erik Schokkaert. 2009. CRITICAL NOTICE: MACROJUSTICE AS A RESEARCH
PROGRAMME. Economics and Philosophy 25:01, 69. [CrossRef]
155. Caterina Calsamiglia. 2009. DECENTRALIZING EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY.
International Economic Review 50:1, 273-290. [CrossRef]
156. Christian Pfeifer, Tatjana Sohr. 2008. Eine multivariate Szenarienanalyse zur
Gerechtigkeitswahrnehmung betriebsbedingter Kündigungen. Schmollers Jahrbuch 128:3, 381-404.
[CrossRef]
157. Olaf Struck, Christian Pfeifer, Alexandra Krause. 2008. Entlassungen: Gerechtigkeitsempfinden
und Folgewirkungen. KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 60:1, 106-126.
[CrossRef]
158. Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Reiner Eichenberger. 2008. Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments.
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 8:1. . [CrossRef]
159. Christine MathiesReference Points Beyond Price — Fairness Effects in Customer Choices 99-118.
[CrossRef]
160. Bertil TungoddenJustice (New Perspectives) 1-12. [CrossRef]

161. Christine Mathies, Siegfried Gudergan. 2007. Revenue management and customer centric marketing
— How do they influence travellers' choices?. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 6:4,
331-346. [CrossRef]
162. WULF GAERTNER, LARS SCHWETTMANN. 2007. Equity, Responsibility and the Cultural
Dimension. Economica 74:296, 627-649. [CrossRef]
163. Sven Fischer, Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull. 2007. Is there as-if bargaining?. The Journal of SocioEconomics 36:4, 546-560. [CrossRef]
164. Christian Pfeifer. 2007. The Perceived Fairness of Layoffs in Germany: Participation, Compensation,
or Avoidance?. Journal of Business Ethics 74:1, 25-36. [CrossRef]
165. Jeroen Stouten, David Cremer, Eric Dijk. 2007. Managing Equality in Social Dilemmas: Emotional
and Retributive Implications. Social Justice Research 20:1, 53-67. [CrossRef]
166. Christian Cordes, Christian Schubert. 2007. Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract.
Constitutional Political Economy 18:1, 35-62. [CrossRef]
167. Marco Grasso. 2007. A normative ethical framework in climate change. Climatic Change 81:3-4,
223-246. [CrossRef]
168. Felix Oberholzer-Gee. 2006. A Market for Time Fairness and Efficiency in Waiting Lines. Kyklos
59:3, 427-440. [CrossRef]
169. Dominique Demougin, Claude Fluet, Carsten Helm. 2006. Output and wages with inequality
averse agents. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'<html_ent glyph="@eacute;" ascii="e"/
>conomique 39:2, 399-413. [CrossRef]
170. Oscar De-Juan, Fabio Monsalve. 2006. Morally ruled behaviour: The neglected contribution of
Scholasticism *. European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 13:1, 99-112. [CrossRef]
171. James Konow. 2005. Blind Spots: The Effects of Information and Stakes on Fairness Bias and
Dispersion. Social Justice Research 18:4, 349-390. [CrossRef]
172. Simon Gächter, Arno Riedl. 2005. Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims.
Management Science 51:2, 249-263. [CrossRef]
173. Mary Ann Baily. 2004. Improving Fairness in Coverage Decisions: Appearance or Reality?. The
American Journal of Bioethics 4:3, 110-112. [CrossRef]
174. Ingvild AlmåsEqualizing income versus equalizing opportunity:a comparison of the United States and
Germany 129-156. [CrossRef]

